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My dissertation examines the impact of legal challenges to Affirmative Action in higher
education and the subsequent policy responses on the various aspects of educational be-
havior. The first chapter examines the impact of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decisions in
Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger on applications and admissions at the Univer-
sity of Michigan, an elite public institution. The second chapter investigates the effects of
Texas’s Top Ten Percent rule and targeted recruitment and financial aid programs on the
score report sending behavior of SAT takers in Texas. The third chapter examines how
the implementation of Texas’s Top Ten Percent Rule (TTTPR) affected the rate at which
graduates from Texas’s high schools attempt admissions examinations; the taking of an
admissions examination signifies that a student is interested in applying to more selective
institutions.
The modern Affirmative Action debate is not about general access to post-secondary
education; rather, it is about the use of race and ethnicity in determining access to elite
colleges and universities. As such, this dissertation is provides credible information for
researchers and policy makers as they consider this contentious issue.
The first chapter is entitled “The Impact of Legal Challenges to Affirmative Action on
Applications and Admissions at an Elite Public University”. In the summer of 2003, the
United States Supreme Court handed down decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter
v. Bollinger. Taken together the decisions accomplished two things: 1. The decision in
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Gratz v. Bollinger proscribed any system that mechanically assigns a fixed point value
to applicants for being a member of a particular racial/ethnic group. 2. The decision in
Grutter v. Bollinger reaffirmed Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke; that is, securing the benefits that flow from diversity is a sufficient
reason to allow for the use of narrowly-tailored policies designed to acquire the benefits.
The University of Michigan was a named defendant in the cases and the office of un-
dergraduate admissions was forced to change its admissions system. Using two data sets
provided the University, I estimate the impact of the changes on the pool of applicants,
the pool of admitted students, and the probability of admissions.
I find that the applicant pool changed after the Supreme Court decisions. The size of
the applicant pool declined. The proportion of whites and blacks in the applicant pool
declined. The academic quality of the applicant pool, as measured by average SAT scores
and ACT scores, increased. The average SAT scores and average ACT scores of black
applicants increased by the greatest amount. The average SAT scores and ACT scores
of admitted students increased; however, the increase in both measures was less than the
increase observed in the applicant pool.
Using a version of the selection index as a basis for comparing applicants and admits
from the periods before and after the Supreme Court’s decisions, I find that the conditional
probability of admissions did not decline appreciably for black applicants. I also find that
the advantage in the probability of admission that white applicants with relatively low
selection index scores enjoyed over Asian applicants with similar scores in the period before
the Supreme Court’s decisions declined.
The second chapter is entitled “Estimating the Responsiveness of College Applications
to the Likelihood of acceptance and Financial Assistance: Evidence from Texas”. The
Hopwood v. Texas decision in 1996 proscribed the use of race in both the admissions
decision and the decision to provide financial aid. Minority enrollment dropped precip-
itously at the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M-College Station. The Top
2
Ten Percent rule was signed into law in the Spring of 1997 to address the drops in mi-
nority enrollment. The Top Ten Percent Rule guarantees admissions to any public college
or university in Texas for graduates from Texas high school graduates who finish in top
decile of their graduating class and submit a completed application to a college within two
years of graduation. The University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M-College Station
also established programs that targeted poor high schools that hadn’t had many graduates
matriculate at the respective institutions and offered some of the graduates from these
high schools financial aid other support.
Since class rank plays such a important role in determining admissions, this paper
examines the impact of switching from admissions regimes where rank mattered somewhat
to a system where rank explicitly determines admission and this information is available
to all interested parties. This paper also examines the impact of the targeted recruitment
plans on the score report sending behavior of the targeted high schools. This paper is
not the first to consider these programs; however, I use methods to account for the bias
that results from non-random selection into treatment. Previous work examining these
programs did not account for the bias. I combine two data sources to obtain my estimates,
the student descriptive questionnaire data from all SAT test takers in Texas from 1996–2004
and information on public high schools in Texas from its Academic Excellence Indicator
System.
I find evidence that the score report sending behavior of students of different rank
changed compared to identically ranked students who applied under admissions regimes
where class rank wasn’t as important a determinant of college admission. I find evidence
that the students in schools that are eligible for the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
Program were more likely to send a score report to the University of Texas at Austin,
especially for students in the top decile, when compared to students from similar schools.
I find that the Century Scholars program was not as effective in inducing students to
submit score reports to Texas A&M-College Station.
3
The third chapter is entitled “The Impact of Colorblind Admissions on the Educational
Expectations of Texas High School Graduates”. This chapter considers the impact of
Texas’s Top Ten Percent Rule on the test-taking behavior of Texas’s high school grad-
uates. Initiated in response to the decision of Hopwood v. Texas, TTTPR guarantees
admission into any public college or university in Texas provided the student finishes in
the top decile of her class and submits a completed application to the college. I investigate
the impact of the policy on the percentage of graduates from different types of high schools
who attempt an admissions examination. The taking of an admissions examination is in-
terpreted as being the intent to apply to a more selective post-secondary institution. I find
a considerable decrease in the overall percentage of graduates who attempt an admissions
examination and that the decrease is larger at schools that are poor and have student
bodies that with relatively large percentages of Hispanic students.
4
CHAPTER II
The Impact of Legal Challenges to Affirmative Action on
Applications and Admissions of Disadvantaged Groups at an
Elite Public University
2.1 Introduction
Prior to the decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 23, 2003 in
Gratz v. Bollinger1 and Grutter v. Bollinger2, the University of Michigan used a selection
index to score applications. The selection index awarded a specific number of points for
certain characteristics—e.g., GPA and standardized test scores. The selection index was
proscribed because it mechanically awarded twenty points of the one hundred points needed
to guarantee admission to all under-represented minority groups.3
The University of Michigan was forced by the Court to change its undergraduate appli-
cation and admission processes in order to meet the new legal standards. The University
now uses a holistic review—in which the use of race in the admissions process conforms to
“strict scrutiny”4 —to make admissions decisions.
The University of Michigan is a selective public institution. The number of applicants it
receives each year far exceeds the number of available slots for freshmen. In order to craft
an incoming cohort, the admissions office must employ a method of ordering applications,
a way of determining which applicants are suitable for admission. I address the following
question: How does switching from the selection index to a “properly devised” admissions
1Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
2Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
3Under-represented minority groups include African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans applicants.
4Strict Scrutiny requires that two conditions are met: 1) The existence of a compelling interest to warrant treating
individuals differently. 2) The program used to further this interest must be “narrowly tailored” to accomplish its purpose.
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program affect the pool of applicants, the pool of admits, and admissions at an elite public
university?
The use of race in the admissions process remains a contentious issue. A ballot initiative
amending the State of Michigan’s constitution, Proposition 2, was placed on the November
2006 ballot and was approved by voters. It became law on December 22, 2006. With
the passing of Proposition 2, Michigan joins California, with its Proposition 209, and
Washington State, with its Initiative 200, as states that have banned public entities—
for example, public universities, school districts, and local governments—from granting
preferential treatment to groups or individuals based on race, gender, color, ethnicity, or
national origin. Nevertheless, there are many other states where the public institutions of
higher education still practice some form of affirmative action in the admissions process
that conform to Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger. In this paper, I focus on the
period prior to the ratification of Proposition Two, when the University of Michigan was
still able to use race in making admissions decisions.
This question has interesting policy implications. The relationship between post-secondary
education and wages has grown over time. Lemieux (2006) documents that the returns to
post-secondary education have nearly doubled between 1973 and 2005. There is evidence
that minority students benefit from attending a high quality postsecondary institution
(Dale and Krueger, 2002). The University of Michigan is one of a handful of elite public
institutions. As such, it is under a great deal more scrutiny than a comparable private
institution with respect to its admission policies.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Gratz v. Bollinger
Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, both of whom are natives of Michigan and Cau-
casian, applied to the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts
in 1995 and 1997, respectively. Upon being denied admission, they filed a class action
suit in the fall of 1997 that claimed that the University of Michigan’s use of race in the
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admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. §1981. The petitioners sought
compensatory and punitive damages for past violations, declaratory relief finding that the
respondents violated their rights to nondiscriminatory treatment, an injunction prohibiting
respondents from continuing to discriminate on the basis of race, and an order requiring
the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts to offer Patrick
Hamacher admission as a transfer student.5
The admissions guidelines used by the University of Michigan’s Office of Undergraduate
Admissions (OUA) changed several times during the litigation in this case. The District
Court determined that the admissions guidelines used by OUA from 1995 − 1998 was
functionally equivalent to a quota. This is in violation of Justice Powell’s principal opinion
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317. The District Court
granted the petitioners summary judgement in regards to the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate admissions programs for those years. The OUA began using the selection
index in 1998. The decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger addresses the legitimacy of the selection
index.
The Supreme Court found that the selection index is not narrowly tailored to achieve the
goal of securing the educational benefits that flow from having a diverse student body. In
effect, the twenty points allotted to every under-represented minority makes race a decisive
factor for virtually every minimally qualified under-represented minority applicant. The
selection index is not consistent with the principles espoused by Justice Powell whereby the
race of a particular applicant could be considered as one of many factors in the admissions
process without being decisive.
However, the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, the case brought against the law
school, held that a narrowly tailored use of race in a properly devised admissions system
designed to obtain the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not
5Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251− 252 (2003)
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prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, or 42
U.S.C. §1981.6
2.2.2 Grutter v. Bollinger
Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, had earned a 3.8 grade point average
and scored 161 on the Law School Admissions Test. After being denied admission to
the University of Michigan’s Law School (Law School), she filed suit, alleging that the
University of Michigan had discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. §1981.
The District Court decided that the Law School’s use of race as a factor in the admissions
process was unlawful. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
District Court. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell’s opinion in
California Board of Regents v. Bakke was binding precedent that established diversity as
a compelling state interest and that the Law School’s program was sufficiently narrowly
tailored as it mirrored the Harvard admissions program that Justice Powell put forth as
an appropriate model.
The Law School used a holistic review that evaluates each individual candidate based
on all of the information available in the file. The information that is considered includes
letters of recommendation, transcripts, a personal statement, and an essay that describes
how the candidate will contribute to both life at the Law School and diversity. The
law School’s review process required officials to look beyond grades and test scores and
to consider “soft-variables”—for example, the enthusiasm of the student’s recommenders,
the quality of the undergraduate institution, and the difficulty of the undergraduate cur-
riculum. The Law School did not classify diversity purely with respect to racial or ethnic
characteristics and it did not restrict the types of contributions to diversity that are eligible
to receive consideration in the admissions process.7
In deciding Grutter v. Bollinger, the United States Supreme Court held in a 5 − 4
6See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306− 307 (2003)
7Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306, 315− 316 (2003)
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decision that the pursuit of the benefits that flow from diversity comprises a compelling
state interest and that the Law School’s admissions program was sufficiently narrowly
tailored. Taken together, these two decisions mean that states have the choice of using
race as a means of furthering diversity provided that the specific admissions procedures
minimize the damage to groups who are treated less favorably.
The next three sections discuss the decision to apply to the University of Michigan, the
University’s role in the admissions decision, and the data that will be used in the analysis,
respectively. This is followed by a discussion of the results and the conclusion.
2.3 The Application Decision





Y es If PUM{
J(∼UM)∏
j=0
πj max[0 , UUM − Uj]} − CUM > 0
No Otherwise
J(∼ UM) is the number of schools in a student’s optimal choice set sans the University
of Michigan. Let PUM be the student’s subjective estimate of her own probability of
admission to the University of Michigan. The term πj represents the probability that
school j is the best school that admits the applicant. UUM is the utility she receives from
being admitted to the University of Michigan. Uj represents the utility the student receives
from attending school j. CUM is the total cost of applying to the University of Michigan;
this includes both pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs.
Card and Krueger (2004) derive this rule to characterize the set of schools that are
included in a student’s final choice set. I apply the decision rule to highlight the various
channels through which the changes at the University of Michigan impact the decision to
apply.
The decision rule is straightforward. The student applies if and only if the expected
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gain in being to admitted to the University of Michigan, the term in braces, multiplied
by her estimate of her probability of admission, PUM , exceeds the cost of applying to the
University of Michigan.
The Supreme Court decisions and the University of Michigan’s subsequent response
affect the components of the decision rule. An examination of how PUM , UUM , and CUM
are impacted by the changes yield insight into how the applicant pool under the holistic
review will be changed relative to the applicant pool under the point system regime.
Suppose there are two under-represented minority applicants who are alike in every re-
spect except that one applies for admission in 2003, while the other applies for admission
in 2004. How will PUM vary across the two regimes? Under the point system, an under-
represented applicant receives twenty points towards the one hundred points required for
admission. It is unclear how race factors into the computation of PUM for the applicant
who applies for admission in 2004. Given that the point system was struck down, perhaps
the applicant who applies in 2004 estimates that ethnic status has decreased in impor-
tance. This would lead to a decrease in PUM relative to the 2003 estimate. Under the
holistic review, the contribution of ethnic status towards admission varies from applicant
to applicant. Perhaps ethnic status matters more for applicants with low socioeconomic
status. This is not possible under the point system, because the contribution of race is
fixed. It is possible that our applicant concludes that race matters more than it would
have in 2003. If so, then the estimate of PUM by the 2004 applicant has increased relative
to the estimate of PUM by his 2003 analogue.
How is UUM impacted relative to the level that an applicant would have received prior
to 2004? The utility that students receive from attending the University of Michigan is
affected by the composition of the student body. Suppose there is a positive relationship
between campus diversity and UUM . If the student expects a decrease in diversity, then
the utility from matriculating at the University of Michigan has declined. Conversely,
an increase in diversity will increase UUM relative to the 2003 level ceteris paribus. The
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relationships reverse themselves if there is a negative relationship between diversity and
UUM .
UUM can be impacted by the changes at the University of Michigan even if the applicant
is indifferent to the level of campus diversity. The debate concerning affirmative action
heightens the tension on campus. If a student prefers a tranquil campus, then the tension
associated with the affirmative action debate lowers UUM . On the other hand, a student
may be indifferent with respect to the changes at the University of Michigan, but enjoys
being on a campus that actively engages in social discourse. If so, then UUM increases
relative to the level that a identical applicant would have expected prior to 2004. UUM is
also affected by the cost of attendance. If under-represented minority students thin that
the changes at the University will reduce the amount of funding that they receive, then
the attractiveness of the University declines.
CUM , the cost of applying to the University of Michigan, increases. Prior to 2003 the
University of Michigan required one 500 word essay and a counselor recommendation. The
application process now requires two 250 word essays, one 500 word essay, and recommen-
dations from both a counselor and a teacher. This raises the cost to students in terms of
the amount of time required to complete an application. However, the increase in CUM
is not uniform across all students. Potential applicants vary with respect to how onerous
they perceive the essays to be.
The model highlights what segments of the pool of potential applicants is likely to be
impacted by the changes. Marginal applicants, academically weaker students with low
PUM , are likely to be impacted by the changes. In particular, under-represented minority
applicants who are marginal are likely to be affected.
The additional costs of applying reduce the expected benefit for marginal students, and,
thus, we might expect the number of weaker students to decline. Exceptionally strong
students are also likely to be affected. Applicants with a set of schools that have expected
utilities that are comparable to the University of Michigan might reduce the rate at which
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they apply. For such an applicant, the University of Michigan doesn’t yield a sufficient
expected gain relative to his other options to offset the increased cost of application.
The aggregate impact of the changes at the University of Michigan on the pool of
applicants is theoretically ambiguous. It must be determined empirically.
2.4 The University
Bowen and Bok (1998) state that the fundamental goal of admissions at a selective
institution is to ensure that all admitted applicants are above a high academic thresh-
old. Despite the high academic requirements, selective institutions still have many more
applicants than there are available slots in an entering cohort. Bowen and Bok (1998) iden-
tify four reasonable considerations that admissions officers typically give weight in making
admissions decisions after imposing the academic quality constraint. The considerations
are:
• The first consideration is to admit an ample number of students who show promise
in excelling in their studies.
• The second consideration is to assemble a class of students with a wide diversity of
backgrounds, experiences, and talents.
• The third consideration is to attract students who seem especially likely to use their
education to make significant contributions to their chosen vocation or to the welfare
of society.
• The fourth consideration is to respect the importance of long-term institutional loy-
alties and traditions—for example, legacy admissions.
The four admissions considerations in conjunction with the high academic threshold
characterize the University of Michigan’s goal in making admissions decisions: to select a
set of students that are best suited to maximize both the educational and social experiences
that comprise an undergraduate education at the University of Michigan.
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The University of Michigan was forced to change the method it used to rank applicants.
This does not imply that it has changed its conception of the characteristics that an
optimal set of admitted students must possess. That is, I assume the University has stable
preferences with respect to the set of students that it deems worthy of admission. The
University has provided prima facie evidence that it is committed to its conception of
what constitutes an optimal class. The University of Michigan argued the case before the
Supreme Court; it spent a total of 10, 637, 976 dollars in defending its affirmative action
practices.8
2.4.1 Admissions Model
The Supreme Court cases addressed the process that the University used to determine
admissions and not the outcomes. The University was committed to the selection index.
They employed the system until forced to change. I infer from these facts that the Uni-
versity would adopt a system that was holistic in nature, but would produce admission
decisions that are very similar to the outcomes that would have emerged had the selection
index not been proscribed.
To fix ideas, consider a stringent point system with a clearly defined score that guaran-
teed admission. Let S∗ be the required score. If an applicant has a selection index score,
Si, that is greater than or equal to S
∗, then the probability of admission conditional on
Si is equal to one. The probability of admission given a selection index score that is less
than S∗ is zero. Under these assumptions, the graph of the probability of admission as a
function of the selection index score is a step function.
The selection index employed by the University was not a strict system. Under the
University’s selection index system, S∗ is equal to one hundred points. However, for
selection index scores less than one hundred points, the probability of admission is not
zero. Rather, the probability of admission conditional on an applicant’s selection index
score is an increasing function of the score. The graph of the probability of admission
8This figure was obtained from Lynette Kosky, senior department administrator and senior department paralegal for the
University of Michigan’s Office of the Vice-President and General Counsel.
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conditional on the selection index score as a function of the selection index score has an
S-shape.
I assume that the University’s holistic review produces a new admission rule is a noisier
version of the selection index score. That is, I assume they now use Ti = Si + ε, where,
for convenience, I assume that ε has a mean of zero and finite variance equal to σ2. The
probability of admission under the new rule is the probability that that Ti exceeds a certain
threshold. This simple model yields predictions about how the mapping from the selection
index score to the conditional probability of admission will change.
Assume that the applicant pool does not change. Under the new admissions regime, the
S-shaped graph of the conditional probability of admission as a function of the selection
index score will be flatter than the curve that would have emerged under the system that
the University used to practice. The intuition is as follows. For applicants with high
selection index scores—who would have gotten in automatically—the holistic review can
only hurt them. The probability of admission weakly declines for those students. For
applicants with low selection index scores, the holistic review can only help them. The
probability of admission weakly increases for such students. The combination of the two
changes, yields a conditional probability of admission schedule that is flatter.
Suppose the applicant pool declines in size and it is applicants with selection index
scores less than some value, So, who stop applying.The University of Michigan must admit
a certain number of students in order to function. If the reduction in the applicant pool
is sufficiently, then the University of Michigan will have to admit students that from the
weaker end of the distribution. The graph of the probability of admissions as a function
of the selection index score will have higher values for selection index scores less than So
relative to the curve that would have emerged had there been no changes at the University
of Michigan and coincide with the “no changes” curve for selection index score values
greater than So. If different segments of the potential pool of applicants are disparately
impacted by the changes at the University, then the shape of the changes in the probability
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of admission curves for the various segments will be different. For example, the decline
in applications may start at different values for blacks and whites. If the declines are
sufficiently large, then the probability of admissions schedules for blacks and whites will
change at different points. This theoretical outline provides a means of interpreting the
changes we observe in the conditional probability of admissions function.
2.5 Data
The data used in this analysis will come from two sources. The first data set—the
applicant data set—is a subset of a ninety percent random sample of all first-year freshman
applicants to the University of Michigan for the fall cohorts for the years 2000 – 2006. The
second data set—the admit data set—is a subset of a ninety percent random sample of the
first- year freshman applicants who were granted admission to the University of Michigan
for the fall cohorts for the years 2000 – 2006.
The applicant data set includes domestic applicants with a valid standardized test and
a non-zero high school grade point average.9,10 One of the goals of this paper is to analyze
the impact of the University of Michigan being forced to discontinue the use of the selection
index to determine admissions. The inclusion criteria I use guarantee that the applicants
were evaluated using the selection index or would have been evaluated using the selection
index had they applied during the period of time when it was in use.
The applicant data set includes a total of 106, 004 applicants. The data set includes
standardized test scores, recalculated high school grade point average11, the applicant’s
gender, the applicant’s state of residence, self-reported race or ethnicity, the year the
applicant applied, the applicant’s legacy status12 as well as high school level information
9Theodore Spencer, Associate Vice-Provost and Executive Director of the Office of Undergraduate Admissions, in an
email message sent on August 11, 2006, states that: ”international students are given a Grade Point Average in a different
way than the domestic students.” There were students who were granted admission with recorded Grade Point Averages of
zero. I was informed that the majority of admitted students with zero grade point averages are international students. The
process used to evaluate international students was not made available to me. However, the process for domestic students is
clearly defined.
10An email message from Diane Walton, an official with the University of Michigan’s Office of Undergraduate Admissions,
stated that an application must have a valid standardized test score to be considered for review. This email was received on
August 1, 2006
11Recalculated GPA is calculated from tenth and eleventh grade academic courses.
12Legacy status consists of having a parent, step-parent, grandparent, sibling, or spouse who attended the University of
Michigan as a degree seeking student.
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from both the Educational Testing Service and ACT.
The admit data set contains information on students who were offered admission to the
University of Michigan and, for comparability, meet the inclusion restrictions that I placed
on the applicant data set. The admit data set contains the records of 63, 155 admitted
students. The admit data set has the same measures as the applicant data set as well as
some additional information. The additional measures include the following: the admitted
student’s enrollment decision, financial aid information for students who decided to enroll,
a by-term measure of overall grade point average for enrolled students, the student’s grade
point average for a particular term for enrolled students, a by-term measure of the student’s
academic plan(student’s major and/or minor) for enrolled students, as well as information
on the attendance patterns of students who decided to accept admission to the University
of Michigan.
The confidentiality agreement does not allow me to match individuals across the two
data sets. However, I am allowed to make use of both data sets if the level of aggregation
is sufficient to mask the identity of individuals.
2.6 Methodology
2.6.1 Describing the Applicant Pool
In a previous section, I outlined a simple model that describes how the decision to apply
to the University of Michigan is affected by the changes in the admissions regime and the
events surrounding the changes. I do not observe sufficient information to empirically
model the application decision; I only observe the set of applicants who applied. However,
the model does offer some insight into how to interpret changes in the applicant pool.
I exploit the timing of the the decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger
to discern the impact on the applicant pool by comparing applicants who applied before the
Supreme Court Decisions with Applicants who applied afterwards. The comparisons are
useful if the following assumption hold: The applicant pool prior to the Supreme Court
cases serves as a counterfactual for how the applicant pool would have looked had the
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changes never occurred.
2.6.2 Describing the Admit Pool
The University of Michigan used a holistic review system to make admissions decisions
after the decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger. I compare the distribu-
tion of characteristics of students admitted under the selection index with the distribution
of characteristics of the pool of students admitted under the holistic review. The analysis
will describe how the pool of admitted students changed after the Supreme Court Decisions
relative to the pool of students who were admitted under the selection index regime.
The pool of admits is the result of series of complicated decisions and is directly depen-
dent on the pool of applicants. As such, one must be careful in drawing conclusions from
the descriptive analysis. Still, it is important to document the differences in the pool of
students who will shape the undergraduate educational experience. Examining the differ-
ences in the admit pool will offer some insight in the University of Michigan’s admissions
process, as the University strives to select the set of students to both maximize the edu-
cational experience offered by the University of Michigan and fulfill the social obligations
that the University faces as a public university. The simple model of admissions that I
outlined previously will aid in interpreting the changes in the pool of admitted students.
2.6.3 Admission Probabilities
The University of Michigan’s selection index has a maximum value of 150 points where
100 points usually guaranteed admissions. The selection index assigns a fixed number of
points for certain characteristics. For example, a SAT score greater than or equal to 1360
would earn an applicant 12 points; a recalculated high school grade point average of 2.0
would earn an applicant 40 points.13 The selection index is constructed as follows:




13A detailed description of how the selection score index is calculated is available from the author upon request.
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C is the set of characteristics that the University considers in the admissions process. Ic
is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if an applicant possesses characteristic
c; it assumes a value of zero otherwise. βc is the fixed point value that the University
assigns to characteristic c.
I am interested in discerning if switching from a mechanical point system to a system
that meets the guidelines of Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger affects the
probability of admission.
The conventional way of empirically determining the changes would be to use a regres-
sion framework with the outcome being a dummy variable that indicated whether or not
an applicant was admitted. With an appropriate set of covariates one could estimate the
impact of various characteristics—such as race and the admissions regime under which an
applicant applied—on the probability of admission. I do not have a data set that has both
the covariates and the outcome. In order to investigate the changes in the probability
of admission, I must use another method. In the paragraphs that follow, I describe the
method.
Suppose I generated a selection index score for each applicant and admit from the
periods before and after the change in the admissions regime sans the twenty points which
are allotted for being an under-represented minority. For a given selection index score
and a full census of each data set, the conditional probability of admission is equal to the
following:
P(Ai = 1|S) = P(S|Ai = 1)P (Ai = 1)P(S) (2.1)
The result in (2.1) follows from Bayes’ rule, where P(S|Ai = 1) is the probability
mass at selection index score S in the data set of admitted students, P(Ai = 1) is the
unconditional probability of a randomly drawn applicant being admitted, and P(S) is the
probability mass at selection index score S in the data set of applicants. With the true
data sets, the conditional probability of admission is a number; no estimation is required.
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The sample analogue of (2.1) is:
̂P(Ai = 1|S) =
̂P(S = |Ai = 1) ̂P(Ai = 1)
P̂(S)
(2.2)
If ̂P(S|Ai = 1), ̂P(Ai = 1), and ̂mathcalP (S) are consistent estimates of each of their
full sample analogues on the right hand side of equation 2.1, then ̂P(Ai = 1|S =) ap-
proaches P(Ai = 1|S =) in probability; that is, ̂P (Ai = 1|S) is a consistent estimator of
P(Ai = 1|S). The sample analogue of P(S|Ai = 1) is estimated from the data set of
admitted students. The sample analogue of P(Ai = 1) comes from both data sets, it is
merely the number of admits divided by the number of applicants. For the subgroups, it is
the number of the members of the subgroup in the admit data set divided by the number
of members of the subgroup in the applicant data set. The sample analogue of P(S) is
estimated from the applications data set.This approach can be readily modified to yield
estimates of the conditional probability of admission for a number of subgroups.14
I do not observe the full set of characteristics that are considered in constructing the
selection index. However, the quasi-selection index that I construct includes the following
characteristics: GPA, Standardized test score, Michigan residency, whether an applicant
is from an under-represented state, a limited measure for school strength, and alumni
relationships. These characteristics are weighted according to the schedule formerly used
by the University of Michigan.
The selection index employed by the University of Michigan had a maximum value of
150 points. My version of the selection index has a maximum value of 108 points. The
version of the selection index that I use does not include the following: points for the
strength of a students’ curriculum, points for the strength of an applicant’s high school,
points for the essay, points for personal achievement, points for leadership, and points
for the miscellaneous category. I do not include the points allotted to under-represented
14My estimate of the conditional probability of admissions depends on my estimate of P(S|Ai = 1) and P(S). I use Stata’s
kdensity function to generate the estimates. The estimates depend on the bandwidth selection. I use Stata’s default which is
to select the bandwidth that minimizes the mean integrated squared error as if the data were gaussian and a gaussian kernel
were being used.
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minorities, because I want to examine how under-represented minority status truly impacts
the probability of admission.
I categorize each applicant and admit by my version of the selection index score, race,
and period. I compute consistent estimates of the conditional probability of admissions
for a given selection index score, period, and race/ethnic category. For a given race and
selection index score combination, comparing the conditional probability of admissions
for applicants from before and after the Supreme Court decisions answers the following
question: What is the change in the probability of admission that can be attributed to
the new admissions regime and the changes at the University of Michigan given that the
applicants are, on average, observationally equivalent relevant to the metric that was used
to determine admissions from 2000− 2003?
2.6.4 Computing Confidence Intervals for the Conditional Probability of Admissions
I compute bootstrap-t confidence intervals (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) for my estimates
of the conditional probability of admission. I use a non-standard estimator. The bootstrap-
t methodology allows me to generate a “t” table that is suited to this particular sample
and estimator without making a normality assumption.
I employ an algorithm that is described in Horowitz (2001). The algorithm is as follows:
1. Sample the data set with replacement.
2. Estimate the conditional probabilities of admission and compute τ ∗ =
̂P∗(Ai=1|S)− ̂P0(Ai=1|S)
̂se(P∗(Ai=1|S))
where ̂P∗(Ai = 1|S) is the conditional probability of admissions for a randomly drawn
applicant with selection index score S from the bootstrapped sample, ̂P0(Ai = 1|S =)
is the conditional probability of admissions for a randomly drawn applicant with se-
lection index score S from the original sample, ̂se(P∗(Ai = 1|S)) is an estimate of
the standard error of the conditional probability of admissions for a randomly drawn
applicant with selection index score So from the bootstrapped sample.
3. Repeat steps one and two 1000 times.
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4. For a given selection index score, order the 1000 estimates of τ ∗ and select the twenty-
fifth and nine hundred seventy-fifth largest values. The ninety-five percent confidence
interval for the estimate of the conditional probability of admission for a given selec-
tion index score is :
( ̂P(Ai = 1|S)− τ ∗(1−α2 ) ∗ ̂se(P∗(Ai = 1|S)), ̂P(Ai = 1|S)− τ ∗(α2 ) ∗ ̂se(P∗(Ai = 1|S)))
I employ the delta method to generate my estimate of se( ̂P∗(Ai = 1|S). Recall (2.1) and
assume that P(Ai = 1) is fixed. A first order approximation of the variance of ̂P∗(Ai = 1|S)
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The terms V ar( ̂P(S|Ai = 1)), Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S)), and V ar(P̂(S)) are the approx-
imate variances of the probability of the selection score conditional on being admitted, the
covariance between the probability of the selection index taking on a particular value, S,
conditional on being admitted and the probability of observing selection index score S
in the applications data set, and the variance of the estimate of the probability mass of
observing selection index score S in the applications data set. In the remainder of the
subsection, I detail how I estimate the components of the variance-covariance matrix of
the conditional probability of admission that I require to produce the confidence intervals.
I apply the following formula from Silverman (1986, pg. 40) to generate estimates of
the variances of ̂P(S|A = 1) and P̂(S)).
V ar(P̂(S)) ≈ n−1h−1P̂(S)
∫
(K(t))2 dt (2.4)
In this application, K(t) is the Epanechnikov kernel, n is the number of applicants or





















I also require an estimate of Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S)) to estimate ̂se(P∗(Ai = 1|S)).
Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S)) measures the extent to which the fraction of students of a given
selection score in the complete applicant data set covaries with the fraction of students with
the same selection score in the admit data set. The random sampling and the law of total
probability indicates that Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S))is equal to the following expression.15
P̂(S) = .9 ̂P(S|A = 1) ̂P(A = 1) + .9 ̂P(S|A = 0) ̂P(A = 0) (2.6)
Recall that P̂(S) is the estimate of the probability of observing a particular selection
index score, S, in the applications data set. Equation (2.6) reflects the fact that the
applications data set consists of applicants who will be admitted and applicants who will
be denied admission.
By substituting the right hand side equation (2.6) for P̂(S) in Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S))
and applying the bilinearity property of the covariance, Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S))can be
shown to equal the following expression:
(.9)2 ̂P(A = 1)V ar( ̂P(S|A = 1)) + (.9)2 ̂P(A = 0)Cov( ̂P(S|A = 0), ̂P(S|A = 0)) (2.7)
Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S)) measures the extent to which the fraction of students of a given
selection score in the complete applicant data set covaries with the fraction of students
with the same selection score in the admit data set. It does not appear that the sign of
Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S)) is knowable, in general. The reason for the uncertainty about
the sign comes from the term Cov( ̂P(S|A = 1), ̂P(S|A = 0)). Determining the sign of
Cov( ̂P(S|A = 1), ̂P(S|A = 0)) requires knowledge of the set of students who are rejected,
a set of students who I don’t observe.
15In deriving the analytic expressions, I elide the distinction between whether the data set is the full population or a single
instantiation from a superpopulation.
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I assume that Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S)) is zero. This is true in the case where I have
a full census of the data sets. In this case, the probabilities are the true values of P(S)
and P(S|A = 1) which are fixed numbers; the covariance is zero by definition. However,
for most “realistic” cases I have been able to study Cov( ̂P(S|Ai = 1), P̂(S)) appears to
be positive.
2.7 Implications of Sampling
The random sampling is the sole reason that I have to estimate the probabilities. The
data sets that I have are the results of two independent random samples. This implies
that the following configurations are possible: 1. Observations that appear in both data
sets. 2. Observations that appear in the applications data set but not in the admissions
data set. 3. Observations that do not appear in the applications data set but appear in
the admit data set. 4. Observations that don’t appear in either data set.
To see how the sampling affects the estimates of the conditional probabilities and con-
fidence intervals, consider the following extreme example. Suppose that applicants with
a particular selection index score, S0 didn’t appear in either data set. How would the
conditional probability for a different score S1 be affected? The estimate of the conditional
probability of admission depends on the likelihood of observing S1 in the applicant data
set in the denominator and the likelihood of observing S1 in the admit data set in the
numerator. Not observing S0 implies that the estimates of the probabilities of observing
S1 in both data sets are biased and, therefore, the estimate of the conditional probability
of admission given a score of S1 is biased. The estimate of the standard error also depends
on the estimated probabilities of observing S1 in both data sets; the omission of S0 also
produces biased estimates of the components of the standard errors.
Given that I have a single random sample of applicants and admits, my estimates,
therefore, are sensitive to the vagaries of my particular samples. The severity of the




2.8.1 Changes in the Applicant Pool
Figure 2.1 is a graph of the total number of applicants by race/ethnicity for each year
in the data set. The time series of the level of applicants across the four race/ethnicity
categories were increasing at a modest rate in the years prior to the Supreme Court de-
cisions in 2003. However, there are sharp declines in the total number of applications for
whites, blacks, and Hispanics in 2004, the first cohort that applied under the University of
Michigan’s holistic review.
The scale of Figure 2.1 makes it difficult to detect changes in the numbers of appli-
cants. To alleviate this problem, Figure 2.2 graphs the percent change in admissions by
race/ethnicity for each year relative to the level of applications received in the year 2000,
the first year in the data set. Applications from Hispanic and Asian students were in-
creasing in the period prior to the Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger decisions;
whereas, the applications from whites and blacks remained close to their 2000 levels. In
2004, each of the racial/ethnic categories had applications decline by at least 19 percentage
points relative to the 2003 levels. Application levels increased increased in 2005. As of
2005, the application levels for the four racial/ethnic categories applicants remain below
the levels obtained prior to 2003.
Table 2.1 demonstrates that the academic quality of applicants—as measured by average
standardized test scores and average GPA— were increasing at a modest rate in the period
prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions. Table 1 shows that the changes are relatively
smooth and that the applicants in each of the cohorts prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions
are fairly similar to one another.
The timing of the changes in the level of applications is consistent with the idea that
the Supreme Court’s decisions and the subsequent changes at the University of Michigan
affect the applicant pool. The Supreme Court Decisions and the events that followed likely
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impacted the average academic quality—as measured by standardized test scores and grade
point averages—of students who now decide to apply to the University of Michigan.
Table 2.2 contains descriptive statistics from the sample of applicants. The average
SAT score rose by 20.16 points in the period following the Supreme Court Decisions. This
is roughly 14 percent of the standard deviation of the average SAT score for the applicants
in the period prior to the Supreme Court Decisions. The average ACT score increased
by .6 points which is 15 percent of the standard deviation of the average ACT score in
the period prior to the Supreme Court Decisions. There is little difference in the average
grade point average, gender composition, and the percentage of applicants that are in-state
across the two periods.
The proportion of the applicant pool that is black declined fell from .070 to .058, a 17
percent decline relative to the proportion of the applicant pool that was black in the period
prior to the Supreme Court changes. The proportion of the applicant pool that is Hispanic
increased by .003, from .035 to .038, a 8.6 percent increase relative to the proportion of
the applicant pool that is Hispanic in the period prior to the Supreme Court decisions.
The proportion of the applicant pool that identifies as being of Asian decent increased by
.004 or 2 percent of the proportion of the pool of applicants that was Asian prior to the
Supreme Court Decisions. Interestingly, the proportion of the applicant pool that identifies
as being white declined by .018 or 1.8 percentage points..
Table 2.3 examines the means and differences of standardized test scores and grade point
averages of applicants by race/ethnicity for the periods before and after the Supreme Court
decisions. The average SAT score and average ACT score of white applicants increased by
16.76 points, 13 percent of the standard deviation of the before-decisions white SAT score,
and .430 points, 13 percent of the standard deviation of the before-decisions white ACT
score, respectively. In the after-decisions period, the average SAT score and average ACT
score of black applicants increased by 27.74 points, 16 percent of the standard deviation of
the before-decisions black SAT score, and .982 points, 24 percent of the standard deviation
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of the before-decisions black ACT scores, respectively. The average SAT score and average
ACT score of Hispanic applicants increased by 17.83 points, 12 percent of the standard
deviation of the before-decisions Hispanic SAT score, and .577 points, 15 percent of the
standard deviation of the before-decisions Hispanic ACT score, respectively.The average
SAT score and average ACT score of Asian applicants increased by 24.14 points, 18 percent
of the standard deviation of the before-decisions Asian SAT score, and .612 points, 17
percent of the standard deviation of the before-decisions Asian ACT score, respectively.
The changes in the average GPA was small for all race/ethnic categories. I focus on
the changes in standardized test scores. The quality of the applicant pool, as measured
by the mean of standardized test scores, has increased across the four race/ethnic cat-
egories. However, the mean and standard deviation offer limited information about the
underlying distribution. I graph the distributions of SAT scores and ACT scores for the
four race/ethnic categories from the periods before and after the Supreme Court decisions.
The results are striking. Figure 2.3 shows the distributions of SAT scores for black
applicants from before and after the Supreme Court decisions.The distribution of scores
for the period after the Supreme Court decisions shows a drastic decrease in the mass of
applicants who score less than 1000 on the SAT relative to the distribution of scores for
the period prior to the Supreme Court decisions. In fact, the likelihood of observing a
black applicant with a SAT score of less than 1000 declines by 6.4 percentage points from
25.3 percent to 18.9 percent.
Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5, and Figure 2.6 show the before-decisions and after-decisions
distributions of SAT scores of white applicants, Hispanic applicants, and Asian applicants,
respectively. There are slight differences in the distributions. For example, the distribution
of Asian applicants for the period after the decisions shows more mass in the right tail,
and there are differences in the SAT distributions for Hispanic applicants near the modal
values. The overall shape of the distributions for white applicants and Asian applicants
is remarkably stable. The distributions of SAT scores for the under-represented minority
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groups, blacks and Hispanics, appear to change more than the distributions of both white
and Asian Applicants.
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show that the application levels declined for the four race/ethnic
categories. The stability of the distributions for white applicants, Hispanic applicants, and
Asian applicants indicate that, on average, for these groups the reduction in applicants was
uniform across the distribution of SAT scores. However, for black applicants the reduction
was relatively large with respect to the level of applicants with SAT scores less than a
1000. I infer from these changes that blacks with relatively low SAT scores are less likely
to apply.
Figure 2.7 displays the distribution of ACT scores for black applicants for the periods
before and after the Supreme Court decisions. The distributions have similar shapes;
however, the distribution of ACT scores for black applicants in the period following the
decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger is clearly to the right of the
distribution of ACT scores for black applicants from the period prior to the Supreme
Court decisions. This pattern—where the distributions of ACT scores for the period
following the decisions have shapes that are similar to the distributions in the period prior
to the Supreme Court decisions but are shifted to the right—manifests for each race/ethnic
category I consider. Figure 2.8, Figure 2.9, and Figure 2.10 graph the distributions for
white applicants, Hispanic applicants, and Asian applicants, respectively. The shapes of
the distribution of ACT scores for black and Hispanic applicants do not change as much
between periods as do the shapes of the analogous SAT distributions.
The University of Michigan is a public university; its primary mission is to educate the
residents of the state of Michigan. State of residence is an important consideration. Table
2.4 contains the means and differences of standardized test scores and grade point averages
by race/ethnicicty, Michigan residency, and cohort membership for the periods before and
after the Supreme Court Decisions.
Table 2.4 reveals some interesting patterns. With respect to standardized test scores,
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out-of-state students score higher than their in-state counterparts regardless of the period.
The standardized test score averages of applicants from the period following the Supreme
Court decisions are higher than averages for students from the period prior to the decisions.
These facts hold for all race/ethnic categories.
The residency differences in average SAT score and Average ACT score are largest
for black and white applicants. Black and Asian applicants show the largest between
cohort differences with respect to SAT scores. In-state black applicants and in-state Asian
applicants show the largest between-cohort difference in the average ACT score.
Taking the between-cohort difference in the residency differences measures how the gap
between in-state and out-of-state students has changed across the periods. For example,
the gap in average SAT scores between in-state white applicants and out-of-state white ap-
plicants has grown by 11.67 points. For black applicants, the gap decreased by 3.18 points,
a very small change. The gap in average ACT scores between in-state black applicants
and out-of-state black applicants decreased by .78 points or 18 percent of the standard
deviation of black applicants in the period prior to the Supreme Court decision.
Average GPA is the one category in which in-state students actually perform better
than out-of-state students. Moreover, this gap increased between cohorts. However, the
changes are very small.
The applicant pool changed after the Supreme Court decisions. In particular, the dis-
tribution of black applicants changed. The arguments for the use of race in the admissions
process focused on the “points” that under-represented minorities the point received for
admissions. This is especially true for black applicants. If black applicants perceived that
the events at the University of Michigan would negatively affect the probability of admis-
sion or reduce the benefit of the educational experience, then they may have responded by
not applying.
However, the applicant pool, in both periods, consists of strong students. With re-
spect to ACT scores, for example, the average ACT score of each race/ethnic category
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bests the national average for the same race/ethnic category by at least six points, which
is approximately 1.2 times the standard deviation of all ACT test takers (see Table 8).
The descriptive analysis suggests that the quality of the applicant pool as measured by
standardized test scores has increased.
Application levels dropped across the four race/ethnicity categories that I consider. One
explanation for this decline is the increase cost of application. The increase in the cost of
applying matters more for students for applicants who are marginal with respect to the
probability of admissions. As blacks have the lowest academic scores, a larger percentage
of blacks are both likely to be marginal and to respond by not applying. The decline in
the number of applicants across race/ethnicity categories implies that the cost of acquiring
information pertinent to admissions under the new regime is not borne solely by one group.
2.8.2 Changes in the Admit Pool
Figure 2.11 is a graph of the total number of admits by race/ethnicity for each year in the
data set. The number of black admits declined steadily in the period prior to the decisions
in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger. The number of white admits declined
from 2000 to 2002 and rose in 2003, the year before the change in the admissions regime.
The number of white admits remained close to the 2003 level in the period following the
Supreme Court Decisions. The number of Asian admits declined from 2000 to 2002, rose
in 2003, and remained close to the level obtained in 2003. The number of Hispanic admits
appeared to be relatively stable across periods.
The scale of Figure 2.11 makes it difficult to detect the magnitude of the changes in the
level of domestic admits. Figure 2.12 graphs the percent change in the number of admits
relative to the year 2000. The downward trend in the level of black admits is evident. In
the period prior to the Supreme Court decisions the number of black admits declined by
more than ten percent relative to the number of black applicants admitted in the year 2000.
The number of black admits declined by more than fifteen percentage points in 2004, the
first year of the holistic review. White admits declined from 2000 to 2002, rose in 2003, and
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maintained levels comparable to the levels admitted in 2003. The level of white admits
remained above the levels obtained in 2000. Asian admits followed a temporal pattern
similar to that of white admits. As of 2005, Asian admits exceeded the level obtained in
2003. Hispanic admits experienced a sharp increase in 2002, a decline in 2003, and an even
steeper decline in 2004, returning to the level of Hispanics applicants admitted in the year
2000. The number of applicants admitted declined for all race/ethnic categories in 2004,
with blacks and Hispanics experiencing the largest percentage point declines. The number
of admits rose for the four race/ethnic categories I consider; however, blacks are the only
group with the level of admitted applicants below the level obtained in the year 2000.
Table 2.5 contains descriptive statistics from the sample of admits. The average SAT
score of admitted students rose by 17.67 points, 13.5 percent of the standard deviation
of average SAT scores for students admitted in the period prior to the decisions in Gratz
v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger. The average ACT score rose by .44 points, 12.3
percent of the standard deviation of the average ACT scores for students admitted in the
period prior to the Supreme Court decisions.
The composition of the pool of admitted students changed substantially. The percentage
of the admitted applicants that is male increased by .02 percentage points. The percentage
of Michigan residents in the admit pool declined by 2.6 percentage points. The proportion
of the pool of admitted students that is white decreased from .687 to .648, a 5.7 percent
increase. The proportion of the pool of admitted applicants that is black decreased from
.089 to .055 , a 38.2 percent decline. The proportion of the pool of admitted applicants
that is Hispanic increased from .034 to .065 , a 91.2 percent increase relative to the value
obtained in the period prior to the change in the admissions regime. The proportion of
the pool of admitted applicants that is Asian increased from .102 to .127 percent, a 24.5
percent increase.
The primary goal of admissions is to admit a class with sufficient academic potential.
Table 2.6 contains the within-period means and between-period differences by race/ethnic
30
category of the SAT, the ACT, and GPA, the variables used by admissions officers to gauge
academic potential. Examining Table 2.6 allows me to look for differences in the academic
quality of the admitted students.
Table 2.6 reveals significant heterogeneity in standardized test scores and GPA across
both time and race/ethnic categorization. For example, the average SAT scores of black,
Hispanic, and Asian admitted applicants declined by 11.01 points, 69.55 points, and 7.00
points, respectively, while the scores of white admitted applicants increased by 31.70 points.
The average ACT scores of black, Hispanic, and Asian admitted applicants increased by
.76 points, .65 points, and .56 points, respectively, while the average ACT score of white
admitted applicants fell by a statistically insignificant and small .04 points. The average
GPA increased by .02 points, .03 points, and .06 points for white, black, and Hispanic
admitted applicants, respectively, while the average GPA of admitted Asian applicants
increased by .06 points. Although the increases in average GPA are statistically significant,
they are substantively small.
Comparing Table 2.6 with Table 2.3 reveals some interesting facts. Average SAT scores
increased for the four racial/ethnic groupings. However, the average SAT scores for black
and Hispanic admits declined. The average ACT score of white applicants increased, while
the average ACT score of white admits remain virtually unchanged.
Table 2.6 presented the means and differences across both time and race/ethnic cat-
egorization. The mean is only one aspect of the distribution. Figure 2.13 - Figure 2.20
present the entire distribution of SAT and ACT scores across both time and race/ethnic
categorization.
Figure 2.13 contains the distributions of SAT scores for blacks that were granted ad-
mission for the periods before and after the Supreme Court decisions. The distributions
are quite different. The distribution of SAT scores of black admits for the period after
the Supreme Court decision has relatively more mass for SAT scores below 1000 points
and for SAT scores above 1500 points. Figure 2.14 presents the distribution of SAT scores
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for white admits. The distribution of scores for whites admitted after the Supreme Court
decisions has relatively more mass for scores greater than 1400 points.
Figure 2.15 presents the distribution of SAT scores for Hispanic admits from the periods
before and after the Supreme Court decisions. There are drastic changes in the distribu-
tions over time. There is the appearance of a huge spike at approximately 1100 points in
the distribution of SAT scores for Hispanic applicants admitted after the decisions.16 The
distribution of SAT scores for Hispanic admits in the after-decisions period has relatively
more of its mass in the tails of the distribution. Figure 2.16 contains the distributions of
SAT scores for Asian admits. Both distributions contain relatively large spikes; however,
for the distribution of scores after the Supreme Court decisions, the spike is to the left of
1400 points; it is to the right of 1400 points for the distribution of SAT scores from the
period before the Supreme Court decisions.
Figure 2.17 contains estimates of the density of ACT scores for blacks admitted before
and after the Supreme Court’s decisions. The distribution of ACT scores for admitted
blacks after the Supreme Court decisions has relatively more mass for scores greater than
19 points. Figure 2.18 contains the graphs of ACT scores white admits. The shapes of
the distributions are remarkably similar. The distribution of ACT scores for white admits
is nearly a mean preserving compression of the distribution of ACT scores for whites who
were admitted in the period prior to the the Supreme Court decisions.
Figure 2.19 contains the distribution of ACT scores for Hispanic admits. The distri-
bution of ACT scores for Hispanics who were granted admission after the Supreme Court
decisions has relatively more mass for scores greater than 25 points. For extremely high
scores in excess of 34 points, the distribution of ACT scores for Hispanics who were admit-
ted prior to the decisions has slightly more mass. Figure 2.20 displays the distributions of
ACT scores for Asian applicants who were granted admission. The change in the distribu-
16There is a discrepancy in the admit data for out-of-state Hispanic students. The data set has 933 out-of-state Hispanic
students admitted in 2005. This far exceeds the numbers reported by the the University of Michigan’s Office of Undergraduate
Admissions. As out-of-state students are more likely to take the ACT, this explains the strange result for the distribution of
SAT scores for Hispanic students after the Supreme Court’s decisions. This anomaly precludes me from doing analyzing the
admissions probabilities of Hispanic students.
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tions is similar to the changes in the distribution for blacks and Hispanics. The distribution
for the period following the Supreme Court’s decision has relatively more mass on higher
ACT scores.
The University of Michigan is a public institution. As such, the University of Michigan
gives special consideration to applicants from Michigan.17 Table 2.7 contains the means
and differences of standardized test scores and grade point averages by race/ethnicicty,
Michigan residency, and cohort membership for the periods before and after the Supreme
Court’s decisions.
Out-of-state admits have higher standardized test scores relative to their in-state coun-
terparts; the difference in standardized test-scores between out-of-state admits and in-state
admits holds for all race/ethnic and cohort categories with the exception of Hispanics who
were admitted after the Supreme Court’s decisions. This occurrence should be discounted,
however, given the discrepancy in the data.
Although out-of-state students have higher standardized across the board, there were
striking changes in the relative standing of in-state students relative to out-of-state students
for the periods before and after the Supreme Court’s decisions. The average SAT score
of in-state white admits rose by nearly 3 points, from approximately 1297 points to 1300
points. The average SAT score for out-of-state white admits rose by more than 43 points,
from 1318.14 points to 1351.83. The difference in the between-cohort differences between
the average SAT score out-of-state white admits and the average SAT score of in-state
white admits increased by more than 40 points. The gap in the average SAT score between
in-state white admits and out-of-state white admits nearly tripled in magnitude.
For black admits, the inter-temporal pattern reverses relative to white admits. For
in-state black admits, the average SAT score rose by more than 34 points, from 1092.95
points to 1127.02 points. For out-of-state admits, the average SAT score fell by nearly 36
points, from 1231.65 to 1195.73. The difference in the between-cohort differences between
17In testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Higher Education Appropriations on April 29, 2005, Mary Sue Coleman,
President of the University of Michigan, states, “ students who hail from Michigan get far greater access to admission than
the sheer number of applications would indicate.”
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the average SAT score out-of-state black admits and the average SAT score of in-state
black admits increased by nearly 70 points, which is more than half of the gap in average
SAT scores between in-state black admits and out-of-state black admits in the period prior
to the Supreme Court’s decision.
The average SAT scores of Asian admits followed an inter-temporal pattern that is
similar to black admits. For in-state Asian admits, the average SAT score rose by 17.30
points, while the average SAT score out-of-state Asian admits fell by nearly 23 points. The
difference in the between-cohort differences between the average SAT score of out-of-state
Asian admits and the average SAT score of in-state Asian admits decreased by more than
40 points.
The average ACT scores of in-state white admits rose by .12 points, while the average
ACT score of out-of-state white admits fell by a quarter of a point. The difference in the
between-cohort differences between the average ACT score of out-of-state white admits
and the average ACT score of in-state white admits fell by more than a third of a point,
a change that is statistically significant but substantively small.
For black admits, however, the changes in average ACT scores was far larger relative
to white admits. The average ACT score for in-state black admits increased by .87 points.
The average ACT score for out-of-state black admits declined by .11 points. The difference
in between-cohort differences declined by .97 points, which is nearly fifty percent of the 2.10
point difference in the average ACT scores between in-state black admits and out-of-state
black admits.
The average ACT scores of in-state Asian admits and out-of-state Asian admits in-
creased by .61 points and .26 points, respectively. The increase in out-of-state ACT scores
wasn’t statistically significant. The difference in the between-cohort differences between
in-state Asian admits and out-of-state Asian admits declined by .35 points; the decline is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The average GPAs of white admits, both in-state and out-of-state, are statistically sig-
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nificant and substantively small. For black admits, however, this is not the case. The
average GPA for in-state black admits increased by .04 points, while the average GPA for
out-of-state black admits declined by .15 points. Black admits were the only race/ethnic
category in which the out-of-state students initially had a higher average GPA, 3.47 for
out-of-state black admits versus 3.42 for in-state black admits. After the Supreme Court’s
decisions, the in-state black admits average GPA was higher than their out-of-state coun-
terparts.
The average GPA of in-state Asian admits increased by a marginally significant and
substantively small .02 points, while the average GPA of out-of-state Asian admits declined
by .08 points. The difference in the between-cohort differences between the average GPA
of out-of-state Asian admits and in-state Asian admits declined by a tenth of a point.
The difference between the average GPA of in-state Asian admits and out-of-state Asian
admits in the period after the Supreme Court’s decisions more than doubled the difference
in average GPA between in-state Asian admits and out-of-state Asian admits in the period
prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions.
The pool of admitted students changed after the decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger and
Grutter v. Bollinger. The relative strength of the University of Michigan’s admitted class,
however, did not change. Table 2.8 contains the yearly averages of the SAT and ACT for
whites, blacks, and Asians.18 A comparison of the values in Table 2.8 with the values in
Table 2.5 supports this assertion. With respect to standardized test scores, the applicants
that are granted admission to the University of Michigan outscore the national averages by
more than 200 points on the SAT and by more than 5 points on the ACT. These differences
hold for every race/ethnic category in each time period under consideration. Although
Michigan’s admitted class remained relatively strong in comparison to the national average,
the between cohort changes in Michigan’s admitted classes deserves consideration.
The changes in the averages for black admits are intriguing. Table 2.7 reveals that in-
18The SAT information was obtained from Kobrin et al. (2006). The ACT information was obtained from the following
ACT sponsored universal resource locator: http://www.act.org/news/data.html.
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state black admits possessed a higher average SAT score, average ACT score, and average
GPA relative to the averages of in-state black admits from the period prior to the Supreme
Court’s decisions. Conversely, out-of-state black admits after the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions have lower averages relative to the out-of-state black admits from the period prior to
the Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to SAT score, ACT score and GPA. Table 2.4
shows that the average SAT score and ACT score for both in-state and out-of-state black
applicants increased, while the average GPA of in-state black applicants increased and the
average GPA of out-of-state black applicants remained stable across periods. Is there a
cogent explanation that is consistent with these facts?
The University of Michigan’s primary mission is to admit a sufficient number of aca-
demically talented students. This is a binding constraint. In addition, the University of
Michigan desires to admit a sufficient number of minority students to reach critical mass,
a sufficient number of minorities to yield the benefits of diversity. Suppose that the Uni-
versity has a minimum threshold for standardized test performance that is non-binding
in the sense that there are sufficient numbers of black applicants that meet the criterion.
After the Supreme Court’s decisions, the number of black applicants decreased, while the
average SAT score, average ACT score, and average GPA increased. In attempting to
reach a critical mass, it is possible that average scores of the admit pool declines even as
the average score of the pool of applicants increases, because both the lower scoring out-
of-state black applicants are less likely to apply and critical mass depends on the number
of under-represented minority applicants available to be admitted.
The above explanation of the outcomes with respect to the changes in the set of black ad-
mits, while plausible, is both illustrative and unwieldy. It is illustrative in that it highlights
that any attempt to explain the changes in the admit data set requires one to speculate
about the changes in the mapping from applicants to admits. The explanation is unwieldy
in the sense that too many factors—for example, race/ethncity, time, standardized test
scores, and Michigan residency—are in play simultaneously; there is no ceteris paribus
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condition. Further, one has to speculate on the importance of a certain factor in the ad-
missions decision. I employ a version of the selection index to weigh certain factors in a
manner similar to the method that the University of Michigan employed in determining
undergraduate admissions prior to Gratz v. Bollinger, this allows me to reduce the number
of factors under consideration. Examining the changes in the mapping from applicant to
admit will aid in interpreting the observed changes in the pool of admitted applicants.
2.8.3 Admissions
Figure 2.21, Figure 2.22, and Figure 2.23 show the distributions of the quasi-selection
index score for white applicants, black applicants, and Asian applicants, respectively, for
the periods before and after the Supreme Court’s decisions.19 The distributions are remark-
ably similar across time periods; that is, for each race/ethnic category, the distributions of
the selection index have basically the same shape.
White applicants, on average, have the highest selection index scores, 87.6 points in
the period prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions and 87.7 points in the period after
the decisions. Asian applicants have the second highest average selection index scores,
83.3 points in the period prior to the decisions and 82.7 points in the period after the
decision. Blacks have the lowest average selection index scores, 78.1 points in period prior
to decisions and 79.1 points in the period after the decision.
Figure 2.24, Figure 2.25, and Figure 2.26 show the distributions of the selection index
for white admits, black admits, and Asian admits, respectively, for the periods before and
after the Supreme Court’s decisions. There is far more inter-temporal variation in the
distributions of selection index scores for a given race/ethnic category. In particular, the
distribution of selection index scores for black admits changed. There is a huge spike at
the modal value of 83 points for black admits for the period prior to the decisions. The
distribution of selection index scores for blacks is much smoother in the period following
the Supreme Court decisions.
19From this point on, the term selection index will refer to the quasi-selection index; unless, I explicitly indicate otherwise
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White admits have the highest average selection index scores, 91.9 points in the period
prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions and 92.8 points in the period following the decisions.
Asian admits have the second highest average selection index scores, 91.9 points in the
period before the decision and 89.7 points in the period afterwards. Black admits have the
lowest selection index scores, 84.7 points in the period before the decisions and 85.4 points
in the period after the decisions.
Figures 2.21 – 2.26 allow me to determine the regions of “common support” for the
race/ethnic groups. I evaluate and compare the conditional probabilities of admission for
selection index scores between 74 and 104 points. This range of selection index scores
provides sufficient support so that my numerical estimation procedure can produce both
estimates of the conditional probability of admissions for a given selection index score
and the accompanying confidence interval for the estimate. For example, in the period
prior to the Supreme Court decisions, there were 11 black applicants with selection index
scores that exceed 104 points, 5 applicants with 105 points, 3 applicants with 106 points,
2 applicants with 107 points, and 1 applicant with 108 points. In the period following
the Supreme Court’s decisions, there was a total of 4 black applicants with selection index
scores in excess of 104 points, 2 applicants with 105 points, 1 applicant with 106 points, and
1 applicant with 107 points. The combination of such a small number of black applicants
with the given selection score and the random sampling prevents my numerical technique
from consistently generating estimates of the standard errors and confidence intervals for
these values. Similar reasoning applies to white applicants and Asian applicants for scores
lower than 74 points.
Figure 2.27 contains both the estimates of the conditional probability of admission
and the associated ninety-five percent confidence interval for a given selection index score
for the entire sample sans the Hispanic applicants and Hispanic admits. Both graphs
have the S-shape as predicted by the model. The estimated probability of admission for
applicants with a selection index score of 74 points is 15.0 percent for applicants from
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before the decision and 13.7 percent for applicants who applied after the decision. The
difference is not statistically significant. For selection index scores that are greater than
or equal to 75 points and less than or equal to 81 points, applicants from the period
prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions have higher probabilities of admission and these
differences are statistically significant. Applicants from before the decisions with scores in
this range had probabilities of admission that were, on average, less than twenty percent.
The probabilities of admission for selection index scores in the 75–81 point range for
applicants from the period prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions—which range from
25.9 percent to 37.6 percent—are at least 10 percentage points higher than the estimated
probabilities of admission for applicants with identical selection index scores from the
period after the decisions. The differences are statistically significant.
There is considerable noise in the 83–95 point range, especially for the estimates from
the period after the Supreme Court’s decisions. Applicants from the period after the de-
cisions with selection index scores of 83 points, 84 points, and 85 points have estimated
probabilities of admission equal to 75.4 percent , 86.7 percent, and 89.9 percent, respec-
tively. Applicants from the period before the decisions with selection index scores of 83
points, 84 points, and 85 points have estimated probabilities of admission equal to 53.6
percent , 71.4 percent, and 71.1 percent, respectively. The differences are statistically
significant. Applicants from the period before the decisions with selection index scores of
86 points and 87 points who applied before the decisions, 63.2 percent and 60.2 percent
versus 53.2 percent and 50.7 percent, respectively.
Applicants from the 2004, 2005 period with selection index scores between 89 points and
99 points generally have higher estimated probabilities of admission, with the exception
of selection index score values of 92 points and 93 points. Applicants from the 2004, 2005
period have a higher probability of admission for the selection index score value of 94 points,
74.9 percent versus 69.0 percent. However, the difference in the estimated probabilities
is not statistically significant. For selection index scores between 100 and 104 points,
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however, the estimated conditional probabilities of admission for applicants from the period
before and after the Supreme Court’s decisions—which are in excess of ninety percent—are
statistically and substantively not different.
Some general patterns emerge upon examining Figure 2.27. First, for a given period,
as you increase the selection index score, the probabilities form a S shape. Second, the
probabilities are noisier for the period after the Supreme Court’s decisions.
Figure 2.28 contains the estimates of the conditional probability of admissions for white
applicants for the periods before and after the Supreme Court’s decisions. The pattern
is very similar to Figure 2.27. This is expected, as whites comprise the majority of both
the applications and admits. For selection index scores between 75 points and 81 points,
whites who applied in the period prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions have higher
estimated probabilities of admission. Whites who applied before the Supreme Court’s
decisions have higher probabilities of admission in this range relative to the overall pool
of applicants with similar scores. Whites who applied after the Supreme Court’s decisions
have lower estimated probabilities of admission relative to the overall pool of applicants
with scores in this range. For selection index scores between 82 points and 100 points,
white applicants from the period after the Supreme Court’s decisions generally have higher
estimated probabilities of admission relative to white applicants from the period before the
change in the admissions regime, with the exception of the following selection index scores:
87 points, 88 points, 93 points, and 94 points. Whites with selection index scores in excess
of 100 points who applied after the decision also have slightly higher estimated probabilities
of admission relative to whites who applied before the Supreme Court’s decisions; however,
the differences aren’t statistically significant.
Figure 2.29 contains the estimates of the conditional probability of admissions for black
applicants for the periods before and after the Supreme Court’s decisions. The estimated
probabilities of black applicants from before and after the Supreme Court applicants with
scores at the lower end of the selection index are much greater than the estimated prob-
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abilities for both the overall pool of applicants and white applicants with similar scores
regardless of the period under consideration. For example, a white applicant with a se-
lection index score of 75 who applied before the decisions had an estimated probability
of admission of 31.2 percent; a black applicant who applied during this period had an
estimated probability of admission of 55.5 percent, a difference of 24.3 percentage points.
Except for selection index score values between 79 points and 87 points, black applicants
from the period following the Supreme Court’s decisions have higher estimated probabili-
ties of admissions for a given selection index score. In the range between 79 points and 87
points, the estimated probabilities of admissions are exceptionally high, with some values
far in excess of one. Comparing Figure 22 and Figure 25 yields one possible explana-
tion for this occurrence. The estimates of the conditional probability of admission for a
given selection index score for a particular group is the ratio of the probability mass for a
given selection index score for that particular group from the admit data set to analogous
probability mass from the applicant data set multiplied by the probability of admission
for that particular group. For black admits in the period prior to the Supreme Court
decisions there is a spike in this range of scores. Even with this ratio being deflated by
the probability of admission for blacks, the estimated conditional probability of admission
exceeds one. Mechanically, this explains the occurrence. Also, I can’t dismiss the possi-
bility that admissions was especially generous towards black applicants in this range prior
to the Supreme Court’s decisions. Still, the estimated probabilities of admission for black
applicants with selection scores in 79–87 point range from the period following the decision
are all in excess of eighty percent with some estimates exceeding one. I conclude that black
applicants continue to be admitted at relatively high rates.
Figure 2.30 contains the estimates of the conditional probability of admissions for Asian
applicants for the periods before and after the Supreme Court’s decisions. The estimated
conditional probabilities of admissions for Asian applicants with relatively low selection in-
dex scores are low. For example, a black applicant with a selection index score of 74 points
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from the period before the Supreme Court’s decision had an estimated probability of ad-
mission of 52.2 percent, while an Asian applicant from the same time period with an index
score of 74 points had an estimated probability of admission of 2.7 percent. For selection
index scores in the range of 74 points to 81 points, applicants from the period following the
Supreme Court’s decision have slightly higher estimated probabilities of admission ranging
from 5.6 percent to 19.4 percent versus a range of 2.7 percent to 12.9 percent for Asian
applicants who applied after the decisions. The differences in the estimated probabilities
are not statistically significant. For selection index scores ranging from 82 points to 90
points, Asian applicants from the period following the decisions generally have higher es-
timated probabilities; however, the differences are larger, at least 10 percentage points,
and statistically significant, with the exceptions of 86 points and 87 points. The values
of the estimates far exceed one for Asian applicants after the Supreme Court’s decisions
with selection index scores of 88 points, 89 points, and 90 points. Asian applicants from
the period prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions with scores of 88 points, 89 points, and
90 points had estimated probabilities of admissions of 34.7 percent, 37.7 percent, and 40.5
percent, respectively. Asian applicants from the period before the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions with selection index scores in the 92 point to 98 point range have higher estimated
probabilities of admission relative to Asian applicants with similar selection index scores.
For values of the selection index in excess of 98 points, there are no statistically significant
differences in the estimated probabilities of admission.
The following figures compare the estimated probabilities of admission of white, black,
and Asian applicants. Figure 2.31 contains estimates of the conditional probability of
admissions for black and white applicants from the period before the Supreme Court
decision. Figure 2.32 contains estimates of the conditional probability of admissions for
black and white applicants who applied under the admissions regime that came after
the Supreme Court’s decisions. Figure 2.33 and Figure 2.34 allow for comparison of the
estimated probabilities of admission for white and Asian applicants for the periods before
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and after the Supreme Court’s decisions.
Examining figure 2.31 reveals that black applicants have higher estimated conditional
probabilities of admission for nearly the entire range of selection index scores. For example,
black applicants with a selection index score of 74 had a 52.2 percent chance of being
admitted, while a white applicant with the identical score had a 13.5 percent chance of
being admitted, a difference of 38.7 percentage points. The gap between black and white
applicants in the conditional probability of admission for selection index scores with values
of 78 points to 88 points. Although the estimated conditional probabilities for black
applicants over this range lie outside the unit interval, I conservatively interpret this as
meaning that blacks were far more likely to be admitted relative to whites with selection
index scores in this range. For selection index scores with values ranging from 90 points to
100 points, blacks had a considerable edge with respect to the probability of admissions.
Over this range, the smallest difference occurred at 100 points. At values of the selection
index that are greater than 100 points, the differences in the estimated probabilities of
admission for black and white applicants, while high, are statistically indistinguishable
from each other.
Figure 2.32 contains the estimated probabilities of admission for white and black ap-
plicants from the period following the Supreme Court’s decisions. Black applicants, on
average, have higher estimated probabilities of admission relative to their white counter-
parts. For example a black applicant with a selection index score of 74 points had a 68.9
percent probability of being admitted, while a white applicant with the identical selection
index score had a 11.4 percent chance of being admitted, the probability of admission for
blacks at this value of the selection index is slightly greater than six times the probability
of admission for whites with the identical selection index score. In fact, for selection index
scores with values less than 82 points, the gap in the conditional probability of admission
between blacks and whites has widened, with black applicants gaining even more of an
advantage. Blacks still maintain a relative advantage over whites in the range of scores
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from 83 points to 92 points. However, the gap is not nearly as large in magnitude as it
was in the period prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions. For scores in the range of 92
points to 95 points the difference in the estimated probabilities of admission increased.
For selection index scores that are greater than 100 points, the conditional probabilities of
admission for black applicants statistically different from white white applicants; however,
as the estimates for black applicants exceed one and the estimates for white applicants are
very close to one, I interpret this as meaning virtually all the applicants, black and white,
with a selection index score this high were admitted.
Figure 2.33 contains estimates of the conditional probability of admissions for white and
Asian applicants for the period prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger
and Grutter v. Bollinger. For each of the selection index scores in the interval that spans 74
points to 89 points, the estimated probability of admission for whites are more than double
the estimated probability of admission for Asian applicants. For example, the estimated
probabilities of admission of Asian applicants with selection index scores of 87 points, 88
points, and 89 points are 31.7 percent, 34.8 percent, and 37.8 percent, while the estimated
probabilities of admission for white applicants with identical selection index scores are
64.8 percent, 79.1 percent and 79.3 percent, respectively. At a selection index score of 90
points, the estimated probability of admission for whites exceeds the estimated probability
of admission for Asian applicants by more than twenty percentage points, 63.2 percent for
whites versus 40.5 percent for Asians. For values of the selection index of 91 points to
95 points, the conditional probabilities of admissions are higher for Asian applicants. The
difference in the estimated probability of admission between white applicants and Asian
applicants with a selection index equal to 90 is 4 percentage points; this difference is not
statistically significant. The difference in the estimated probability of admissions for Asian
applicants with selection index score values of 92 to 95 points is substantially larger than
the estimated probability of admissions for white applicants with selection index score
values of 92 to 95 points; for example, the estimated probability of admissions for Asian
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applicants with a selection index score of 92 points is 86.2 percent, which is 25 percentage
points larger than the estimated probability of admission for a white applicant from this
period with the identical selection index score. Asian applicants have higher estimated
probabilities of admission for selection index scores in excess of 95 points. The differences
are small, on the order of a few percentage points, and statistically insignificant.
Figure 2.34 displays the conditional probabilities of admission for white and Asian
applicants who applied during the period following the Supreme Court’s decisions. The
difference in the conditional probabilities of admission between white and Asian applicants
with selection index scores less than 90 points who applied during the period prior to
Supreme Court’s decisions has decreased. A white applicant with a selection index score
of 74 points who applied during the period after the decisions has an estimated probability
of admission of 11.4 percent versus an estimated probability of admission of 5.6 percent
for Asian applicants who applied during the same period. The difference is statistically
significant, but the magnitude of the difference is significantly smaller than the difference
between white and Asian applicants from the period prior to the decisions, 5.5 percentage
points versus 9 percentage points. A similar pattern exists for scores in the range 75 points
to 81 points. For selection index scores greater than 82 points and less than 86 points,
the gap in the estimated probabilities of admission between white and Asian applicants
increase. For example, the conditional probability of admission for a white applicant with
a selection index score of 82 points is 54.7 percent versus 25.2 percent for a white applicant
with an identical selection index score. In the range of scores from 88 points to 90 points,
the estimated probabilities of admission for Asian applicants are very high, far outside of
the unit interval. The probabilities for white applicants were also high in this range. For
selection index scores greater than or equal to 91 points and less than or equal to 101
points, white applicants generally have higher estimated probabilities of admission. This
is the reverse of the pattern of estimated probabilities between whites and Asians with
scores in the range 91 points to 101 points during the period prior to the Supreme Court’s
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decisions. For selection index scores greater than 101 points, the estimated probabilities
of admission between white and Asian applicants, which are in excess of 90 percent, are
statistically indistinguishable.
I have presented evidence that there were changes in the mapping from applicants to
admits. The conditional probabilities of admission increased for black applicants with se-
lection index scores less than 79 points and greater than 87 points. The increase in the
probability of admission for applicants with relatively low selection index scores is consis-
tent with the model outlined earlier. However, I also find that the conditional probability
of admissions is higher for blacks with relatively high selection index scores who applied
after the Supreme Court decisions.
The difference in the estimated probability of admission between white and black appli-
cants with selection index scores less than 82 points increased in the period following the
Supreme Court’s decisions, with blacks gaining more of an advantage. The differences in
the estimated probability of admission between white applicants and Asian applicants with
selection index scores less than 90 points decreased over times. Black applicants still have
a higher conditional probability of admissions after the Supreme Court decisions. This
finding directly opposes the notion that the change in the admissions system will decrease
the probability of admissions for blacks who choose to apply.
The difference in the probability of admissions between white and Asian applicants
declined, especially for selection index scores less than 81 points. It isn’t the case that the
conditional probability of admissions increased for Asian applicants with selection index
scores in this range. Rather, the conditional probability of admissions for white applicants
with scores in this range declined.
2.9 Conclusion
Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger did two things. First, the decisions reaf-
firmed that obtaining the benefits of diversity is a sufficient reason to practice Affirmative
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Action. Second, the decisions made clear that systems that mechanically assigned a fixed
number of points to members of certain race/ethnic populations are proscribed.
The discussion about Affirmative Action, at least with respect to post-secondary educa-
tion, is about access to highly selective institutions. Examining the University of Michigan
offers the opportunity to examine how applications and admissions are impacted at a highly
selective institution that has publicly demonstrated its commitment to using race in the
admissions process.
I document how the Applicant pool changed at the University of Michigan. Both the
composition and the size of the applicant pool changed. That is, the applicant pool after
the Supreme Court’s decisions have fewer students with higher standardized test scores.
This applies especially to black applicants, the group with the largest percentage decline
in application levels and also had the largest absolute gains with respect to both average
ACT and average SAT scores.
I find that the pool of admitted students has changed drastically, and these changes vary
with respect race/ethnic membership and the applicant’s state of residence. In most cases,
the in-state students drastically improved their standing with respect to standardized test
scores.
I use a version of the University of Michigan’s selection index to classify applicants
and admits and compute consistent estimates of the conditional probability of admissions.
Using this metric and comparing the estimates of the conditional probabilities of admis-
sion for applicants who applied in the period after the Supreme Court’s decisions with the
estimates of the conditional probabilities of applicants who applied before the decisions, I
find that there are differences. White applicants with low selection index scores had lower
probabilities of being admitted in the period following the Supreme Court decisions. Black
applicants with relatively low selection index scores experienced an increase in the condi-
tional probability of admission. The difference in the conditional probability of admissions
between white and Asian applicants with relatively low selection index scores declined.
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At a minimum, I conclude that the holistic review that the University of Michigan em-
ployed after the Supreme Court’s decisions did not reduce the probability of admission for
applicants. In particular, there is no evidence that the conditional probability of admission
for black applicants declined. The benefits of diversity, however, depends on there being
a critical mass of minorities. Hence, it is important that institutions that are interested
in securing the benefits of diversity take steps to ensure that minority students know that




Table 2.1: Academic Quality Variables
Quality Variables
Period Year GPA ACT SAT SAT-V SAT-M
Pre
2000 3.52 27.06 1275.10 624 651
2001 3.53 27.18 1283.22 628 655
2002 3.55 27.12 1289.94 629 661
2003 3.56 27.44 1293.62 633 661
Post
2004 3.60 27.79 1301.99 639 663
2005 3.58 27.87 1309.17 642 667
Note: The averages are derived from the Applications data set.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics from the Applications Data Set
2000-2003 2004,2005
Variables Before Decisions After Decisions Difference
Average SAT Score 1285.62 1305.78 20.16∗∗∗
(144.00) (142.25) (1.12)
Average ACT Score 27.23 27.83 .60∗∗∗
(3.86) (3.65) (.03)
Average GPA 3.51 3.49 −.01∗∗∗
(.532) (.689) .004)
Proportion Male .507 .501 −.006∗
(.500) (.500) (.003)
Proportion White .661 .643 −.018∗∗∗
(.473) (.479) (.003)
Proportion Black .070 .058 −.012∗∗∗
(.255) (.235) (.002)
Proportion Hispanic .035 .038 .003∗∗
(.184) (.191) (.001)
Proportion Asian .150 .154 .004∗
(.357) (.361) (.002)
Proportion In-state .398 .404 .006∗∗
(.489) (.491) (.003)
N 73097 32907 –
Notes: Measures derived from 90 percent random sample of Applications
from the 2000-2005 cohorts.
Sample includes applications with valid GPA and Standardized Test Score
In columns two and three, parentheses contain standard deviations.
In column four, parentheses contain standard errors.
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Table 2.3: Standardized Test Scores and GPAs of Applicants by Race/Ethnicity
2000-2003 2004,2005
Before Decisions After Decisions Difference
White
Average SAT Score 1291.18 1307.84 16.76∗∗∗
(131.67) (132.52) (1.32)
Average ACT Score 27.81 28.23 .430∗∗∗
(3.36) (3.30) (.034)
High School GPA 3.57 3.55 −.012∗∗∗
(.463) (.625) (.004)
Black
Average SAT Score 1107.98 1135.71 27.74∗∗∗
(174.01) (167.74) (5.92)
Average ACT Score 22.24 23.21 .984∗∗∗
(4.19) (3.99) (.127)
High School GPA 3.18 3.21 .019
(.594) (.718) (.017)
Hispanic
Average SAT Score 1221.12 1238.95 17.83∗∗∗
(148.05) (148.76) (5.96)
Average ACT Score 25.66 26.24 .577∗∗∗
(3.83) (3.78) (.171)
High School GPA 3.37 3.36 -.010
(.554) (.703) (.021)
Asian
Average SAT Score 1320.54 1344.68 24.14∗∗∗
(134.39) (131.29) (2.42)
Average ACT Score 27.79 28.40 .612∗∗∗
(3.62) (3.71) (.094)
High School GPA 3.44 3.39 −.042∗∗∗
(.672) (.851) (.012)
Notes: Significance Levels: ∗ ⇒ 10% ∗∗ ⇒ 5% ∗∗∗ ⇒ 1%
In columns two and three, the parentheses contain standard deviations.
In column four, the parentheses contain standard errors.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for Admitted Students
2000-2003 2004,2005
Variables Before Decisions After Decisions Difference
Average SAT Score 1310.52 1328.19 17.67∗∗∗
(131.00) (140.10) (1.32)
Average ACT Score 28.27 28.71 .44∗∗∗
(3.57) (3.27) (.03)
Average GPA 3.72 3.74 .02∗∗∗
(.359) (.386) (.003)
Proportion Male .526 .547 .021∗∗∗
(.499) (.498) (.004)
Proportion White .687 .648 −.039∗∗∗
(.464) (.478) (.004)
Proportion Black .089 .055 −.034∗∗∗
(.285) (.228) (.002)
Proportion Hispanic .034 .065 .031∗∗∗
(.180) (.247) (.002)
Proportion Asian .102 .127 .025∗∗∗
(.303) (.333) (.003)
Proportion In-state .456 .429 −.026∗∗∗
(.489) (.495) (.004)
N 40994 22161 –
Notes: Measures derived from 90 percent random sample of Admits
from the 2000-2005 cohorts.
Sample includes applications with valid GPA and Standardized Test Score
In columns two and three, parentheses contain standard deviations.
In column four, parentheses contain standard errors.
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Table 2.6: Standardized Test Scores and GPAs of Admits by Race/Ethnicity
2000-2003 2004,2005
Before Decisions After Decisions Difference
White
Average SAT Score 1311.60 1343.30 31.70∗∗∗
(119.605) (134.48) (1.56)
Average ACT Score 28.98 28.94 −.04
(3.01) (2.77) (.035)
High School GPA 3.76 3.78 .02∗∗∗
(.463) (.625) (.003)
Black
Average SAT Score 1166.99 1155.97 −11.01∗
(147.20) (153.56) (6.50)
Average ACT Score 23.14 23.90 .76∗∗∗
(3.70) (3.60) (.135)
High School GPA 3.44 3.41 .03∗∗
(.388) (.445) (.014)
Hispanic
Average SAT Score 1235.20 1165.65 −69.55∗∗∗
(137.55) (117.65) (5.67)
Average ACT Score 26.10 26.75 .65∗∗∗
(3.60) (3.34) (.189)
High School GPA 3.50 3.56 .06∗∗∗
(.432) (.326) (.014)
Asian
Average SAT Score 1376.72 1369.72 7.00∗∗
(117.52) (103.15) (2.82)
Average ACT Score 29.02 29.58 .56∗∗∗
(3.20) (3.22) (.121)
High School GPA 3.76 3.70 −.06∗∗∗
(.510) (.599) (.014)
Notes: Significance Levels: ∗ ⇒ 10% ∗∗ ⇒ 5% ∗∗∗ ⇒ 1%
In columns two and three, the parentheses contain standard deviations.
In column four, the parentheses contain standard errors.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: National Average of SAT and ACT by Year
Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
White
Average SAT 1058 1060 1060 1063 1055 1068
Average ACT 21.8 21.8 21.7 21.7 22.7 22.8
Black
Average SAT 860 859 857 857 857 864
Average ACT 17 16.9 16.8 16.9 17.8 17.7
Asian
Average SAT 1064 1067 1070 1083 1084 1091
Average ACT 21.8 21.8 21.7 21.7 22.7 22.5
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CHAPTER III
Estimating the responsiveness of college applications to the
likelihood of acceptance and financial assistance: Evidence from
Texas
3.1 Introduction
The end of affirmative action in Texas due to the 1996 Hopwood v. Texas decision led
to precipitous drops in minority enrollment at the University of Texas at Austin and Texas
A&M University-College Station. In order to reverse the decline in minority enrollment
at Texas’s elite public institutions, the Texas legislature passed House Bill 588 or the Top
Ten Percent Rule (TTPR) which was signed into law on May 20, 1997 by then governor
George W. Bush. The Top Ten Percent Rule grants automatic admission to any public
college or university in Texas for Texas high school graduates who both finish in the top
decile of their graduating cohort and submit a completed application for admission to a
qualifying postsecondary institution within two years of graduating.1
The Top Ten Percent Rule did not have a large enough effect on minority applicants
to restore minority enrollment to the levels obtained prior to the Hopwood v. Texas
decision. Texas’s Attorney General interpreted the decision handed down in Hopwood v.
Texas by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to mean that race or ethnicity could factor
into neither the decision to admit a student nor the decision to provide financial aid.
Two selective institutions in Texas, The University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M
University-College Station, identified a set of high schools with student bodies that were,
1House Bill 588 also allows each public college or university in Texas to annually determine if it will offer automatic
admission to graduates in the top quartile and provides each institution with a list of eighteen factors that can be used in
making admissions decisions if a student does not qualify for automatic admissions
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on average, socioeconomically disadvantaged and had not had many students matriculate
at the respective institutions.
The University of Texas at Austin identified 70 Texas high schools that were both poor
and, which historically, had not had many students matriculate at the University of Texas
at Austin. These schools, on average, consisted of student bodies that were more than
ninety percent minority (Tienda and Niu, 2006). The most deserving graduates at these
high schools were offered scholarships, smaller classes, and tutoring if they were admitted to
the University of Texas at Austin. The funding is not exclusively for Top Ten Graduates.
This program, which was introduced to selected Texas High schools in 1999, 2000, and
2001, is known as the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship (LOS) Program.2
Texas A&M followed suit with its Century Scholars program which offers scholarships
to the graduates of 40 high schools located in Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio. The
Century Scholars (CS) Program began in the fall of 2000. The high schools were selected
based on high poverty rates of their students and the low number of applications that these
schools sent to Texas A&M University-College Station.3
The Top Ten Percent rule and the institution of the targeted financial aid and recruit-
ment programs offer the opportunity to examine two questions:
1. What is the impact of both the increased emphasis and transparent use of class rank
on the score-report sending behavior of Texas’s High School Graduates? The sending
of a score report to a college or university is our proxy for an application.
2. How does targeted financial aid and recruitment affect the application behavior of
potential recipients?
The use of race in the admissions process remains a contentious issue across this country.
California, Washington State, and, most recently, Michigan have passed bans that forbid
2The Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship information was obtained from Dr. Lawrence W. Burt, former associate vice
president and director of student financial services at the University of Texas at Austin.
3The Century Scholar program information was obtained from correspondence with Myra Gonzalez, Associate Director
Office of Honors Programs and Academic Scholarships at Texas A&M - College Station.
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the use of race in both the admissions and financial aid processes. Knowledge of how
prospective students respond to race neutral admissions regimes is vital to institutions of
higher learning that are interested in maintaining a diverse student body.
Two of the selective institutions in Texas responded by both increasing recruitment
efforts and offering financial aid to high schools that were likely to yield students who
were members of under-represented minority groups. In addressing the second question,
we explore the efficacy of such programs by asking: Do students from the targeted high
schools increase the rate that they send score reports to the university that targeted the
high school relative to the rate that would have prevailed had there been no intervention?
By exploring the behavior of potential applicants and their responsiveness to targeted
recruitment and financial aid, we will enhance our understanding of the determinants of
student application behavior.
3.2 Previous Research
Card and Krueger (2004, 2005) examine the impact of ending affirmative action in
California and Texas on the score report sending behavior of highly qualified minority
applicants. Card and Krueger have information on all SAT takers in California and Texas
from 1994–2001. Using the sending of a score report as a proxy for applying to a college,
they find that highly qualified minorities—minorities with an A/A- grade point average or
a score of at least 1150 on the SAT—did not substantially alter the set of institutions that
they choose to send their score reports in response to the changes in admissions policies.
Long (2004), using a random sample of ten percent of all SAT I takers from 1996–
2000, finds that the gap between minorities and non-minorities in the number of score
reports sent to in-state public institutions widened. He simulates the effect of the change
in state policies on the number of score reports of minority and non-minority students and
compares the results of the simulation to the actual outcomes. The simulation predicts
both a decrease in the number of score reports sent to top-tier public colleges by minorities
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and an increase in the number of score reports sent to top-tier colleges by non-minorities
due to changes in the relative probability of admissions between minority and non-minority
applicants.
Dickson (2006) analyzes the impact of the change in the admissions regime in Texas
on the percent of graduates from Texas’s public high schools who attempt an admissions
examination, either the SAT or SAT. Using data from the Texas Education Agency’s Aca-
demic Excellence Indicator System, Dickson constructs a balanced panel of high schools
and estimates weighted fixed effects models which include high school level covariates—
for example, the percentage of the high school that is black and the percentage of a the
high school that receives free or reduced price meal. Dummies for the various admissions
regimes as well as an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if the school is eligi-
ble for the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program are also included in the empirical
specification. Dickson finds a significant decrease in the percentage of graduates taking
admissions examinations after the implementation of the Top Ten Percent Rule. In addi-
tion, she finds that high schools that were selected as Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
schools experienced an increase in the percentage of graduates who attempted admissions
examinations.
Niu, Tienda, and Cortes (2006) use a representative sample of Texas high school seniors
in 2002 who were re-interviewed one year later to discern the effects of the Top Ten Percent
Rule. First, they find that Texas seniors—and top decile graduates in particular—are
sensitive to institutional selectivity. That is, Texas seniors prefer more selective institutions
all else equal. Second, they find that graduates from affluent high schools are more likely
than their counterparts from less-affluent high schools to apply to selective institutions.
Third, they find that while there are disparities in the selectivity of colleges that blacks
and Hispanics within the top decile apply to, these differences do not carry over into the
actual matriculation decision.
Our paper builds on this existing literature in various ways. First, we are interested
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in evaluating the transition from an admissions regime where class rank was merely one
factor that was used in differing degrees with respect to admissions to a regime where class
rank is the primary factor in admissions. Moreover, this fact is known to all interested
parties.4 In contrast to Card and Krueger (2004, 2005), we do not limit our sample to
highly qualified test-takers as measured by SAT performance or grade point average, as
the Top Ten Percent rule likely impacts students who aren’t highly qualified, especially
those students who are from high schools with relatively low test scores.5
Second, our data allows us to investigate in detail the set of schools a student chose
to send their scores to. Thus, whereas Long (2004) is able to only observe classifications
of the colleges that are designated to receive score reports, we observe the student’s full
choice set.
Third, only limited evidence has been gathered in the evaluation of targeted recruitment
programs. The only other paper that considers such programs is Dickson (2006). The
analysis in Dickson (2006) is conducted at the high-school level and focuses on the extensive
margin of test taking, the percent of graduates that attempt an admissions examination. In
addition, Dickson (2006) focuses only on the LOS program. Our data allows us to examine
the impact of both the LOS program and the CS program on the actual score report
sending behavior of individual students, conditional on a student having attempted the
SAT I examination. We believe that this provides a more direct measure of the effectiveness
of such programs. If the programs worked, then the probabilities that students from either
a LOS school or students from a CS school sent score reports to the University of Texas
at Austin and Texas A&M-College Station, respectively, should increase relative to the
probabilities for similar students from non-Longhorn high school and non-Century Scholar
schools.
In addition, our empirical method for evaluating the LOS differs considerably from
4For example, Bucks (2004) provides evidence that the University of Texas relied heavily on class rank prior to House Bill
588; however, this policy was not explicit.
5In our data set we identify 74, 472 students who self-identify as being in the top ten percent of their class and have SAT
scores less than 1150, one of the benchmarks they used to identify highly qualified students.
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that of Dickson (2006). In analyzing the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship, Dickson
(2006) draws inference from the dummy associated with Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
status. The fixed effects specification means that the variation used to identify the effect of
the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship comes from inter-temporal variation in Longhorn
status. The counterfactual high schools are the set of Longhorn Schools prior to the schools
obtaining Longhorn status and the set of high schools that never obtained Longhorn status.
Later in the paper, we show that Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship Schools have a higher
percentage of minority students, score lower on the SAT, and are less likely to to have
graduates attempt a college admissions examination. Because the Longhorn Opportunity
Scholarship schools are so different from other high schools in Texas, using the other high
schools in Texas as a comparison group could lead to biased estimates of the impact of the
Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program.
We take a number of steps to reduce the bias in estimating the impact of the targeted
recruitment and financial aid programs. We impose a common support condition to identify
a set of non-treated schools that are “similar” to the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
Schools. We compute the propensity score and use inverse probability weighting to identify
the average effect of treatment on the treated for students who attend LOS high schools
and CS high schools. Selection into treatment for these programs depended on the rate
at which the high school’s students sent score reports to either the University of Texas
at Austin or Texas A&M and the socioeconomic status of the high school’s students. We
directly include measures of the first factor and proxies for the second in calculating the
propensity scores. This is likely to provide better estimates of the true effects of the
LOS program and CS program than estimation procedures that ignore the problem of
non-random selection into treatment.
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3.3 Theory
We adopt verbatim the theoretical model presented in Card and Krueger (2004). In
this framework, a student needs to decide whether to apply to a particular college or not.
Relevant factors are the utility of attending the school being considered, the chance of
being admitted to that school, the cost of attending the school, the costs of applying, and
the corresponding factors in the set of available alternative colleges.
3.3.1 The Model
A student assigns a net utility level Ui(Qi, Ci) to attending college i. Utility increases
with the quality of the institution (Qi) and decreases with the cost of attending the in-
stitution (Ci). The student estimates the probability of being admitted to school i with
probability pi, which is, for simplicity, assumed to be independent across schools. The cost
of applying to any school is d and the utility of not attending college is U0.
Optimizing behavior on the part of the student generates an application set C consisting
of an ordered list of J schools with U1 ≤ U2 ≤ . . . ≤ UJ . A necessary condition for applying
to a given school i is that Ui > U0, and that the student’s subjective estimate of the
probability of admission is strictly positive. Let πj represent the probability that school j
is the best school in C that admits the student. Then




Let C(∼ k) denote the optimal choice set when school k is excluded, and J(∼ k) represent





πj max[0, Uk − Uj]} − d > 0 (3.2)
The above equation defines the condition for including school k in the choice set. It
states that college k will be included in the optimal application set if the expected return
of attending college k exceeds the cost of applying.
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3.4 Some predictions from the model
This simple framework is useful to clarify the effects we expect to identify empirically.6
The introduction of the Top Ten Percent Rule changes the subjective estimation of the
probability of admission conditional on rank and the type of institution under considera-
tion. In particular, for students in the top decile, the probability of admission to any of
Texas’s public colleges or universities is one. For Texas high school graduates who aren’t in
the top decile, the impact of change in the admissions regime is not clear. Perhaps students
not in the top decile perceive that their probability of admission, pi, has declined at elite
public institutions. If this is the case, then students in the lower rank classifications are
more likely to submit scores to both less selective institutions within Texas and selective
institutions outside of the state of Texas. The perceived change in the probability of ad-
mission will cause some colleges to be added and other colleges to be deleted relative to the
optimal choice set that would have prevailed absent the change in the admissions regime.
Conversely, students in the top decile should be more likely to submit score reports to
more selective institutions in Texas and less likely to submit to less selective institutions.
The introduction of the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship at UT Austin and the Cen-
tury Scholars Program at Texas A&M, on the other hand, changed the expected costs of
attending these two colleges for students at the eligible schools. This effectively increases
the expected utility, Ui from attending one of these schools, which should increase the like-
lihood that the applicant places either the University of Texas at Austin or Texas A&M
University in the optimal college choice set.
3.5 Data
The data we use for this paper was obtained from two sources. First, we downloaded
Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS) data from the Texas Educational Agency
(TEA). This is high school level data, available publicly on the internet, which provides
6A more complete discussion of the model and its implications is presented in the original paper by Card and Krueger
(2004).
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a wide range of information on the performance of students in each school and district
in Texas for each academic year. Indicators include Texas Assessment of Academic Skills
(TAAS) performance, attendance rates, dropout rates, completion rates, and SAT/ACT
test results.” 7
Second, we used extremely rich student level data from the College Board. This data set
contains the SAT verbal and math scores of every high school senior in the state of Texas
who took the SAT exam, for the 1996–2004 cohorts. Student demographic information
was also available including age, race, and gender.8 We also utilized information on the
number of test scores each student sent to colleges, as well as the name of the destination
college.
Both data sets contained the name of the student’s high school, enabling us to merge
the two data sets and conduct analyses that include both high school and student level
information. In addition, we used information provided on the SAT Questionnaire (for-
merly known as the Student Descriptive Questionnaire). Most students taking either the
SAT Reasoning Test or any of the SAT Subject Tests also complete the optional SAT
Questionnaire when they register to take the SAT Program tests, providing valuable con-
textual information to aid in interpreting and understanding individual and group scores.
The questionnaire asks students about their family background, high school courses and
performance, college aspirations, and most importantly for this study, a student’s class
rank. It should be stressed that the SAT Questionnaire, as well as any particular question,
is voluntary. Moreover, the responses are all self-reported.
Table 3.1 provides some descriptive statistics of our data set. We include only students
for whom we are able to merge these data sets. This excludes primarily students in private
and charter high schools. In total, we have 916,348 remaining unique student observations
7The URL is “http://www.tea.state.tx.us/”
8We only have racial information for students from the 1999 cohort onwards
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across all years combined, with a mean number of test takers of about 102,000 per year. 9
Of these, approximately 11 percent are Black, 17 percent are Hispanic and 46 percent are
White, with a sizable proportion for whom we do not have racial information. Roughly 54.5
percent of takers are female, and the average performance of these Texas graduates is 458
points and 466 points on the verbal and mathematical component of the SAT, respectively.
3.6 Empirical Specifications
3.6.1 Score Report Sending
We use the inter-temporal variation in the importance of rank with respect to the
probability of admissions to identify the impact of the change in the admissions regime on
the score report sending behavior of Texas’s public high school graduates. We estimate
linear probability models of the following form:










ist × P ) + εist (3.3)
Yist, our outcome, is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one in the event that
student i in high school s in year t engages in a particular behavior with respect to score
report sending. Examples of the outcomes that Yist represent include the following: does
a student send a score report to a selective institution in Texas, does the student send
a score report to one of the schools that must abide by the Top Ten Percent rule, does
the student send at least one score report to a less-selective institution in Texas, does the
student send more than four score reports in total.10
We include both high-school fixed effects, αs, and a linear time trend, αt. We include
year specific high school level variables, Xst. Xist are individual level characteristics; we
include the individual’s verbal SAT score and the math SAT score. P is an indicator
variable that assumes a value of one for cohorts that are under the Top Ten Percent
9The original sample size was 1,068,071 individuals.
10The first four score reports are free. A student must pay a fee for each additional score report that he or she chooses to
send.
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regime. The Rjist are a series of six rank dummies. We include dummies that assume a
value of one if student i in school s in year t identifies as being in one of the following
categories: the first decile, the second decile, the second quintile, the fourth quintile, the
fifth quintile, and non-reported rank . The excluded category consists of students who
are in the third quintile. We cluster at the high school level to produce standard errors
that are both robust to using variables that are at a higher level of aggregation than the
micro-units (Moulton, 1990) and to allow for arbitrary temporal correlation of the εist’s
within a cluster (Bertrand et al., 2004).
The coefficients of interest are δjP , the coefficients associated with the interaction terms,
Rjist×P . To flesh out the interpretation of the δjP consider the following example. Let Yist
represent the event that a student sends to a selective university in Texas and consider the
coefficient associated with the interaction term between the indicator for the top decile and
the indicator dummy for the Top Ten Percent Rule admissions regime. This coefficient
can be interpreted as the difference in the probability that a student in the top decile
sends a score report to a selective institution relative to the probability that she would
have sent a score report to a selective university in Texas prior to the advent of the Top
Ten Percent Rule. Similar interpretations apply to the coefficient estimates with respect
to both different rank categorizations and different outcomes.
3.6.2 Targeted Recruitment and Financial Aid
We are interested in determining the average effect of the treatment on the treated with
respect to both the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program and the Century Scholar
program. If we naively compared schools that were chosen to receive the scholarships with
the schools that were not selected, then we would likely obtain biased estimates of the
impact of the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship. The schools that are selected to receive
the treatment are likely to be systematically different in important ways that affect the
outcome of interest. Therefore, we need to select an appropriate set of non-treated high
schools that are “similar” to the set of schools that were selected to receive either the
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Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program or the Century Scholar program.
The LOS program and the CS programs were designed to boost minority enrollment
at the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M-College Station, respectively. As
such, high schools where the student body was majority white were unlikely to be selected
to receive either the LOS program or the CS program. We trimmed the sample of high
schools with students bodies that had high concentrations of white students in the year
1996. For the LOS program, we trimmed high schools with a percentage of white students
that exceeded 66 percent of the student body in 1996. For the CS program we trimmed
the sample of high schools with a percentage of white students that exceeded 75 percent
of the student body in 1996. The maximum value of the percentage of the student body
that is white in 1996 for LOS schools and CS schools is 41.7 percent and 60.3 percent,
respectively. In evaluating the LOS program, the trimming resulted in 886 high schools
being dropped from consideration. In evaluating the CS program, the trimming resulted
in 757 schools being dropped from consideration. The total number of high schools in our
base sample is 1440.
Using the trimmed samples, we estimate the probabilities that these particular Texas
high schools are selected to receive either the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship or the
Century Scholar Program, P(Longhorn|X) or P(Century|X). That is, we estimate the
propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) of treatment by either of the programs on
the appropriate sample.11 The common support condition means that we are interested
in comparing treated and non-treated schools with similar values of ̂P(Longhorn|X) or
̂P(Century|X). The common support condition is implemented as follows:
max(min[ ̂P(T = 1|X), ̂P(T = 0|X)]) , min(max[ ̂P(T = 1|X), ̂P(T = 0|X)])
where T is either the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program or the Century Scholar
program. The above condition establishes the set of schools that will be used in the anal-
11We use a probit specification that include as regressors high school level characteristics prior to the start of the Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship program and the Century Scholar Program for the years 1996− 1998.
88
ysis. The common support condition for the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program
includes high schools with estimated propensity scores in the interval .02 to .93 inclusive.
The common support condition for the Century Scholar program includes high schools
with estimated propensity scores in the interval .01 to .74 inclusive.
Histograms of the propensity scores for the LOS schools and CS schools are shown in
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.3, respectively. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4 are adjusted histograms
of the propensity scores. Essentially, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4 remove the huge spikes
near zero. This readjusts the scale of the graphs to better show the full distribution of the
propensity scores.
Table 3.2a and Table 3.2b demonstrate the effects of the balancing. The LOS pro-
gram and CS program schools are remarkably different from non-LOS schools and non-CS
schools.
In Table 3.2a, Column I contains the average of a particular characteristic for non-LOS
schools minus the average of the same characteristic for LOS schools. Examining the tables
we see that LOS schools have student bodies with higher percentage of Hispanic students,
black students, students on free or reduced price lunch, limited English proficient students
and higher student-to-teacher ratios. The LOS and non-LOS schools are clearly different.
Column II and Column III demonstrates how trimming and trimming in conjunction with
inverse probability weighting using the propensity score, respectively, reduces the differ-
ences in the observables. Table 3.2b shows the effects of balancing with respect to the
difference between CS and non-CS schools.12
We make a conditional independence assumption and employ inverse probability weight-
ing (Horvitz and Thompson, 1952; DiNardo et al., 1996) to estimate models of the following
form:
12We only show the balancing results for the year 1996. Similar results are obtained for the other years. This is expected


















Yist is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if the student submits a score
report to the University of Texas at Austin. The terms αs, αt, Xst, Xist, P, R
j
ist, and
Rjist × P are the same as the previous specification. DT is an indicator variable that
assumes a value of one the year a school becomes a Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
School when analyzing the LOS program. DT is an indicator variable that assumes a value
of one the year that a high school becomes a Century Scholar school when we analyze
the CS program. DT × Rjist is an interaction term. The coefficient associated with the
interaction term, δjT is the difference-in-differences estimate. However, in this case we limit
the sample to students in schools that survive the trimming procedure.
We weight the students in the non-treated schools by P
1−P × 1−ΠΠ where P is equal
to propensity score for either the LOS program or the CS program for the particular
school that the student attends and Π is equal to the unconditional probability of being
either a LOS school or a CS school. This weighting scheme re-weights students in non-
treated schools so that, on average, they are similar to students in treated schools. With
a defensible set of counterfactuals, we are able to reduce the bias in the estimates of
the impact of the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program and the Century Scholar
programs. We cluster at the level of the high school to deal with the aggregation issues
raised by Moulton (1990) and the serial correlation issues raised by Bertrand et al. (2004).
3.7 Results and Discussion
Our analysis comprises of three sections. First, we summarize our data in terms of the
outcome variables of interest. This provides a broad overview of trends and aggregates
for high school seniors in Texas. Second, we estimate how student behavior changed in
the TTPR period relative to the prior two years using multivariate regressions. We next
90
investigate the effects of the LOS program and CS on score report sending behavior. For
the TTPR the LOS program, and CS, we estimate standard OLS models as well as models
that include school level fixed effects.
3.7.1 Summary Statistics
3.7.1.1 Score Sending
Table 3.3 presents the mean values of various score sending outcomes. We see that the
mean number of scores sent for each SAT taker declined between 1996 and 2004, from 4.29
scores to 3.86 scores, an 11 percent decline. This is also reflected in the mean numbers sent
to Texas based institutions. In terms of the selective schools we consider, the proportion
of SAT takers sending to the University of Texas at Austin drops by 4 percentage points
from 35.5 percent to 31.5 percent, the proportion to the University of Texas at Dallas grew
by 2.7 percentage points from 3.1 percent to 5.8 percent, while the proportion sending
to Texas A&M decreased by 7 percentage points from 31.2 percent to 23.3 percent. On
average, the proportion sending to any of these three schools decreased by 7.1 percentage
points, or about 14 percent relative to the 1996 level. Thus, we observe that both the
number of scores sent, and the proportion sending to selective schools decreased markedly
in the period of our study.
In Table 3.4a, we observe an increasing trend in the proportion who refuse to answer the
entire Student Descriptive Questionnaire (SDQ), although this occurs largely in 2003 an
2004. At the same time, there is a gradual and persistent upward trend in the proportion
who answer parts of the SDQ, but refuse to respond to the question on class rank. The
increase is large, from 8651 in 1996 to 33829 in 2004, which is almost a quadrupling in
absolute number. Indeed, by 2004, more than a third of takers do not respond to the class
rank question. This is problematic for our analysis, as a significant portion of our analysis
is related to the class rank variable. Thus, all results making reference to the class rank
variable pertains only to those students who provided us with such information.
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Table 3.4b captures the mean proportion taking the SAT by class rank. This was
computed for each school by dividing the total number of SAT takers reporting a particular
rank in a given school in a given year, by the number of twelfth graders in that particular
rank in that same school in that same year. The number of twelfth graders was obtained
from Texas’s Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS) data set. The mean was
calculated by averaging across schools within a year, where each school received equal
weighting in the calculation. We observe that the mean proportion in the first decile
exceeds one for 1996 and 1997. Therefore, there has to be some misreporting in the data,
with students systematically overstating their rank. Within each rank, the proportion
taking the SAT decreased, although this is possibly due to the increased non-response rate
for the class rank question. Nevertheless, we do observe sustained downward trends in the
proportions taking an SAT conditional on them answering the class rank question. There
are also large differences in test taking across rank classifications, which is to be expected.
In 2004, the ratio of students who reported being in the top decile relative to one tenth
of the number of twelfth graders is 0.90, compared to an analogous ratio of 0.376 for the
second quintile, and only 0.051 for students in the lowest quintile.
Tables 3.4c and 3.4d provide the mean performance on the SAT verbal and mathematics
components respectively, in each rank category for each year. Somewhat reassuring is that
the performances are monotonically decreasing in rank, amongst those who do report a
rank. We also observe that 2002 seems to be an outlier year, in that performance on both
the verbal and mathematics component of the SAT greatly exceed those in other years.
These tables also indicate that the students for whom we have no class rank information
are not likely to be randomly drawn from the population of SAT takers in terms of their
scholastic abilities in the period from 2002 to 2004. Prior to 2002, these students were on
average likely to be placed somewhere between the 2nd and 3rd quintiles, whereas there-
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after, their mean performance places them between the 2nd decile and the 2nd quintile. 13
Tables 3.5a – 3.5i summarize the various dimensions of score sending behavior within
each class rank category. This allows us to observe any heterogeneity in the trends that
occur as a function of a student’s relative rank within their high school cohort. The mean
number of scores sent decreases for most categories, although this is largest for those in
the first decile (Table 3.5a). The mean number of scores sent to colleges within Texas
decreased as well, most markedly in the first and second deciles, but was stable in the
fourth quintile and actually increased for those in the fifth quintile (Table 3.5b). Table
3.5c shows the mean number of scores sent to schools that are legally compelled to follow
the Top Ten Percent rule. For all students who do report a valid class rank variable, this
number remains fairly stable. The next table concerns score sending to Texas two year
colleges. The mean numbers here are also relatively stable. 14
Tables 3.5e – 3.5g summarize the proportion sending to each of the three selective
schools we consider, namely UT Austin, UT Dallas and Texas A&M. Table 3.5h presents
the mean number of scores sent to this set of selective schools on aggregate, and Table
3.5i contains the proportion of students who send to at least one of these selective schools.
Students in the top decile in 2004 are 2.2 percentage points more likely to send to UT
Austin than similar students in 1996, while students in the other reported ranks in 2004
are generally less likely to send to Austin than their 1996 counterparts. 15 Score sending
to UT Dallas increases in every category, although this occurs off of a rather small initial
base. In all reported class ranks we observe a clear decrease in the proportion sending to
Texas A&M, with large decreases of about nine percentage points in the first two deciles
13We use deciles for the first and second deciles, and quintiles for the remainder, as this is how the question that asks a
student to report her rank is structured.
14Two year colleges are not the primary focus of this paper. Moreover, the SAT is taken primarily for applications to
selective colleges. Thus, we do not comment in depth on the application decision for two year colleges.
15An exception is students in the 5th quintile, although these students represent a very small percentage of the population
of SAT takers in any year.
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as well as the second quintile. Table 3.5i indicates that approximately seventy percent of
students in the first decile send to at least one selective school, and that this remains stable
during the period of analysis. However, students in the other reported class rank categories
generally show marked declines in the probability of sending to a selective school. This
is most pronounced for students in the 2nd quintile, where the proportion decreases by
about 10 percentage points, or almost 20 percent of the 1996 base proportion. This is in
line with the model provided above, as those far from the first decile will need to compete
aggressively in order to gain admission into selective schools compelled to admit anyone in
the top 10 percent of their cohort.
3.7.1.2 Longhorn and Century Scholars Programs
Tables 3.6a – 3.6c show the number of test takers, the proportion of twelfth graders
taking an SAT, and the proportion of SAT takers who send a score to UT Austin respec-
tively. Table 3.6a shows that regardless of the scholarship program being administered at
a school, if any, the number of takers increased with time. We also observe that more than
10 percent of all public school SAT takers attend a school where the LOS was subsequently
implemented. The proportion taking an SAT increases dramatically in the LOS schools,
by more than 20 percent, actually decreases in the CS only schools, and increases by a few
percentage points in the non-scholarship programs. Moreover, the large increases observed
in the LOS schools coincides with the time period when the LOS was introduced. Further
suggestive evidence that LOS caused these responses is seen in Table 3.6c. Whereas the
proportion of score senders sending to UT Austin actually decreased with time by about
5 percentage points between 1996 and 2004, the proportion from LOS schools increased
by about 3 percentage points. These patterns are observed in Table 3.7 as well, where we
summarize the schools using a binary classification of LOS or non-LOS schools, ignoring
the particular potential school’s CS status.
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3.7.2 Top Ten Percent Rule
3.7.2.1 Score Sending
Table 3.8 presents individual level regression results for score sending behavior. Of
primary interest to us are the coefficients on the post and post interacted with class rank
variables. The dependent variable in the second column is an indicator variable for whether
the student sent more than four SAT score reports. In the post period, students in the 1st
decile were 5.6 percentage points less likely to send out more than four scores. Those in
the 2nd decile and second quintile were also significantly less likely to send out more than
four reports, but the decrease is less than 2 percentage points. In the third column, we
model the actual number of scores sent. All students send fewer scores on average in the
post period. However, this again is most pronounced amongst students who are in the 1st
decile, who send 0.356 16 fewer scores out. This is as predicted by the theory, since these
students are guaranteed admission to any of the top public colleges in Texas. In the fourth
column, the dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a student
sends a score to one of the non-selective four year colleges in Texas. In the post period,
students in the 1st decile are significantly less likely to apply to a non-selective school. At
the same time, those in the 4th and 5th quintiles who do take an SAT have a significantly
increased probability of sending to a non-selective college. This suggests that students
of all ranks are being forced by the law to pre-select themselves into a particular type of
college more strongly than prior to the law. The estimates in the sixth column shows that
students in the first decile have an increased probability of sending to UT Austin in the
post-TTPR period, of 3.8 percentage points, while students in the 2nd and 3rd quintiles
have similarly small, but significant reductions in this probability. Interestingly, students
in the 5th quintile show a large increase in the probability of sending there, although we
observed that this group is small and likely to be selected in terms of other unobservables.




Table 3.9 presents models with the same dependent variables and same set of covariates,
but includes school level fixed effects. Of note in comparison to Table 3.8 is that the
coefficients are very similar, both in terms of magnitude and significance. By and large,
the theoretical framework predictions of the impact of the law are substantiated by the
empirical analysis.
3.7.3 Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
This component of our analysis looks at the effects of the targeted recruitment and
financial aid packages offered by the University of Texas at Austin under the LOS program.
This program targeted high schools with both socioeconomically disadvantaged students
and graduates who send standardized test scores to UT Austin at a rate below the average
rate at which Texas high school graduates send score reports to UT Austin.
Table 3.10 presents difference-in-differences (DD) results for various score sending be-
haviors as a function of the LOS program. We further allow for these effects to differ
depending on the class rank of the students. Interpreting the coefficients on the inter-
action terms, we observe that most of the effects manifest in the first decile of students.
The probability that a student in the first decile at a Longhorn school sends to Austin
increases by 9.2 percentage points in the DD model. In 1999, 20.0 percent of test takers
from LOS schools sent at least one score report to the University of Texas at Austin. Rel-
ative to the 1999 level, the change in the first decile is a forty-five percent increase. The
coefficients associated with the interaction of being LOS and self-identifying as being in
the second decile increase the probability of increasing of sending to to the University of
Texas at Austin by 3.2 percentage points. The coefficient is statistically significant at the
one percent level.
The second dependent variable is the total number of score reports sent. The coefficients
associated with the interaction terms are all small and statistically insignificant.
The third dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if a
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student sends a score report to a non-selective four year institution in Texas.17 Surprisingly,
the coefficient associated with the interaction term between being in a LOS school and a
self-reported rank of being in the top decile is 5.1 percentage points and is statistically
significant at the one percent level.
The fourth dependent variable is a set of selective schools in Texas.18 The coefficient
associated with the interaction term between LOS and a self-reported rank of the top decile
is 7.7 percentage points and is statistically significant at the one percent level.
The fifth dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes a value of one if the
test-taker chooses to send at least one score report to the set of colleges in Texas that must
abide by the Top Ten Percent Rule. The difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of
the LOS program on the first decile is 5 percentage points, and it is statistically significant
at the one percent level.
The sixth dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if a
test-taker sends at least one score report to the a school in Texas. Students in the top
decile at a LOS school are 1.2 percentage points more likely to send to an in-state college
or university. This effect is relatively small as a large proportion of test takers send at
least one score report to an in-state school.
The final dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if a
test-taker chooses to indicate more that four colleges to receive score reports. SAT test
takers in the first decile at LOS schools are three percentage points more likely to send
more than four score reports. We find small and statistically insignificant effects of the
LOS program on the probability of designating more than four colleges to receive score
reports for the remaining interaction terms.
Table 3.11 presents the results from the difference-in-differences model with fixed effects.
The results we obtain are similar. Test-takers who self-identify as being in the top decile
at schools under the LOS program are 9.4 percentage points more likely to submit a score
17Colleges are classified as non-selective according to the system used by Barron’s Guide to Colleges and Universities
18Selective schools include the University of Texas at Austin, Texas A&M-College Station, and the University of Texas at
Dallas.
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report to the University of Texas at Austin; the coefficient is significant at the one percent
level. Students who self-identify as being in the second decile at LOS schools are 3.2
percentage points more likely to send a score report to the University of Texas at Austin;
the coefficient is significant at the five percent level. Students who self-identify as being
in the second quintile at LOS schools are 2.3 percentage points more likely to send a score
report to the University of Texas at Austin.
The results with respect to the number of scores sent are similar to the estimates
obtained without fixed effects. With respect to non-selective institutions, the difference-
in-differences estimate of the impact of the LOS program on the probability of a test-taker
in the top decile submitting to a non-selective dropped to 4 percentage points, roughly a
20.0 percent decline relative to the estimate from the model without fixed effects. Still,
the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.
The fixed effects difference-in-differences estimate of the impact of the LOS program
on the probability of a test taker in the top decile submitting to a selective institution in
Texas is 8.2 percentage points an increase of .5 percentage points relative to the estimate
from the model without school fixed effects; the estimate is statistically significant at the
one percent level. The estimate of the difference-in-differences estimate of the impact of
the LOS program on the probability of students in the top decile submitting to a TTPR
school is 5 percentage points and is significant at the one percent level. The finding that
students in the top decile at LOS schools are 1.1 percentage more likely to remain in state
is significant at the five percent level.
The difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the LOS program on the proba-
bility that a test-taker who self-identifies as being in the third decile sends more than four
score reports is 3.3 percentage points and is significant at the five percent level. Although
none of the other difference-in-differences estimates are significant, the coefficients show
a pattern whereby the difference-in-differences estimates for the third, fourth, and fifth
quintiles are larger than the difference-in-differences estimates for the first decile, second
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decile, and the third quintile. This pattern doesn’t emerge in the differences-in-differences
model that doesn’t include school fixed effects.
Overall, this is a remarkable finding. The impact of the LOS is large and significant. It
also has the largest impact on the best ranked students in these schools. Indeed, the effects
on weaker students are small and often statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that student application decisions from under-represented
schools are subject to multiple constraints. These include both the likelihood of admission
as well as funding and post-enrollment support.
3.7.4 Century Scholars Program
This part of the analysis will focus on the Century Scholars Program. Table 3.12
contains the results of the difference-in-differences models without school fixed effects.
The first dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if
the student sends a score report to Texas A&M-College Station. In stark contrast to
the estimates for the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program, none of the interaction
terms are statistically significant and differ greatly in magnitude from the estimates of
the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program. The difference-in-differences estimate of
the impact of the Century Scholar program on the likelihood that a test-taker who self
identifies as being in the first decile attempts sends a score report to Texas A&M College
Station is 3.5 percentage points, which is far smaller than the analogous estimate for the
LOS program.
The second dependent variable is the total number of scores sent. The difference-in-
differences estimates of the impact of the CS program on number of score reports sent by
the first and second decile are −.322 and −.255 score reports. The estimates are both
significant at the one percent level.
The third dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if a test-
taker sends to a non-selective school. For students who self-identify a class ranking in the
third quintile and students who indicate that they are in the fourth quintile, the difference-
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in-differences estimates take on values of −5.7 percentage points, and −8.0 percentage
points, respectively. The estimates are significant at the one percent level. The CS program
seems to reduce the probability that lower ranked students send score reports to non-
selective institutions.
The Century Scholar program increases the probability that a student who chooses not
to indicate rank sends a score report to a selective institution by 3.5 percentage points.
This estimate is significant at the one percent level. This result is not surprising given the
positive impact of the CS program on the likelihood that a student who does not indicate
rank applies to Texas A&M. Texas A&M is one of the selective schools. The difference in
differences estimates for the impact of the CS program on the probability that a student
who identifies as being in ranked in the top decile is 4.3 percentage points; the estimate is
significant at the one percent level.
Students in the top decile at CS high schools are 3.5 percentage points more likely to
apply to a school with admissions that are subject to the Top Ten Percent rule. The
difference-in-differences estimates for the impact of the CS program on the likelihood that
test-takers of various ranks send score reports to Texas are small and statistically insignif-
icant.
The CS program does seem to impact the probability that students from in the top
decile, second decile, and second quintile send more than four score reports. The difference-
in-differences estimate for the test-takers who identify as being in the top decile is −5
percentage points and is significant at the one percent level. The estimate of the impact
of the program on both the probability of sending more than four score reports for a
student whose self-reported rank is the second decile is −5 percentage points; the estimate
is statistically significant at the one percent level. The difference-in-differences estimate
for the second quintile is −2.9 percentage points. The estimate is significant at the five
percent level.
Table 3.13 contains the results for the difference-in-differences models that include high
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school level fixed effects. The estimate is not statistically significant. The difference-in-
differences estimate of the impact of the program on students who self-identify as being
ranked in the top decile is 3.7 percentage points, which is similar in magnitude to the
estimate we obtained without fixed effects.
The estimates of the impact of the CS program on the number of score reports changes
after the addition of the school fixed effects. The difference-in-differences estimates of the
impact of the CS program on number of score reports sent by the first and second decile
are −.301 and −.228 score reports. The estimates are both significant at the one percent
level.
Except for the estimate of the impact of the CS program on students who self-identify
as being in the first decile, which falls by a percentage point, the fixed effects augmented
difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of the CS on the probability of test-takers
sending score reports to non-selective institutions are similar in magnitude to the values
obtained from the models without fixed effects. The difference-in-difference estimates for
the test-takers in the third quintile and test-takers who identify as being in the fourth
quintile remain remain statistically significant, with values of −4.2 percentage points and
−5.9 percentage points, respectively.
Test-takers in CS schools who do not indicate rank or self-report being in the top decile
are more likely to send score reports to selective institutions. The estimates are similar
to the estimates obtained from the model without school fixed effects. The estimate for
students who don’t report rank is 3.6 percentage points and is statistically significant at
the five percent level. The difference-in-differences estimate for students in the top decile
is 4.8 percentage points; the estimate is significant at the one percent level. The other
differences-in-differences estimates decrease in magnitude relative to the model with no
fixed effects.
The estimate of the impact of the CS program on the likelihood that a test-taker who
self-reports as being in the top decile sends a score report to a TTPR schools remains nearly
101
the same across specifications. The estimate obtains a value of 3.5 percentage points and
is significant at the one percent level. The addition of school fixed effects does not change
appreciably change the estimates of impact of the CS program on the likelihood that test-
takers send score reports to in-state schools. The estimates remain small and statistically
insignificant.
Test takers in the top decile and the second decile at CS schools are less likely to send
out more than four score reports, estimates for both ranks take on values of 5 percentage
points and 4.6 percentage points; both estimates are statistically significant at the one
percent level. The sign of the difference-in-differences estimate for the second quintile is
of similar magnitude to the estimates without fixed effects.
The Century Scholar program does not appear to attract highly ranked students to
Texas A&M as effectively as does the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program. This
is in contrast to the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program which has it greatest
impact on highly ranked students; that is, students who self-identify as being in the top
two deciles. The magnitude of the impact of the LOS program on the likelihood that a
student who self reports as being in the top decile at a LOS school sends a score report
to the University of Texas at Austin is 162 percent larger than the estimate of the impact
of the CS program on the likelihood that a student who self-reports as being in the top
decile in a CS school sends to Texas A&M-College Station.
There is evidence that the CS program reduces the probability that both low ranked
students and students who don’t report rank send score reports to non-selective schools.We
find evidence that the CS program increases the probability that both students who don’t
report rank and students who report being in the top decile send score reports to selective
institutions. The CS program increases the probability that test-takers in the top decile
send a score report to schools to colleges that must abide by the Top Ten Percent rule;
however, the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship Program has a larger impact on the prob-
ability that students in the top decile send score reports to Top Ten Percent colleges. The
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CS program also appears to reduce the probability that highly ranked students send more
than four score reports.
3.8 Conclusion
Our analysis and results highlighted some important and useful new insights. First,
the theoretical framework we adopted was useful in understanding the changes that were
observed in student college applications behavior. Second, as predicted, there exists signif-
icant heterogeneity in the effects of the law, depending on a student’s class rank. Previous
research has not investigated this.
Third, the targeted recruitment program implemented by UT Austin was extremely
successful. However, this success was limited mostly to the best students in these schools.
The targeted recruitment program implemented by the Century Scholar program was not
nearly as effective at increasing the likelihood that students send score reports to Texas
A&M.
Our evidence suggests that students from poor schools face multiple barriers to obtaining
postsecondary schooling at selective colleges. Using the combination of the TTPR and the
LOS program, we find strong evidence that it is possible for targeted recruitment programs
to attract students from such schools. However, as the results from evaluating the Century




Table 3.1: Sample Size and composition
Year # of Obs % Black % Hisp % Cauc. % Female Mean SAT-V Mean SAT-M
1996 83,769 – – – 54.7 460 466
1997 87,750 – – – 54.73 459 467
1998 94,136 – – – 54.84 456 463
1999 98,730 11.45 16.54 51.95 54.73 453 459
2000 103,367 11.11 16.57 49.46 54.41 454 461
2001 105,015 11.22 16.73 47.87 54.57 452 459
2002 110,097 11.23 16.58 45.07 54.57 488 499
2003 115,260 10.84 16.37 40.48 54.02 452 460
2004 118,224 12.07 18.28 43.53 54.19 450 458
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Table 3.2a: Difference in Means between LOS and non-LOS schools: 1996
I II III
Full Sample Trimmed on % White Trimmed + IPW
Diff Std. Error Diff Std. Error Diff Std. Error
SAT Verbal 1996 84.2 11.3 60.6 12.9 -76.0 41.0
SAT Math 1996 78.7 11.5 56.9 13.2 -76.6 42.5
% Male1996 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07
% LEP 1996 -9.08 1.06 -5.46 1.45 -1.92 2.91
% Poor 1996 -21.61 2.47 -11.18 2.69 -4.55 6.26
% White 1996 56.14 3.32 31.38 2.54 -0.61 1.67
% Black 1996 -28.67 1.96 -24.30 2.67 -4.35 10.69
% Hispanic 1996 -27.49 3.47 -7.45 3.86 5.57 10.35
% Twelfth Grade 1996 1.29 0.82 1.78 0.85 -1.77 0.89
Teacher Exper. 1996 -1.52 0.30 -1.31 0.31 -0.85 0.73
Stud to Teach. ratio 1996 -3.49 0.40 -2.97 0.46 0.89 0.99
% Taking Exam 1996 9.45 2.30 6.95 2.45 -11.09 6.61
Sent to Austin 1996 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.04 0.04
Sent to UTD 1996 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Sent to A&M 1996 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.10
Notes:
IPW is our acronym for Inverse Probability Weighting.
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Table 3.2b: Difference in Means between CS and non-CS schools: 1996
I II III
Full Sample Trimmed on % White Trimmed + IPW
Diff Std. Error Diff Std. Error Diff Std. Error
SAT Verbal 1996 68.2 15.0 53.0 16.3 -07.0 27.7
SAT Math 1996 59.7 15.1 46.6 16.5 -14.2 28.0
% Male 1996 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02
% LEP 1996 -8.32 1.40 -5.86 1.72 -3.77 2.43
% Poor 1996 -8.94 3.32 -1.42 3.44 6.12 3.86
% White 1996 52.03 4.59 33.75 3.83 6.91 2.96
% Black 1996 -43.78 2.47 -39.99 3.00 -14.09 8.19
% Hispanic 1996 -6.46 4.64 7.79 4.89 8.45 6.96
% Twelfth Grade 1996 1.97 1.07 2.36 1.07 0.97 1.11
Teacher Exper. 1996 -1.79 0.40 -1.49 0.39 -0.88 0.66
Stud. to Teach. ratio 1996 -4.25 0.52 -3.82 0.56 -0.49 0.54
% Taking Exam 1996 7.14 2.96 5.65 3.04 -3.99 3.57
Sent to Austin 1996 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.04
Sent to UTD 1996 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Sent to A&M 1996 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02
Notes:
IPW is our acronym for Inverse Probability Weighting.
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Table 3.3: Score Report Sending Behavior
Mean Number of Scores Sent: Proportion of Scores Sent:
In In To To To To To To
Year Total State TTPR schools TX 2yr college UT Austin UT Dallas Texas A&M selective TX college
1996 4.29 3.11 1.75 0.34 0.355 0.031 0.312 0.514
1997 4.27 3.10 1.74 0.35 0.343 0.034 0.296 0.498
1998 4.08 2.97 1.67 0.34 0.334 0.034 0.281 0.480
1999 3.98 2.91 1.64 0.33 0.330 0.034 0.278 0.475
2000 4.05 2.97 1.70 0.34 0.352 0.043 0.288 0.499
2001 4.06 2.95 1.69 0.33 0.337 0.046 0.281 0.484
2002 4.02 2.95 1.70 0.32 0.328 0.053 0.265 0.470
2003 3.97 2.93 1.72 0.31 0.332 0.056 0.253 0.466
2004 3.86 2.88 1.69 0.31 0.315 0.058 0.233 0.443
Table 3.4a: Number of Taker within class rank
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Total
1996 8,651 15,678 16,286 21,162 16,553 3,064 604 1,771 83,769
1997 9,528 16,182 17,093 21,674 16,983 3,308 630 2,352 87,750
1998 11,019 16,838 17,582 23,204 18,727 3,569 695 2,502 94,136
1999 13,229 17,311 18,483 23,776 19,133 3,730 773 2,295 98,730
2000 16,677 17,912 19,051 23,192 19,232 3,797 823 2,683 103,367
2001 22,258 18,202 18,623 21,438 17,792 3,495 729 2,478 105,015
2002 31,548 17,817 18,218 19,310 16,724 3,381 763 2,336 110,097
2003 27,176 17,693 17,510 17,567 15,338 3,098 704 16,174 115,260
2004 33,829 18,933 18,846 17,622 15,858 3,406 807 8,923 118,224
Note the increasing proportion that do not provide rank
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Table 3.4b: Proportion Taking conditional on rank reported
year top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint
1996 1.02 0.93 0.52 0.43 0.13 0.06
1997 1.01 0.93 0.52 0.42 0.12 0.06
1998 0.98 0.90 0.51 0.43 0.13 0.06
1999 0.95 0.91 0.50 0.42 0.12 0.05
2000 0.97 0.89 0.50 0.42 0.13 0.07
2001 0.96 0.89 0.46 0.40 0.12 0.05
2002 0.92 0.87 0.43 0.37 0.13 0.06
2003 0.90 0.81 0.38 0.34 0.10 0.05
2004 0.90 0.83 0.38 0.34 0.11 0.05
Table 3.4c: Mean of SAT Verbal by class Rank
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 412.59 560.67 491.05 451.29 400.73 354.39 323.00 404.24 460.04
1997 409.32 558.26 489.88 451.78 401.79 359.40 312.10 408.78 458.91
1998 414.18 557.35 489.49 450.18 396.57 351.26 309.63 398.29 455.64
1999 420.49 558.94 486.29 445.38 395.49 345.47 304.42 371.25 453.35
2000 424.51 556.36 486.25 446.74 396.64 347.87 303.03 377.37 453.53
2001 430.66 555.35 482.66 441.31 393.78 342.59 312.73 363.80 452.09
2002 483.85 567.01 503.02 468.48 433.83 403.11 391.88 426.55 487.75
2003 432.26 553.92 478.71 431.74 382.32 331.86 297.32 463.76 452.16
2004 426.76 552.46 480.72 430.55 385.40 336.66 304.36 464.98 449.96
Table 3.4d: Mean of SAT Math by class Rank
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans. Overall
1996 409.78 579.89 501.58 455.39 399.39 354.20 323.39 410.01 466.28
1997 409.55 578.17 501.47 458.20 402.92 358.52 318.43 411.77 466.77
1998 413.80 576.98 500.83 456.63 397.77 350.07 313.60 406.12 463.25
1999 420.04 575.89 496.49 449.57 394.06 343.22 301.51 376.52 458.92
2000 426.37 575.69 498.25 453.16 397.10 343.45 303.78 383.75 460.93
2001 432.98 574.87 494.29 447.49 393.59 339.02 309.14 370.52 459.27
2002 490.49 588.62 518.06 479.01 436.91 405.01 400.19 437.22 498.54
2003 435.62 573.47 491.72 437.26 383.36 331.02 296.58 472.41 460.10
2004 429.93 568.76 492.44 437.97 386.93 335.48 308.20 478.64 457.68
Table 3.5a: Number of Scores Sent
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 3.36 5.39 4.63 4.24 3.83 3.43 3.26 2.80 4.29
1997 3.39 5.39 4.55 4.25 3.81 3.51 3.22 2.77 4.27
1998 3.22 5.24 4.43 4.05 3.61 3.26 3.08 2.75 4.08
1999 3.21 5.06 4.3 3.98 3.59 3.24 3.12 2.53 3.98
2000 3.32 5.06 4.41 4.11 3.71 3.39 3.16 2.51 4.05
2001 3.32 5.09 4.45 4.14 3.77 3.49 3.33 2.63 4.06
2002 3.43 5.00 4.41 4.17 3.81 3.53 3.35 2.74 4.02
2003 3.50 4.94 4.36 4.12 3.80 3.57 3.34 3.380 3.97
2004 3.29 4.77 4.22 3.98 3.67 3.41 3.39 3.73 3.86
Table 3.5b: Number of Scores Sent within Texas
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 2.58 3.38 3.33 3.21 3.00 2.72 2.58 2.15 3.11
1997 2.59 3.40 3.30 3.22 2.98 2.74 2.47 2.15 3.10
1998 2.45 3.34 3.21 3.07 2.81 2.56 2.46 2.15 2.97
1999 2.41 3.19 3.14 3.03 2.81 2.56 2.41 1.97 2.91
2000 2.53 3.22 3.22 3.11 2.91 2.67 2.47 1.99 2.97
2001 2.52 3.17 3.23 3.11 2.93 2.71 2.69 2.05 2.95
2002 2.58 3.16 3.26 3.19 2.98 2.81 2.67 2.15 2.95
2003 2.68 3.16 3.24 3.16 2.98 2.81 2.62 2.52 2.93
2004 2.54 3.11 3.17 3.13 2.92 2.72 2.71 2.61 2.88
Table 3.5c: Number of Scores Sent to TTPR schools
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 1.42 1.82 1.90 1.88 1.70 1.41 1.26 1.16 1.75
1997 1.41 1.83 1.90 1.87 1.68 1.43 1.16 1.17 1.74
1998 1.32 1.80 1.85 1.80 1.59 1.32 1.19 1.14 1.67
1999 1.34 1.75 1.81 1.76 1.60 1.36 1.19 1.02 1.64
2000 1.43 1.80 1.88 1.83 1.66 1.43 1.23 1.07 1.70
2001 1.44 1.78 1.90 1.83 1.67 1.46 1.40 1.14 1.69
2002 1.49 1.80 1.94 1.87 1.68 1.50 1.31 1.15 1.70
2003 1.56 1.83 1.95 1.90 1.70 1.50 1.24 1.53 1.72
2004 1.47 1.82 1.93 1.86 1.68 1.46 1.31 1.57 1.69
Table 3.5d: Number of Scores Sent to TX 2yr colleges
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.39 0.17 0.28 0.35 0.48 0.62 0.67 0.36 0.34
1997 0.41 0.17 0.29 0.37 0.48 0.61 0.68 0.37 0.35
1998 0.38 0.18 0.27 0.35 0.44 0.58 0.63 0.40 0.34
1999 0.36 0.16 0.27 0.35 0.44 0.54 0.56 0.39 0.33
2000 0.36 0.16 0.28 0.36 0.47 0.59 0.62 0.40 0.34
2001 0.33 0.15 0.27 0.35 0.46 0.55 0.64 0.43 0.33
2002 0.29 0.14 0.27 0.36 0.46 0.59 0.68 0.49 0.32
2003 0.32 0.14 0.28 0.37 0.48 0.62 0.70 0.25 0.31
2004 0.32 0.14 0.26 0.37 0.47 0.59 0.69 0.24 0.31
108
Table 3.5e: Number of Scores Sent to UT Austin
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.25 0.51 0.42 0.36 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.22 0.35
1997 0.24 0.49 0.40 0.35 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.20 0.342
1998 0.24 0.49 0.41 0.33 0.24 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.33
1999 0.26 0.49 0.40 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.33
2000 0.29 0.51 0.42 0.35 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.35
2001 0.27 0.52 0.41 0.33 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.34
2002 0.28 0.53 0.40 0.30 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.33
2003 0.27 0.54 0.40 0.31 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.31 0.33
2004 0.24 0.53 0.39 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.34 0.32
Table 3.5f: Number of Scores Sent to UT Dallas
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
1997 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03
1998 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.0 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03
1999 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03
2000 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04
2001 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05
2002 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05
2003 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06
2004 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06
Table 3.5g: Number of Scores Sent to Texas A&M
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.21 0.45 0.38 0.31 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.31
1997 0.20 0.43 0.37 0.30 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.30
1998 0.19 0.41 0.36 0.28 0.19 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.28
1999 0.20 0.41 0.35 0.28 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.28
2000 0.22 0.42 0.36 0.29 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.29
2001 0.22 0.42 0.36 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.28
2002 0.23 0.40 0.34 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.27
2003 0.20 0.39 0.33 0.24 0.16 0.116 0.07 0.24 0.25
2004 0.18 0.36 0.30 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.26 0.23
Table 3.5h: Number of Scores Sent to a selective school
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.49 0.99 0.83 0.71 0.49 0.33 0.27 0.41 0.70
1997 0.47 0.96 0.81 0.69 0.48 0.34 0.26 0.38 0.67
1998 0.45 0.95 0.80 0.65 0.46 0.32 0.26 0.40 0.65
1999 0.48 0.94 0.78 0.64 0.46 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.64
2000 0.55 0.98 0.82 0.69 0.51 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.68
2001 0.53 0.99 0.82 0.66 0.47 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.66
2002 0.56 0.99 0.81 0.63 0.43 0.32 0.28 0.32 0.65
2003 0.53 0.99 0.79 0.61 0.43 0.30 0.25 0.60 0.64
2004 0.47 0.96 0.76 0.57 0.41 0.28 0.29 0.66 0.61
Table 3.5i: Proportion who send to at least one selective school
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.38 0.71 0.60 0.52 0.38 0.27 0.23 0.31 0.51
1997 0.36 0.69 0.59 0.51 0.37 0.28 0.21 0.29 0.50
1998 0.35 0.68 0.58 0.48 0.35 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.48
1999 0.37 0.68 0.57 0.47 0.36 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.48
2000 0.41 0.70 0.59 0.50 0.39 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.50
2001 0.39 0.71 0.58 0.48 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.48
2002 0.40 0.70 0.57 0.46 0.34 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.47
2003 0.39 0.70 0.56 0.45 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.43 0.47
2004 0.35 0.68 0.54 0.42 0.32 0.23 0.23 0.47 0.44
Table 3.6a: Number of Takers by LOS x CS schools
LOS=0 LOS=1 LOS=0 LOS=1
CS=0 CS=0 CS=1 CS=1
1996 73574 5369 1802 3024
1997 77113 5704 1845 3088
1998 82870 6221 1829 3216
1999 86909 6612 1774 3435
2000 91058 6981 1796 3532
2001 92824 6898 1774 3519
2002 97596 7242 1663 3596
2003 102307 7425 1880 3648
2004 104945 7746 1909 3624
Table 3.6b: Proportion of 12th Graders taking an SAT by LOS x CS schools
LOS=0 LOS=1 LOS=0 LOS=1
CS=0 CS=0 CS=1 CS=1
1996 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.47
1997 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.45
1998 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.46
1999 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.50
2000 0.49 0.51 0.45 0.51
2001 0.49 0.53 0.44 0.52
2002 0.50 0.54 0.42 0.55
2003 0.49 0.53 0.43 0.54
2004 0.49 0.56 0.42 0.54
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Table 3.6c: Proportion of SAT Takers sending to UT Austin by LOS x CS Schools
LOS=0 LOS=1 LOS=0 LOS=1
year CS=0 CS=0 CS=1 CS=1
1996 0.36 0.23 0.31 0.20
1997 0.35 0.21 0.30 0.18
1998 0.34 0.22 0.27 0.17
1999 0.34 0.21 0.29 0.18
2000 0.36 0.24 0.28 0.20
2001 0.34 0.26 0.30 0.20
2002 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.21
2003 0.32 0.26 0.27 0.22
2004 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.23
Table 3.7: Proportion Taking SAT and Sending to UT Austin
Prop. SAT Prop. Austin—SAT
Year LOS=0 LOS=1 LOS=0 LOS=1
1996 0.39 0.44 0.24 0.23
1997 0.42 0.43 0.22 0.21
1998 0.37 0.47 0.20 0.20
1999 0.33 0.49 0.22 0.20
2000 0.45 0.52 0.23 0.24
2001 0.45 0.53 0.18 0.26
2002 0.42 0.55 0.19 0.25
2003 0.40 0.53 0.24 0.25
2004 0.41 0.57 0.24 0.26
Table 3.8: Individual level regressions for score-report sending w/o fixed effects
Dependent Variables
> 4 scores # scores non-select selective Austin TTPR In-state
Trend 0.001 -0.01 0.008 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0
[0.001] [0.004]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.000] [0.000]
No Rank -0.089 -0.499 -0.071 -0.009 -0.007 -0.031 -0.008
[0.004]** [0.024]** [0.006]** [0.005]* [0.004] [0.005]** [0.002]**
1st decile 0.186 0.984 -0.109 0.201 0.157 -0.006 0.003
[0.005]** [0.027]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.004] [0.002]
2nd decile 0.084 0.442 -0.043 0.152 0.111 0.012 0.004
[0.004]** [0.019]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.002]**
2nd quintile 0.052 0.241 -0.008 0.097 0.073 0.016 0.004
[0.003]** [0.018]** [0.004] [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.001]**
4th quintile -0.035 -0.208 -0.024 -0.071 -0.045 -0.042 -0.008
[0.005]** [0.032]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.003]*
5th quintile -0.049 -0.343 -0.08 -0.095 -0.076 -0.074 -0.017
[0.011]** [0.063]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.010]** [0.014]** [0.007]*
Post 0.001 -0.108 -0.024 -0.003 -0.01 -0.002 -0.001
[0.004] [0.022]** [0.005]** [0.004] [0.003]** [0.003] [0.001]
Post×No Rank 0.036 0.014 -0.004 0.007 0.017 0.006 0.002
[0.004]** [0.026] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]** [0.005] [0.002]
Post×1st decile -0.056 -0.248 -0.02 0.019 0.038 0.005 0
[0.004]** [0.026]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004] [0.002]
Post×2nd decile -0.019 -0.093 -0.003 -0.001 0.012 0.002 0
[0.004]** [0.021]** [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]** [0.003] [0.002]
Post×2nd quintile -0.016 -0.038 -0.002 -0.016 -0.01 -0.005 -0.002
[0.004]** [0.020] [0.004] [0.004]** [0.004]* [0.003] [0.002]
Post×4th quintile 0.005 0.054 0.016 0.013 0.007 0.016 0.004
[0.006] [0.035] [0.007]* [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]* [0.004]
Post×5th quintile 0.008 0.123 0.031 0.044 0.046 0.022 0.015
[0.012] [0.069] [0.016]* [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.015] [0.008]
Constant 0.314 3.853 0.795 0.359 0.435 0.598 0.97
[0.072]** [0.442]** [0.121]** [0.057]** [0.066]** [0.053]** [0.019]**
Observations 865490 865490 865490 865490 865490 751339 751339
R2 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.01 0
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
,whether the school subsequently gets LOS or CS, the post dummy,
and interactions between the post dummy and rank categories.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable
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Table 3.9: Individual level regressions for score-report sending with fixed effects
Dependent Variables
> 4 scores # scores non-select selective Austin TTPR In-state
Trend 0.003 0.007 0.012 -0.004 -0.002 0 0
[0.001]** [0.005] [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.000] [0.000]
No Rank -0.09 -0.506 -0.071 -0.004 -0.003 -0.026 -0.008
[0.004]** [0.023]** [0.005]** [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]** [0.002]**
1st decile 0.213 1.104 -0.113 0.214 0.176 -0.007 0
[0.004]** [0.025]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.003]* [0.002]
2nd decile 0.1 0.515 -0.044 0.158 0.122 0.012 0.002
[0.004]** [0.019]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.002]
2nd quintile 0.06 0.279 -0.008 0.099 0.077 0.016 0.002
[0.003]** [0.018]** [0.004]* [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.001]
4th quintile -0.046 -0.268 -0.021 -0.072 -0.049 -0.04 -0.006
[0.005]** [0.032]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.003]
5th quintile -0.067 -0.439 -0.074 -0.092 -0.073 -0.069 -0.013
[0.011]** [0.062]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.013]** [0.007]
Post 0.002 -0.113 -0.03 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002
[0.003] [0.021]** [0.004]** [0.003] [0.003]** [0.003] [0.001]
Post×No Rank 0.036 0.017 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.004 0.002
[0.004]** [0.024] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]* [0.004] [0.002]
Post×1st decile -0.059 -0.261 -0.018 0.018 0.036 0.007 0
[0.004]** [0.026]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003] [0.002]
Post×2nd decile -0.021 -0.1 -0.001 -0.002 0.01 0.003 0
[0.004]** [0.022]** [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]** [0.003] [0.002]
Post×2nd quintile -0.017 -0.044 -0.003 -0.016 -0.01 -0.004 -0.002
[0.004]** [0.021]* [0.004] [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003] [0.002]
Post×4th quintile 0.007 0.061 0.012 0.011 0.005 0.015 0.004
[0.005] [0.034] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]* [0.004]
Post×5th quintile 0.013 0.144 0.023 0.038 0.039 0.016 0.014
[0.012] [0.069]* [0.015] [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.015] [0.008]
Constant 0.028 1.863 0.453 -0.034 -0.089 0.777 0.933
[0.066] [0.569]** [0.069]** [0.103] [0.105] [0.074]** [0.020]**
Observations 865490 865490 865490 865490 865490 751339 751339
R2 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.02
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, teacher student ratio, teacher experience
and whether the school subsequently gets LOS or CS.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.
Table 3.10: Difference-in-Differences estimates for LOS program w/o fixed effects
Dependent Variables
Austin # scores non-select selective TTPR In-State > 4 scores
Trend 0.005 -0.02 0.011 0.003 0.007 0.001 -0.003
[0.002]** [0.013] [0.003]** [0.002] [0.002]** [0.001] [0.002]
No Rank 0.021 -0.566 -0.055 0.003 -0.035 -0.002 -0.123
[0.017] [0.078]** [0.022]* [0.016] [0.025] [0.012] [0.019]**
1st decile 0.185 1.075 -0.1 0.192 0 0.008 0.231
[0.019]** [0.086]** [0.016]** [0.035]** [0.025] [0.008] [0.016]**
2nd decile 0.127 0.543 -0.031 0.133 0.011 -0.002 0.115
[0.025]** [0.071]** [0.019] [0.018]** [0.016] [0.011] [0.012]**
2nd quintile 0.056 0.342 -0.01 0.057 0.001 0.001 0.076
[0.011]** [0.092]** [0.024] [0.016]** [0.028] [0.008] [0.011]**
4th quintile 0.015 -0.239 -0.05 -0.008 -0.026 0.012 -0.06
[0.037] [0.080]** [0.025]* [0.028] [0.018] [0.008] [0.015]**
5th quintile -0.005 -0.496 -0.123 -0.07 -0.077 -0.044 -0.076
[0.073] [0.197]* [0.031]** [0.056] [0.058] [0.026] [0.036]*
LOS×No Rank -0.011 -0.026 -0.01 -0.002 -0.008 0.003 0.007
[0.014] [0.093] [0.014] [0.013] [0.016] [0.004] [0.013]
LOS×1st decile 0.092 0.081 0.051 0.077 0.05 0.012 0.03
[0.012]** [0.082] [0.017]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.004]** [0.014]*
LOS×2nd decile 0.032 0.097 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.005 0.024
[0.012]** [0.077] [0.013] [0.015] [0.009] [0.004] [0.013]
LOS×2nd quintile 0.022 0.088 0.012 0.033 0.002 0.008 0.016
[0.009]* [0.090] [0.019] [0.014]* [0.011] [0.005] [0.016]
LOS×3rd quintile 0 0.146 0.007 -0.006 0.007 0 0.026
[0.011] [0.096] [0.018] [0.013] [0.010] [0.004] [0.017]
LOS×4th quintile 0 0.052 0.018 0.019 0.002 0.007 -0.003
[0.014] [0.117] [0.021] [0.015] [0.018] [0.007] [0.017]
LOS×5th quintile -0.027 0.067 0.075 -0.012 -0.016 -0.016 -0.01
[0.025] [0.177] [0.038]* [0.023] [0.035] [0.012] [0.031]
LOS School -0.032 -0.068 -0.002 -0.034 -0.015 -0.008 -0.005
[0.013]* [0.096] [0.028] [0.015]* [0.014] [0.004] [0.018]
Constant -9.597 40.47 -21.051 -5.365 -12.465 -0.426 5.503
[3.376]** [26.636] [6.488]** [3.675] [3.375]** [1.216] [3.870]
Observations 189354 189354 189354 189354 167646 167646 189354
R2 0.09 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.02 0 0.11
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
,whether the school subsequently gets LOS or CS, the post dummy,
and interactions between the post dummy and rank categories.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable.
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.
6. The common support condition has been imposed.
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Table 3.11: Difference-in-Differences estimates for LOS program with fixed effects
Dependent Variables
Austin # scores non-select selective TTPR In-State > 4 scores
Trend 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.002
[0.002]** [0.015] [0.002]** [0.002]* [0.002]** [0.001]* [0.002]
No Rank 0.023 -0.564 -0.049 0.003 -0.025 -0.002 -0.127
[0.016] [0.070]** [0.020]* [0.016] [0.027] [0.012] [0.019]**
1st decile 0.185 1.096 -0.08 0.184 -0.001 0.007 0.241
[0.020]** [0.084]** [0.017]** [0.036]** [0.026] [0.007] [0.015]**
2nd decile 0.128 0.548 -0.017 0.128 0.01 -0.002 0.118
[0.023]** [0.072]** [0.017] [0.017]** [0.016] [0.011] [0.011]**
2nd quintile 0.057 0.346 -0.006 0.055 0.003 0.001 0.078
[0.011]** [0.092]** [0.023] [0.016]** [0.029] [0.008] [0.011]**
4th quintile 0.016 -0.245 -0.05 -0.005 -0.026 0.01 -0.059
[0.037] [0.073]** [0.024]* [0.028] [0.018] [0.008] [0.015]**
5th quintile -0.004 -0.53 -0.119 -0.07 -0.083 -0.046 -0.086
[0.073] [0.194]** [0.031]** [0.058] [0.059] [0.026] [0.035]*
LOS×No Rank -0.008 -0.019 -0.017 0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.008
[0.013] [0.082] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.004] [0.011]
LOS×1st decile 0.094 0.024 0.04 0.082 0.05 0.011 0.02
[0.012]** [0.071] [0.016]* [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.004]** [0.014]
LOS×2nd decile 0.032 0.061 0.004 0.02 0.014 0.004 0.018
[0.011]** [0.067] [0.010] [0.015] [0.009] [0.004] [0.012]
LOS×2nd quintile 0.023 0.07 0.005 0.036 0 0.007 0.014
[0.009]** [0.078] [0.016] [0.013]** [0.008] [0.005] [0.013]
LOS×3rd quintile 0.003 0.177 -0.002 0.002 0.003 0 0.033
[0.010] [0.083]* [0.016] [0.012] [0.009] [0.004] [0.014]*
LOS×4th quintile 0.005 0.118 0.013 0.031 0 0.007 0.011
[0.013] [0.104] [0.015] [0.014]* [0.014] [0.006] [0.015]
LOS×5th quintile -0.02 0.184 0.051 0.007 -0.023 -0.014 0.01
[0.024] [0.177] [0.030] [0.024] [0.034] [0.012] [0.031]
Constant -14.065 -9.156 -26.75 -7.974 -9.849 -1.643 -4.504
[3.936]** [30.492] [4.994]** [4.045] [3.311]** [1.289] [4.289]
Observations 189354 189354 189354 189354 167646 167646 189354
R2 0.1 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.13
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
,whether the school subsequently gets LOS or CS, the post dummy,
and interactions between the post dummy and rank categories.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.
6. The common support condition has been imposed.
Table 3.12: Difference-in-Differences estimates for CS program w/o fixed effects
Dependent Variables
A&M # scores non-select selective TTPR In-State > 4 scores
Trend -0.006 0.012 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.005
[0.002]** [0.014] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]**
No Rank -0.017 -0.606 -0.083 -0.011 -0.034 -0.005 -0.118
[0.013] [0.089]** [0.022]** [0.020] [0.016]* [0.008] [0.018]**
1st decile 0.149 0.989 -0.088 0.215 0.031 0.014 0.194
[0.018]** [0.119]** [0.027]** [0.022]** [0.017] [0.008] [0.019]**
2nd decile 0.086 0.479 -0.027 0.115 0.011 0.006 0.109
[0.016]** [0.086]** [0.023] [0.019]** [0.014] [0.008] [0.017]**
2nd quintile 0.057 0.226 0.006 0.075 0.026 0.005 0.06
[0.014]** [0.082]** [0.015] [0.017]** [0.013]* [0.008] [0.013]**
4th quintile -0.061 -0.346 -0.064 -0.092 -0.083 -0.028 -0.068
[0.025]* [0.138]* [0.024]** [0.033]** [0.030]** [0.019] [0.023]**
5th quintile -0.086 -0.357 -0.114 -0.168 -0.139 -0.071 -0.037
[0.031]** [0.198] [0.059] [0.044]** [0.076] [0.069] [0.038]
CS×No Rank 0.023 -0.217 -0.043 0.035 0.004 0.003 -0.021
[0.014] [0.111] [0.025] [0.013]** [0.012] [0.005] [0.017]
CS×1st decile 0.035 -0.322 0.014 0.043 0.035 0.005 -0.05
[0.019] [0.088]** [0.022] [0.015]** [0.016]* [0.006] [0.014]**
CS×2nd decile 0.014 -0.255 -0.017 0.001 -0.008 0.005 -0.05
[0.014] [0.093]** [0.016] [0.015] [0.011] [0.005] [0.017]**
CS×2nd quintile 0.014 -0.148 -0.025 0.023 -0.009 0.007 -0.029
[0.013] [0.092] [0.018] [0.014] [0.013] [0.005] [0.014]*
CS×3rd quintile 0.02 -0.113 -0.057 0.014 -0.01 -0.003 -0.016
[0.011] [0.094] [0.022]** [0.015] [0.014] [0.008] [0.015]
CS×4th quintile 0.015 -0.038 -0.08 0.024 -0.058 0.008 -0.026
[0.018] [0.148] [0.029]** [0.027] [0.030] [0.011] [0.018]
CS×5th quintile 0.02 -0.316 -0.082 0.061 -0.004 0.013 -0.056
[0.032] [0.245] [0.043] [0.039] [0.045] [0.010] [0.051]
CS School 0.001 -0.146 -0.01 -0.035 -0.053 -0.004 -0.02
[0.013] [0.089] [0.034] [0.014]* [0.014]** [0.004] [0.015]
Constant 11.944 -19.36 -4.947 -2.037 -1.9 2.36 -9.546
[3.272]** [27.667] [7.067] [3.751] [3.552] [1.083]* [3.535]**
Observations 265849 265849 265849 265849 233562 233562 265849
R2 0.07 0.1 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.11
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
,whether the school subsequently gets LOS or CS, the post dummy,
and interactions between the post dummy and rank categories.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable.
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.
6. The common support condition has been imposed.
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Table 3.13: Difference-in-Differences estimates for CS program with fixed effects
Dependent Variables
A&M # scores non-select selective TTPR In-State > 4 scores
Trend -0.007 0.002 0.012 -0.004 0.003 0 0.003
[0.002]** [0.016] [0.002]** [0.002]* [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
No Rank -0.017 -0.593 -0.073 0 -0.027 -0.004 -0.118
[0.012] [0.085]** [0.020]** [0.020] [0.016] [0.008] [0.017]**
1st decile 0.154 1.028 -0.078 0.218 0.03 0.012 0.206
[0.017]** [0.116]** [0.025]** [0.021]** [0.016] [0.008] [0.019]**
2nd decile 0.089 0.498 -0.02 0.114 0.014 0.006 0.115
[0.016]** [0.090]** [0.021] [0.018]** [0.013] [0.008] [0.017]**
2nd quintile 0.057 0.239 0.011 0.074 0.03 0.004 0.064
[0.014]** [0.079]** [0.014] [0.017]** [0.013]* [0.008] [0.013]**
4th quintile -0.061 -0.361 -0.078 -0.09 -0.081 -0.027 -0.072
[0.027]* [0.144]* [0.026]** [0.035]* [0.029]** [0.019] [0.024]**
5th quintile -0.077 -0.405 -0.094 -0.177 -0.14 -0.07 -0.045
[0.031]* [0.192]* [0.065] [0.044]** [0.074] [0.069] [0.038]
CS×No Rank 0.021 -0.126 -0.035 0.036 0.002 0.004 -0.011
[0.012] [0.100] [0.020] [0.012]** [0.011] [0.004] [0.014]
CS×1st decile 0.037 -0.301 0.004 0.048 0.035 0.007 -0.05
[0.019] [0.083]** [0.021] [0.015]** [0.013]** [0.005] [0.012]**
CS×2nd decile 0.016 -0.228 -0.019 0 -0.009 0.007 -0.048
[0.014] [0.084]** [0.014] [0.014] [0.010] [0.005] [0.015]**
CS×2nd quintile 0.013 -0.109 -0.023 0.02 -0.008 0.008 -0.025
[0.013] [0.085] [0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.005] [0.012]*
CS×3rd quintile 0.017 -0.079 -0.042 0.005 -0.01 -0.001 -0.012
[0.011] [0.085] [0.018]* [0.014] [0.014] [0.007] [0.014]
CS×4th quintile 0.006 -0.013 -0.059 0.014 -0.055 0.01 -0.024
[0.017] [0.136] [0.025]* [0.025] [0.031] [0.011] [0.016]
CS×5th quintile 0.004 -0.302 -0.09 0.06 0.012 0.011 -0.052
[0.033] [0.235] [0.041]* [0.038] [0.043] [0.010] [0.050]
Constant 13.057 -1.85 -23.622 8.213 -4.524 0.718 -5.723
[3.135]** [31.248] [4.899]** [4.008]* [3.417] [1.516] [3.893]
Observations 265849 265849 265849 265849 233562 233562 265849
R2 0.08 0.13 0.1 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.13
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
,whether the school subsequently gets LOS or CS, the post dummy,
and interactions between the post dummy and rank categories.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.
6. The common support condition has been imposed.
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CHAPTER IV
The Impact of Colorblind Admissions on the Educational
Expectations of Texas High School Graduates
4.1 Introduction
On March 18, 1996 the United States Fifth Circuit court of appeals in Hopwood v. Texas
ruled that the race of applicants could not be used for the purpose of creating a diverse
student body. In July of 1996, the Supreme Court declined to review the ruling of the
Fifth Circuit court of appeals. The ruling of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals coupled
with the Supreme Court’s subsequent refusal to review the case prompted the Attorney
General of Texas to notify all public colleges and universities in Texas that it was illegal
to consider race in decisions concerning either admissions or financial aid.
The Hopwood ruling was followed by precipitous drops in minority enrollment at Texas’s
most selective institutions of higher education. For example, in the three years following
the Hopwood decision, the number of African-American and Hispanic graduates from Texas
high schools enrolling in the state’s two most selective public universities declined by 44
percent and 11.5 percent, respectively, relative to the three years that preceded the decision
(Kain and O’Brien, 2003).
Texas’s legislators sought a race-neutral solution to reverse the decline in minority
enrollment that followed the Hopwood v. Texas decision. The legislators’ policy response,
House Bill 588 or The Top Ten Percent Rule, was signed into law on May 20, 1997 by then
governor George W. Bush. House Bill 588 grants automatic admission to any Texas public
college or university —for up to two years after graduation—for graduates of Texas’s high
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schools provided that the student both finishes in the top decile of his/her high school class
and submits a completed application. Housebill 588 also grants Texas’s public colleges
and universities the option of admitting students who graduated in the top quartile of
their class. The law also provides a list of characteristics that Texas’s public colleges and
universities may consider when making an admissions decision.1
Texas’s race-neutral admissions regime has been the subject of many debates concerning
the appropriateness of affirmative action. The merit based aspects of the regime, such as
House Bill 588’s use of class rank, makes it both more politically attractive and easier to
defend legally than a criterion that explicitly depends on race as a means of prescription.
The use of merit has made policies molded in the style of House Bill 588 viable in states
where there are existing or potential challenges to affirmative action policies.
Among academics, the efficacy of the regime has generated the lion’s share of research.
The initial impact of House Bill 588 on minority enrollment at Texas’s more selective public
universities was small, but there were sizeable increases in minority enrollment during
House Bill 588’s second year (Kain and O’Brien, 2003). Bucks (2003) documents that
students eligible for automatic admissions under House Bill 588 comprise an increasing
share of both applicants and enrolles at the University of Texas at Austin. However, Horn
and Flores (2003) and Kain and O’Brien (2003) argue that that these increases can be
attributed to to targeted financial aid and support programs, such as the University of
Texas at Austin’s Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program.
Card and Krueger (2004) find that the elimination of affirmative action has no impact
on the types of colleges that highly qualified blacks and Hispanics designate to receive
SAT score results. Long (2004) finds that the gap between the number of SAT score
reports sent by non-minority and minority students to in-state public colleges significantly
widened. The share of minority students in Texas’s high schools rose dramatically in the
nineties. When viewed relative to the demographic changes, Housebill 588’s performance
1A subset of the eighteen characteristics include the following:applicant’s academic record,socioeconomic back-
ground,whether the applicant has bilingual proficiency,extracurricular activities,employment history,and personal interview.
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as a means of diversification remains questionable.
Dickson (2006) analyzes the impact of the policies in Texas on the percentage of students
from Texas’s high schools who attempt an admissions examination. Dickson finds that
the end of affirmative action both lowered the overall percentage of students taking an
examination and ,in particular, it lowered the percent of black and Hispanic students who
attempted an admissions examination.
I analyze a similar question with a different focus and estimation method. Horn and
Flores (2003) state that percent plans work partly because the high schools are segregated.
Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I look at the impact of the admissions
regime change on the test taking at relatively segregated Texas high schools. Dickson
(2006) assumes that the impact of the changes in the admissions regime affects all high
schools in the same manner after controlling for school demographics and including both
school and time fixed effects. The method I employ relaxes this assumption. I account for
the interaction of high school type and time in my empirical specifications.
The objective of this paper is to test the ability of Texas’s post-affirmative action regime
to influence the educational expectations of high school graduates as measured by their
willingness to attempt an admissions examination. The decision to attempt an admissions
examination reflects an individual’s decision to join the potential pool of applicants to more
selective colleges. The dependent variable is the percentage of a high school’s graduates
during a particular year that have chosen to attempt an admissions examination. The
analysis focuses on individual outcomes aggregated to the high school level. The aggrega-
tion is appropriate, because eligibility for the automatic admissions granted by House Bill
588 is determined relative to a student’s graduating cohort at the high school where the
student completed her studies.
To preview results, I find a decline in the percentage of students taking admissions
examinations that is associated with the introduction of Texas’s race-neutral admissions
regime. I also find that the decline is worse for high schools classified as being Hispanic or
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Poor. Schools that are classified as being black or minority did not experience declines of
the same magnitude as high schools classified as being poor or Hispanic.
4.2 Impact of Admissions Regime Change
The policies that comprise the post-affirmative action regime are a response to the
use of race being outlawed in the admissions process. Any direct advantage that race
may have conferred upon a potential applicant is diminished. In principle, the loss of the
potential advantage in admissions probability should impact the examination behavior of
the individual minority student regardless of the characteristics of the school the student
attends. However, this paper looks at outcomes aggregated to the high school level. I
assume that such effects will have a greater impact on the schools with relatively high
minority concentrations.
House Bill 588 makes use of a blunt instrument, class rank. It restricts Texas’s public
colleges and universities from considering other measures in the admissions decision for
students who meet the class rank criterion. House Bill 588 introduces a host of effects
that depend upon interschool quality, test scores, and curriculum strength. The following
model fleshes out these issues.
Let there be two types of schools, schools of higher quality (School type: H) and schools
of lower quality (School Type: L). Each type of school produces two types of students,
students who expect to qualify for automatic admissions by being in the top of their class
(Student Type: Q) and students who do not expect to qualify for automatic admissions
(Student Type: N). Assume that both the expectation and the realization of scores on
admissions examinations are positively related to both the quality of a school and the
rank of a student within a school. For example, a Q student from a L school, on average,
expects and obtains a higher score than a N student from her school, but a Q student from
a L school, on average, expects and obtains a lower admissions examination score than an
identically ranked Q student from a H school.
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Students who qualify for automatic admissions by graduating in the top decile are
exempt from having both the quality of their high school and their standardized test
scores factor in the admission decision for Texas’s public colleges and universities. Texas’s
public colleges and universities can not deny admission to students who qualify via House
Bill 588.
The post-affirmative action admissions regime is unlikely to impact the educational
expectations of a Q student from a H school and hence the test taking behavior of such
students. Q students from L schools are likely to have their expectation of attending a more
selective institution increase relative to the periods prior to the change in the admissions
regime. Being a Q student from a L school puts such students on par with Q students
from H schools and grants them a significant advantage in admissions over lower ranked
students from H type schools who obtained higher admissions examination scores relative
to the periods prior to the post-affirmative action regime.
Texas’s post-secondary institutions are not constrained when considering N students.
High school quality, curriculum strength, and standardized test scores factor in the admis-
sions decision for students not in the top decile. Students not in the top decile at schools
of lower quality likely face a lower probability of admission to Texas’s public colleges and
universities relative to similarly ranked students in high schools of higher quality. If Texas’s
post-secondary institutions view some of the top ten students as being less than ideal, then
one method of reducing the impact of the less qualified students on the average quality of
incoming classes is to be more selective in admitting students not in the top decile. Hence,
the educational expectations of N students from L schools may decrease. The above rea-
soning also applies to N students from H schools, but to a lesser extent. Relative to N
students from L schools, N students from H schools are likely to benefit from higher test
scores and higher levels of school quality.
For a N student from a L school, the expected value of attempting an admissions
examination—as measured by the expectation of admission to a more selective institution—
125
has decreased. Given that the benefit of taking an admissions examination has declined,
N students from L schools may respond by opting not to take a costly examination.
Furthermore, if the share of minorities in a high school is negatively related to school
quality then the above mechanisms have a larger impact on the expectations of minorities
relative to the period prior to affirmative action. A minority student of type N in a L
school is subject to the mechanism outlined above and can not expect to benefit from the
consideration of his/her race in the admissions process.
The above scenario considers the behavior of individual students. I do not have data that
follows individual students. My research will investigate the aggregate response. Given
that there are situations that both positively and negatively affect individual outcomes,
my research will determine which effects have the largest magnitude.
I pose the followings questions: Did the admission regime change in Texas influence the
graduates of high schools test taking propensity? If there is an effect, does it differ for
schools of different“types”? I classify schools using the demographic characteristics of the
high schools in my sample prior to the passing of House Bill 588. School quality and the
demographic characteristics of high school are likely related. My estimates will reflect the
impact of both school quality and compositional effects on the dependent variable.
The interaction of a student’s ranking within a school, inter-school quality, and the so-
cioeconomic characteristics of high school students makes the impact of the post-affirmative
action on the educational expectations of Texas’s high school graduates relative to the prior
periods theoretically ambiguous a priori. The answers to these questions must be ascer-
tained empirically.
The study of race neutral programs remains a topic worthy of investigation despite
the United States Supreme Court’s rulings2 in the cases brought against the University
of Michigan. The end result of these rulings is that the use of race is allowable but the
means of applying race in the admissions process remains vague. Texas A&M, one of
2Grutter v. Bollinger established that diversity is a compelling government interest that allows for the use of race when
its usage is governed by a narrowly tailored program. Gratz v. Bollinger proscribes any admissions policy that makes race
a decisive factor.
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Texas’s flagship institutions, has opted to forego the consideration of race in its admissions
process. One of the attractive features of race neutral policies is that they circumvent the
legal constraints that race conscious policies must confront. This paper seeks to determine
if the post-affirmative action regime consists of policies sufficient to combat the impact on
minority students of disallowing the use of race in the admissions process.
Various factions are calling for Texas’s Top Ten Percent Rule to be struck down or
modified. It would be prudent to fully understand the ramifications of House Bill 588 in
its present incarnation before implementing some change in the policy. The two sections
that follow describe both the data and the methods that I will use to determine the impact
of race neutral admissions on the educational expectations of Texas high school graduates.
4.3 Data
The data used in this analysis are drawn from the Academic Excellence Indicator Sys-
tem (AEIS). Through the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS)
the Texas Education Agency (TEA) annually collects a broad range of information from
Texas’s high schools. Testing contractors provide the TEA with scores on standardized
tests which are administered statewide.3 The data are used to construct a panel consisting
of high schools that meet four criteria:
i. No missing values for the variables of interest.
ii. The high school possesses a campus population of at least one hundred students.
iii. The high school cannot be an alternative school.
iv. The school appears at least once in both the pre and post periods.
The sample contains 9, 875 campus-year observations; 1, 148 individual high schools
were followed over a period of nine academic years. Schools in the sample appeared a
minimum of two times with the average number of appearances in the sample being 8.6
3Data available for the following standardized tests: ACT, SAT, Advanced Placement examinations, International Bac-
calaureate examinations
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times. The data used in the analysis consist of high school demographics and institutional
characteristics, such as student to teacher ratio per school, the number of students in the
school and per pupil instructional costs in constant 2001 dollars.
4.4 Methodology
The use of race as a factor in determining admissions and financial aid was banned in
Texas on August 21,1996, the beginning of the 1996− 1997 academic year. House Bill 588
was signed into law on May 20, 1997. The first cohort exposed to the regime under which
House Bill 588 determined admissions graduated from high school during the 1997− 1998
academic year. The 1996− 1997 academic year operated under neither affirmative action
nor the Texas Top Ten Percent rule. The post-affirmative action regime is designated as
beginning during the 1997− 1998 academic year.
I propose estimating the following model to determine if the post-affirmative action
regime is associated with differential test taking propensity relative to the affirmative
action regime.
Entranceit = αi + β
′Xit + γTrend + δPostt + εit (4.1)
The dependent variable is the percentage of a high school’s graduates in year t that have
taken a college entrance examination at some point in their high school career. The αi
are school specific fixed effects. With these initial estimates, I merely cluster at the school
level. Later in the paper when I estimate models with variables that do not vary within
group, I take measures to deal with this issue. Xit consists of school level characteristics—
for example, the percentage of a campus that is black and the percentage of a campus
that is Hispanic. The Trend variable accounts for a linear trend that affects all schools
in the same manner. Postt is a binary variable that indicates an observation comes from
academic years following the 1996− 1997 academic year4
4I estimate models where I include None, a dummy variable to account for the no mandate year (1996-1997). The
inclusion of the None and Post in the estimating accounts for the existence of three regimes in the data— affirmative action
(1993 − 94 to 1995 − 96), the no mandate year (1996 − 97), the Top Ten Percent Years (1997 − 98 to 2001 − 02). The
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The population of high school students experienced tremendous changes during the
nineties. There was a marked increase in the number of graduates produced by Texas’s
high schools. The demographic composition of high schools changed as well. Minorities
comprised an increasing share of the student population. I control for these changes by
including in the specification the percentage of each school’s population that is African
American and Hispanic5.
I have no prior prediction on the sign of the coefficient associated with the variable Postt.
Earlier in the paper, I posited several channels through which the admissions regime change
can both positively and negatively affect the rate at which high school graduates attempt
admissions examinations. The presence of these potentially countervailing effects accounts
for the ambiguity associated with the impact of the post-affirmative action regime on the
test taking propensity.
The second hypothesis consists of the following question: Did the post-affirmative ac-
tion regime impact the percentage of Texas high school graduates who take admissions
examinations differently for schools of varying “type”? In order to test this hypothesis, I
devise a method of classifying schools. This classification scheme is based on the character-
istics of the school prior to the admissions regime change in order to avoid the classification
being contaminated by the effects of the regime change.
I use the demographics of the school to determine school type. Consider a characteristic
of the schools in our sample, say the percentage of the school’s students that is black. I
compute the mean of this variable for each school in the sample from the period prior to
the change in the admissions regime. I construct a binary variable that indicates if a school
is in the top quintile of the distribution of mean percentages.6 This indicator variable is
coefficient associated with this variable was small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. For the remainder of the
paper, the no mandate year is treated as belonging to the period prior to the admissions regime and does not receive separate
consideration.
5Models including the percentage of a high school’s campus that is Asian or of Pacific Island descent were estimated. The
data set has this measure beginning with the 1994 − 1995 academic year. Prior to the 1994 − 1995 academic year schools
reported Black, Hispanic, and White as the primary categories. Other ethnic categories were lumped together. Models
including the percentage of a high school campus that is Asian only use eight years of data. Including this covariate does
not alter the conclusions.





where T is the number of years school i is in the sample prior to the policy change.
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called Black . This procedure is employed to designate schools of varying“types”.
I assume that schools with relatively high minority concentrations are more likely to be
impacted by Texas’s prohibiting the use of race and the subsequent policy response, House
Bill 588. The classification scheme that I employ provides a method of identifying such
schools.
A difference-in-differences approach is employed to estimate the impact of the admis-
sions regime changes on the propensity of the graduates of Texas’s high schools to attempt
entrance examinations. With this quasi-experimental design, high schools with relatively
high concentrations of black students, Hispanic students, minority students, and poor stu-
dents7 in the period prior to the regime change are designated as schools likely to receive
treatment from the changes in the admissions regime. Schools in the four remaining quin-
tiles with respect to the time averaged measure of interest serve as the control group.
A reemergence of the “Moulton” problem (Moulton, 1990) has called into question
a number of studies that have employed a difference-in-differences estimation strategy.
Donald and Lang (2003), Wooldridge (2003), and Bertrand et al. (2004) point out the
pitfalls in estimation and inference when the underlying group structure of the data is not
addressed adequately.
Donald and Lang (2003) critique several papers that employ the difference-in-differences
framework. They point out that asymptotic properties based on the assumption of an
infinite number of groups lead to incorrect inference for the coefficients of variables that
are constant within group. Bertrand et al. (2004) state that improperly accounting for
serial correlation among outcomes and autocorrelation for “treatment” variables in the
typical difference-in-differences estimation leads to the underestimation of the standard
errors. The three papers describe the impact of variants of the “Moulton” critique on
estimation and inference that apply when the number of groups is small.
To deal with these issues I use a two-step estimation procedure that accounts for the
7Minority is defined as being either black or Hispanic. A student is classified as poor if the student receives either free or
reduced price meals
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group structure of the data. The procedure is used to estimate variants of the following
equation.
Entigt = β
′Xigt + γ0Postt + γ1Groupg + δGroupg ∗ Postt + εigt (4.2)
The two-step estimation procedure is implemented as follows. In the first stage I esti-
mate the following equation:
Ẑ = Entgt − β̂′Xgt (4.3)









for g ∈ (1, 2) and for t ∈ (1, . . . , 9)
The second step estimates the following:
Ẑ = ι + γ0Postt + γ1Groupg + δGroupg ∗ Postt + εgt (4.4)
Ẑ of equation three is a mean of the percentage of graduates who take admissions
examinations that has been regression adjusted for the variables that vary within group,
the Xigt. Postt retains the same definition. Groupg is a dummy variable that indicates that
a school is classified as being of a particular type; e.g., Poor. Groupg ∗Postt is an indicator
variable that indicates that an observation is a school of type g in the post-affirmative
action admissions regime. With two groups and nine years of data, a total of eighteen
means are estimated. Equation four estimates how well the group level variables perform
in estimating the variation in the means. The coefficient associated with Post gives the
impact of the time period associated with the post-affirmative action regime on all schools.
The coefficient associated with the indicator variable for group membership represents
the difference in mean of test-taking propensity for the two groups—for example, the
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difference between Hispanic and Non-Hispanic schools. The coefficient δ is the difference-
in-differences estimate. The size and magnitude of this coefficient on the post-affirmative
action regime on schools in a particular group relative to schools in the same group in the
period prior to Texas’s colorblind admissions regime. The regressions in the second step
are weighted by the inverse of the standard errors from the first step in order to correct
for heteroscedasticity.
The Ẑ are group-year means that have been regression adjusted for the variables that
vary at the level of the high school. The two step procedure allows an econometrician to
remove the effects of the characteristics that vary within group, while achieving proper
aggregation in order to deal with the “Moulton” problem.
The next section offers describes the sample of high schools and discusses the results.
The conclusion follows.
4.5 Discussion
The goal of this investigation is to determine the impact of the regime change on the
admissions examination behavior of Texas’s high school graduates. The rate at which
graduates take these examinations is interpreted as a proxy for the intent to possibly
apply to a more selective institution.
I avoid questions concerning the intensive aspect of taking entrance examinations. I
define the intensive component of the admissions examination behavior as the exertion de-
voted to exam performance conditional upon taking an examination. Theoretical modeling
of colorblind programs suggest that such programs result in a decrease in effort for some of
the agents (Fryer and Loury, 2003). I avoid questions concerning effort because there isn’t
an adequate measure of effort at the school level. The dependent variable employed in
this paper reflects the rate at which a Texas high school contributes to the potential pool
of applicants to more selective institutions. Effort is an individual measure that would
require extensive micro-level data beyond what is presently available.
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4.5.1 Discussion of Summary Statistics
Inspection of Tables 4.1a and 4.1b reveal several interesting demographic trends. High
schools have seen on average the percentage of Hispanic students comprising the campus
population increase by 16 percent over the years for which the data are available. This
is a direct reflection of the pattern of immigration that Texas experienced during the
nineties. The percentage of students who are classified as poor8 increased by an average
of 16 percent from 33.99 percent to 39.34 percent between the academic years 1993− 1994
and 2001 − 2002. The average number of students per high school also increased in our
sample from 817 students to 891 students.
The dependent variable is high school graduates who have taken an admissions exam-
ination. This measure is consistently around 64 percent in the pre-period. The measure
drops by four percent for those who graduated during the 1997−1998 academic year. The
timing is conspicuous. The cohort of those who graduated in 1998 is the first to be exposed
to the admissions regime that began with the ratification of House Bill 588.
Table 4.2 summarizes the pre-period and post-period means for the schools in the sam-
ple. Table 4.2 shows that schools have increased in size and that instructional costs per
student have risen over time. Minorities comprise a higher percentage of students in the
period after the regime change. This growth can attributed to the increase in the number
of Hispanic students.
Table 4.3 is constructed to present the actual differences between the pre-period and
post-period averages for the schools in our sample. For each school in the sample, I
produce means9 for the variables in both the pre-period and the pos-period. The means
were subtracted in order to produce the average difference between periods for the schools
in the sample.
The percentage of graduates taking an admissions exam has declined by 3.4 percent
8Poor is defined as students who meet the eligibility requirements to receive free or reduced price meals
9Consider a school i in either the pre or post period. Let Xi be a characteristic of the school. To generate the mean of
this variable in either period I sum this measure for all the years the school was present within the period and then divide
this sum by the number of years the school was present in the period.
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relative to the mean percentage of graduates who attempt an admissions examination in
the period prior to the change this in the admissions regime; although this difference is
not statistically distinguishable from zero, its magnitude is considerable. The differences
in the other variables mimic the patterns demonstrated in Tables 4.1a and 4.1b. The
fourth column in Table 3 contains the overall sample means and standard deviations for
the dependent variable and some of the controls used in the model.
The descriptive statistics suggest that more rigorous analytical methods are required.
I run a few basic regression models to determine if the post-affirmative action regime is
associated with differential examination taking propensity. The results of these regressions
are contained in Table 4.4.
4.5.2 Regression Results
Model 1 is a pooled ordinary least squares specification. I ignore the panel structure
of the data and treat each campus-year as unique observation. Nearly all the covariates
enter significantly. The coefficient associated with the binary variable post is of particular
interest. This coefficient is negative and statistically significant. It suggests that a −2.90
percentage point drop in the rate at which graduates of Texas’s high schools take admissions
examinations is associated with the post-affirmative action regime.
However, one should be careful in using these estimates. This is a pooled model. The
variation used to generate the estimates are derived both from variation within schools
and variation between schools. Consider the coefficient associated with the variable for the
percentage of a school that is Hispanic. It enters positively and is statistically significant.
Given the pattern of immigration in Texas and the relative socioeconomic status of the
immigrants, I find this estimate to be dubious.
Hudson (2003) using the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 documents
that Hispanics are far less likely than whites or Asians to both obtain a high School
diploma and then, within a year of graduating from high school, enroll in a post-secondary
institution. This finding—coupled with the socioeconomic status of the immigrants—
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makes it highly unlikely that an increase in the percentage of a high school that is Hispanic
is associated with an increase in the rate at which the graduates of the high school take
admissions examinations.
Model 2 is a fixed effects specification that accounts for the fact that I have up to nine
years of data on each school in the sample. The coefficients associated with school size, per
pupil instructional costs, student to teacher ratio, teacher experience, and the percentage
of the campus population that is poor decreased in magnitude and became statistically
insignificant. The coefficient associated with the percentage of the campus that is Hispanic
changed sign and increased in magnitude relative to the estimate from model one. A ten
percentage point increase in the percentage of a high school that is Hispanic is associated
with a 3.7 percentage point decline in the rate at which graduates from Texas’s high schools
take admissions examinations. This is a 5.9 percent decrease relative to the overall sample
mean.
The coefficient associated with the percentage of a campus that is black retained both
its sign and significance, but doubled in magnitude. A ten percentage point increase in the
percentage of a campus that is black is associated with a 1.5 percentage point decrease in
the rate at which graduates from Texas’s high schools take admissions examinations. This
is a 2.3 percent decrease relative to the overall sample mean. Given the arguments I made
earlier in the paper, I am a bit more comfortable with these estimates.
Model 2 was estimated without the binary variable post. With this specification, I
am interested in looking at the effects of the covariates on the rate at which Texas’s
high school graduates take college admissions examinations. A majority of the covariates
become insignificant in the fixed effects specification. This is to be expected. For a number
of the covariates, there is not much within school variation. For example, high schools are
generally designed to house a certain number of students. With such constraints in mind, I
shouldn’t expect a great deal of within school variation in the number of students. Similar
arguments are applicable for most of the other covariates. However, it is worth noting
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that the coefficient associated with the percentage of students on campus that are poor
decreased in magnitude and is no longer significant.
Model 3 is a fixed effects specification in the mold of model 2. The binary variable
Post was added. The coefficient associated with Post is negative and highly significant.
This is evidence that there is differential test taking propensity associated with the post-
affirmative action admissions regime. The post period is associated with a 2.9 percentage
point decrease in the percentage of graduates from Texas’s high schools take admissions
examinations. This is a 4.6 percent decrease relative to the overall sample mean.
The dependent variable is the ratio of graduates who have taken an admissions exam-
ination to the total number of graduates. One argument is that my findings result from
an accounting issue. The composition of Texas’s high school graduates have changed and
this accounts for the finding of the model. I control for the demographic characteristics of
the campus over time. These controls account for the impact of the demographic changes
on the nature of Texas’s high school graduates. Furthermore, I control for size of the
school. This accounts for the changes in the size of the cohort of graduates10. Hence, I
am reasonably assured that my findings reflect the impact of the post-affirmative action
regime on post-secondary educational expectations.
The initial findings indicate that the post-affirmative action regime is associated with
a decrease in the propensity of high school graduates to take admissions examinations. I
have yet to speak to the distribution of the impact. Is it the case that the policies enacted
had disparate impacts upon schools of different “type”? Students in the top decile are
now admitted regardless of the score they obtain on the admissions examination. For
students not in the top decile, admissions operates in a classical sense—test scores and the
curriculum count a great deal. The “type” of high school that students attend impacts how
admissions officers evaluate their applications. Given that all students who attend college
do not graduate in the top ten percent, differences in school characteristics will have an
10Though not included in this paper, I have estimated models where the number of graduates per school was used explicitly
as a control. The inclusion of this variable does not alter the conclusions
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impact on both the admissions probabilities of students and the students’ expectations of
admission to more selective colleges and universities. This implies that the impact of the
post-affirmative action regime will differ for students who attend different types of schools..
The comparison of Poor and Non − Poor schools, using the descriptive statistics in
Table 4.5a, reveal several interesting facts. Relative to Non− Poor schools, Poor schools
are on average smaller in size, tend to have higher instructional costs per pupil, and possess
a student body that has a lower percentage of graduates that take admissions examinations,
58.95 percent versus 66.22 percent for Non − Poor schools. Table 4.6a reveals that 147
Hispanic schools and 127 Minority are classified as being Poor. Table 4.6b shows that
87 Hispanic Schools and 45 Minority Schools are also classified as being Non − Poor
schools. This reveals a positive correlation between the the presence of under-represented
minorities and the socioeconomic status of a high school.
Table 4.7 contains the results from the second step of the estimating procedure described
in the previous section. The table includes the estimates for variables that do not vary
at the group level. The second column estimates the model for schools classified as being
Poor. The coefficient associated with Post is −2.71 percentage points and it is significant
at the one percent level. The coefficient associated with Post is an estimate of the overall
decline in the percentage of graduates that take admissions examinations.
The estimate of the coefficient associated with Poor is −26.50 percentage points and
it is significant at the one percent level. This reflects the height difference between the
regression adjusted means. The appropriate interpretation of Poor is that it reflects the
difference between Poor schools and Non−Poor schools that remains even after accounting
for differences in the covariates that vary at the high school level.
The difference-in-differences estimate, the coefficient associated with Post ∗ Poor, has
a value of −2.60 percentage points, and it is significant at the one percent level. Using
the average of the percentage of graduates from Poor schools who take admissions exam-
inations in the period prior to the change in the admissions regime as a reference, this
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indicates that a Poor school, on average, experiences a 7.91 percent decline relative to a
Poor school in the period before the change in the admissions policy.
Figure 4.1 graphs the regression adjusted group-year means used to estimate the sec-
ond step. The Non − Poor group-year means do a good job of tracking the pattern of
the Poor high schools prior to the change in the regime. I also consider the “false experi-
ment” of looking for difference-in-differences findings prior to the change in the admissions
regime. The graph demonstrates that one can reject the existence of spurious difference-
in-differences results prior to the change in the admissions regime.
Inspection of Table 4.5a reveals that the graduates of Hispanic schools, on average,
take admissions examinations at a rate that is 5.2 percentage points lower relative to
Non−Hispanic schools in the period prior the change in the admissions regime. Hispanic
schools are, on average, larger and possessed a demographic profile that with nearly three
times the percentage of minority students, 79.31 versus 27.76 for Non−Hispanic schools.
64.47 percent of Hispanic schools are classified as Poor while only 9.46 percent of Non−
Hispanic are classified as Poor.
The third column of of Table 4.7 contains the estimates for Hispanic schools. The
coefficient associated with Post has a value of −3.00 and is highly significant. The coeffi-
cient associated with the indicator for Hispanic group membership is −23.21 and is highly
significant. No surprises here, Hispanic schools are different from their Non −Hispanic
counterparts.
The difference-in-differences estimate is −1.70 and significant at the five percent level.
Using the average of the percentage of graduates from Hispanic schools who take ad-
missions examinations in the period prior to the change in the admissions regime as a
reference, this indicates that a Hispanic school, on average, experiences a 7.76 percent
decline relative to a Hispanic school in the period prior to the change in the admissions
policy.
The results indicate that the colorblind admissions regime adversely impacts the test
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taking behavior of the graduates from Poor schools and Hispanic schools. The purpose of
House Bill 588 was to restore diversity to Texas’s post-secondary institutions. It is possible
for the program to both permit some graduates to gain admissions to more selective insti-
tutions and, simultaneously, diminish the post-secondary opportunities of other students.
For Poor schools and Hispanic schools, the losses outweigh the gains.
Figure 4.2 contains the graph of the regression adjusted group-year means for Hispanic
and Non − Hispanic schools. The Non − Hispanic group-year means do a good job of
tracking the time pattern of Hispanic schools group year means prior to the change in the
admissions regime. Figure 4.2 demonstrates that one can reject the existence of spurious
difference-in-differences results prior to the change in the admissions regime.
Black schools have, on average, larger student bodies. Teachers at Black schools have
more than a year of experience relative to their counterparts at Non−Black schools. Black
schools have a higher percentage of minorities relative to Non − Black schools but with
less than half the percentage of Hispanic students relative to Non − Black schools. The
graduates of Black schools on average attempt an admissions examination 3.28 percentage
points less than Non−Black schools.
Column four of Table 4.7 contains the results for Black schools. The coefficient asso-
ciated with Post is −3.35 percentage points, and it is highly significant. The coefficient
associated with an indicator for being classified as a Black school is −18.93 percentage
points, and it is highly significant. Again, no surprises here. Black schools are different.
The difference-in-differences estimate is 1.69 percentage points and highly significant. Us-
ing the average of the percentage of graduates from Black schools who take admissions
examinations in the period prior to the change in the admissions regime as a reference,
this indicates that a Black school, on average, experiences a 2.67 percent decline relative
to a Black school in the period prior to the change in the admissions policy.
Figure 4.3 contains the graph of the regression adjusted group-year means for Black
and Non−Black schools. The Non−Black group-year means do a good job of tracking
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the time pattern of Black schools group year means prior to the change in the admissions
regime. Figure 4.3 demonstrates that the decline in test-taking propensity was greater in
magnitude for Non − Black schools. This explains the positive estimate returned by the
difference-in-differences estimator. Let δB and δNB be the differences in the means between
the period prior to the regime change and the period after the regime change for Black
and Non− Black schools, respectively. The difference-in-differences estimator essentially
estimates, δB−δNB. The positive estimate is obtained because δNB is both negative and of
greater magnitude than δB. One interpretation of this finding is that, on average, the set
of schools classified as Black aren’t as responsive to the change in the admissions regime
as students in both Hispanic schools and Poor schools. This idea will be discussed later
in the paper.
The percentage of graduates from Minority schools that attempt at least one admis-
sions examination is smaller than the analogous number from Non−Minority schools by
7.74 percentage points. Minority schools are larger and spend nearly 230 dollars less in
instructional costs per pupil. Minority schools also have, on average, nearly double the
percentage of poor students.
Column four of Table 4.7 contains the results for estimates with respect to Minority
schools.The coefficient associated with Post has a value of −3.65 percentage points. The
coefficient associated with being classified as a Minority school has a value of −21.92
percentage points,and it is significant at the one percent level. the difference-in-differences
estimate is .801. The estimate is statistically insignificant. Using the average of the
percentage of graduates from Minority schools who take admissions examinations in the
period prior to the change in the admissions regime as a reference, this indicates that a
Minority school, on average, experiences a 4.87 percent decline relative to a Minority
school in the period prior to the change in the admissions policy.
Figure 4.4 contains the graph of the regression adjusted group-year means for Minority
and Non −Minority schools. The Non −Minority group-year means do a good job of
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tracking the time pattern of Minority schools group-year means prior to the change in the
admissions regime. Figure 4.4 demonstrates that the decline in test-taking propensity was
greater in magnitude for Non−Minority schools. This parallels what happened when the
difference-in-differences estimate for Black schools was estimated. The positive estimate
is a result of test-taking declining less for Minority schools relative to Non −Minority
schools.
The impact of Texas’s colorblind admissions policy differs for different types of schools.
The difference-in-differences estimates for both Black and Minority schools are positive.
Table 4.5b offers some clues as to why Black schools aren’t as adversely affected by the
change in the admissions regime. Relative to Poor, Hispanic, and Minority schools,
Black schools have far smaller concentrations of Hispanic and Poor students. Only 3.11
percent of Black schools are classified as Hispanic. Only 17.11 percent of Black schools
are classified as Poor. In Texas, schools I classify as being Black aren’t as likely as Poor
schools and Hispanic to contain students of low socioeconomic status who are likely to be
impacted by the policy.
Nearly thirty percent of the Minority schools in my sample are Longhorn Opportu-
nity Scholarship Schools. The University of Texas at Austin established the Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship to recruit at Texas high schools that traditionally had not had
many graduates attend the University of Texas at Austin. High schools that qualify for
this program have, on average, both high minority populations and students from families
of low socioeconomic status. The program offers financial aid to a few of the graduates
in the top decile from the seventy Texas high schools that were selected. In addition to
financial aid, students who were recruited via this program received priority status in reg-
istration, the opportunity to receive mentoring and free tutoring. The University of Texas
at Austin established recruitment centers to inform students about the application process
and the availability of this program.The University of Texas at Austin used the Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship as a segue to recruit other students.
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Dickson (2006) finds that the program has a positive impact on the percentage of
graduates who attempt an admissions program. This would tend to bias the estimate of
the difference-in-differences coefficient upwards for Minority schools.
4.6 Conclusion
There are two main findings in this paper: First, there was a negative change in the
propensity for graduates of Texas’s to attempt admission’s examinations associated with
the change in the admissions regime in Texas. Second, the impact of these changes varied
according to the type of school.
House Bill 588 is an effort to increase diversity at Texas’s public colleges and universities.
It uses an unwieldy measure of merit, class ranking, to determine admissions for the upper
decile of a high school’s graduating class. Relative to admissions in the classical sense,
Texas’s Top Ten Percent Rule alters the incentives both within and between schools.
The June 13, 2004 issue of the New York Times contained a article which highlighted
just this issue (Glater, 2004). In this article the father of a young man denied admission
to the University of Texas at Austin complains that his son was penalized because the son
attended a competitive high school. The father implies his son was crowded out due to
the automatic admissions granted to graduates from less competitive high schools. This
research is intended to provide information for policy makers that reveals the true impact
of the changes and places narratives—like the one mentioned above—in the appropriate
context.
I find an overall decline in the percentage of graduates who take an admissions exami-
nation. Furthermore, I am able to determine that these impacts are particularly severe at
historically Poor schools, Hispanic schools. For Black schools and Minority schools the
impact 0f the post-affirmative action regime is positive, though significant only for Black
schools. It was shown, however, that Black schools are different from the other ethnic
types with respect to minority concentration and the concentration of poor students. For
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Minority schools, the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program and the fact that there
is considerable overlap between Minority schools and Black schools likely attenuate the
impact of the admissions regime change.
House Bill 588 sought to remedy the dearth of minorities by easing admissions for the
top decile to take advantage of the fact that a number of Texas’s high schools are racially
identifiable. Using the racial identifiability of Texas’s high schools in conjunction with
a blunt measure of student quality—like class rank—produces perverse incentives. This
paper finds that for some schools students reacted negatively to the incentives.
I mentioned before that the success of the Top Ten Percent Plan in its primary mission,
which is restoring an acceptable minority presence to Texas’s public colleges and univer-
sities, has been called into question. The proportion of minorities on the campuses of
Texas’s public colleges and universities is less than the proportion of college age minori-
ties relative to the total population of college age youth in Texas. This paper provides
a possible explanation for this lack of results. Given that the policy negatively impacts
Hispanic schools, it stands to reason that the pool of applicants will not equate with the
proportion of minorities present in Texas’s college age youth. This is especially important
when one considers the growth rate of the Hispanic population. In attempting to restore
diversity to its post-secondary institutions, particularly the flagship schools, surely Texas’s
legislators did not intend to dampen the educational expectations of Hispanic students and
poor students.
This paper estimates the impact of the post-affirmative action regime on the admission’s
examination taking propensity of Texas’s high school graduates. I find that the House Bill
588 had a negative impact on the test taking propensity and that the impact is worse for
schools classified as being Poor schools or Hispanic schools. In the future, all the potential
impacts of diversification efforts must be taken into account. To ignore these effects will
prove costly and damaging to those most in need of assistance.
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4.7 Tables
Table 4.1a: Descriptive Statistics: Pre Period
Variable 1993− 1994 1994− 1995 1995− 1996 1996− 1997
% Taking Exam|Graduate 64.47 64.54 64.63 63.86
(16.10) (15.58) (16.61) (15.82)
School Size 817.26 832.91 850.74 876.11
(785.12) (789.79) (807.30) (830.58)
Instructional Costs 3083.19 3085.65 3142.73 3180.40
(929.34) (630.17) (646.24) (658.33)
Teacher’s Experience 12.96 12.92 12.99 12.99
(2.12) (2.12) (2.07) (2.07)
Student\Teacher Ratio 13.67 13.55 13.38 13.45
(2.94) (2.89) (3.06) (3.58)
% Black 13.55 13.72 13.70 13.59
(19.23) (19.19) (19.03) (18.69)
% Hispanic 32.95 32.93 32.92 33.89
(31.32) (31.05) (30.77) (30.81)
% Minority 46.50 46.64 46.62 47.48
(31.18) (31.07) (30.97) (30.93)
% Poor 30.74 31.73 31.59 33.41
(21.48) (21.69) (22.06) (22.69)
N 1088 1102 1098 1108
Notes: The table consists of means with standard deviations in parentheses
School size is in number of students.
Instructional costs are per pupil and in constant 2001 dollars.
Teacher’s experience is the average number of years of experience per teacher.
Table 4.1b: Descriptive Statistics: Post Period
Variable 1997− 1998 1998− 1999 1999− 2000 2000− 2001 2001− 2002
% Taking Exam|Graduate 62.21 62.78 62.63 63.26 61.98
(15.86) (16.02) (16.22) (16.35) (16.59)
School Size 900.06 892.78 895.77 895.34 891.13
(852.43) (849.17) (851.13) (848.59) (853.77)
Instructional Costs 3320.10 3340.31 3563.47 4094.85 4168.68
(646.94) (652.91) (689.13) (1137.20) (1143.47)
Teacher’s Experience 13.03 13.07 12.86 13.08 13.03
(2.05) (1.99) (2.38) (2.33) (2.34)
Student\Teacher Ratio 13.20 13.08 12.88 12.75 12.61
(2.93) (2.85) (2.85) (2.83) (2.34)
% Black 13.68 10.80 13.28 10.85 10.72
(18.58) (17.98) (16.21) (16.57) (16.23)
% Hispanic 34.04 34.33 29.37 30.21 30.88
(30.46) (30.31) (28.25) (28.18) (28.11)
% Minority 47.73 47.61 40.02 41.07 41.60
(30.81) (30.73) (29.50) (29.61) (29.53)
% Poor 34.42 34.19 37.21 38.01 39.34
(23.15) (22.72) (21.01) (21.41) (21.69)
N 1101 1100 1097 1087 1094
Notes: The table consists of means with standard deviations in parentheses
School size is in number of students.
Instructional costs are per pupil and in constant 2001 dollars.
Teacher’s experience is the average number of years of experience per teacher.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics by Period
Variable \ Time Period Pre Post
% TakingExam—Graduate 64.74 62.52
(14.47) (14.50)
School Size 832.01 876.49
(800.15) (845.05)
Instructional Costs 3614.53 4032.62
(1342.57) (1104.68)
Teacher’s Experience 12.33 12.84
(2.28) (2.17)
Student\Teacher Ratio 13.44 12.81
(2.93) (2.81)
% Black 10.84 10.64
(16.79) (16.35)
% Hispanic 27.16 29.59
(27.98) (28.08)
% Minority 38.00 40.23
(29.09) (29.39)
% Poor 35.07 37.88
(19.83) (20.94)
N 1148 1148
The table consists of means with standard
deviations in parentheses.
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Table 4.3: Cross-Period Differences
Differences Sample
Means
∆Colladmpost−pre −2.22 Colladm 63.3
(9.69) (16.48)
∆(Student\Teacher Ratio)post−pre −.625 Student\TeacherRatio 13.17
(1.22) (2.98)
∆(Teacher′s Experience)post−pre .519 Teacher′sExperience 12.64
(1.47) (2.37)
∆(School Size)post−pre 44.48 SchoolSize 874.06
(175.48) (830.63)
∆(Per Pupil Costs)post−pre 418.08 PerPupilCosts 3800.911
(1160.36) (1080.80)
∆(%Poor)post−pre 2.82 %Poor 36.31
(7.33) (20.77)
∆(%Black)post−pre −.196 %Black 10.88
(2.68) (16.66)
∆(%Hispanic)post−pre 2.43 %Hispanic 28.45
(3.58) (28.16)
N 1148 N 9875
[No. of schools] [school− by − year]
Notes: This table presents the difference in means between the pre and post periods.
The second column contains the average differences in the variables for schools
that appeared at least once in both the pre and post periods.
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Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
School Size .0017 −.0006 −.0003
(.0003) (.0009) (.0009)
Instructional Costs .0009 .00001 .00003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Student\Teacher Ratio −.932 −.091 −.098
(.096) (.100) (.100)
Teacher Experience .860 .091 .101
(.070) (.094) .094)
% Disadvantaged −.281 −.018 −.019
(.013) (.020) (.020)
% Hispanic .044 −.365 −.371
(.010) (.047) (.047)
% Black −.064 −.134 −.146
(.011) (.062) (.062)
Post −2.90 . −2.92
(.621) . (.423)
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
N 9875 9875 9875
R2 .132 .041 .044
Model 1 is pooled OLS.
Model 2 and Model 3 are fixed effects specifications.
The above models control for the presence of linear time trends.
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Table 4.5a: Descriptive Statistics by School Type: Pre-Period
Variable \ School Type Poor Non-Poor Hispanic Non-Hispanic
% Taking Exam|Graduate 58.95 66.22 60.57 65.77
(15.19) (13.90) (15.06) (14.13)
School Size 787.26 843.47 1086.66 768.91
(791.86) (802.29) (874.71) (768.13)
Instructional Costs 4041.36 3505.26 3613.72 3614.74
(2450.62) (820.48) (902.95) (1431.18)
Teacher’s Experience 11.62 12.51 11.95 12.42
(2.61) (2.14) (2.35) (2.25)
Student\Teacher Ratio 12.72 13.62 13.91 13.32
(3.30) (2.79) (3.15) (2.86)
% Black 10.36 10.96 3.12 12.75
(20.96) (15.56) (5.41) (18.06)
% Hispanic 60.08 18.73 76.19 15.01
(33.14) (18.82) (17.20) (12.65)
% Minority 70.45 29.69 79.31 27.76
(27.75) (22.96) (16.28) (21.50)
% Poor 65.86 27.18 58.62 29.23
(11.72) (12.39) (17.46) (15.60)
N 234 914 228 920
Notes:The table consists of means with standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 4.5b: Descriptive Statistics by School Type: Pre-Period
Variable \ School Type Black Non-Black Minority Non-Minority
% Taking Exam|Graduate 62.10 65.38 58.54 66.28
(13.22) (14.69) (14.69) (14.00)
School Size 1025.66 784.81 1244.34 729.83
(808.58 (791.37) (874.71) (757.40)
Instructional Costs 3438.12 3657.54 3429.51 3660.39
(784.29) (1443.42) (821.03) (1439.64)
Teacher’s Experience 13.20 12.12 12.52 12.28
(2.21) (2.24) (2.55) (2.20)
Student\Teacher Ratio 14.39 13.21 14.96 13.06
(3.00) (2.86) (3.10) (2.76)
% Black 37.86 4.25 18.78 8.87
(20.91) (4.79) (29.52) (10.83)
% Hispanic 15.02 30.12 67.85 17.07
(14.16) (29.67) (30.38) (15.38)
% Minority 52.88 34.37 86.63 25.94
(24.04) (29.07) (11.25) (17.10)
% Poor 36.52 34.71 58.41 29.28
(16.00) (20.64) (18.59) (15.38)
N 225 923 228 920
The table consists of means with standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 4.6a: School-Type Comparisons—Conditional on Schools being Poor
School Type Hispanic Black Minority Non-Hispanic Non-Black Non-Minority
Hispanic 147 2 127 0 145 20
Black 39 22 37 0 17
Minority 147 20 125 0
Non-Hispanic 87 50 67
Non-Black 195 70
Non-Minority 87
Table 6a allows allows one to identify the number of schools that overlap with respect to two types
given that the schools are classified as being Poor. The diagonal entries contain the number of
schools that are Hispanic, Black, Minority, Non-Hispanic, Non-Black, and Non-Hispanic, respectively.
For example, to figure out the percentage of Hispanic schools that are Black, given that the schools in
the table are classified as Poor, you would take the entry from M12 and divide it by the entry from
M11, which is
2
147 or 1.36%. There are 234 Poor schools.
Table 4.6b: School-Type Comparisons—Conditional on Schools being Non-Poor.
School Type Hispanic Black Minority Non-Hispanic Non-Black Non-Minority
Hispanic 81 5 45 0 70 36
Black 186 41 181 0 145
Minority 81 36 40 0
Non-Hispanic 833 652 797
Non-Black 728 688
Non-Minority 833
Table 6b allows allows one to identify the number of schools that overlap with respect to two types
given that the schools are classified as being Poor. The diagonal entries contain the number of
schools that are Hispanic, Black, Minority, Non-Hispanic, Non-Black, and Non-Hispanic, respectively.
For example, to figure out the percentage of Hispanic schools that are Black, given that the schools in
the table are classified as Poor, you would take the entry from M12 and divide it by the entry from
M11, which is
5
81 or 6.17%. There are 234 Poor schools.
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Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post −2.71 −3.00 −3.35 −3.65
(.271) (.359) (.305) (.404)
Poor −26.50 . . .
(.484) . . .
Post*Poor −2.60 . . .
(.659) . . .
Hispanic . −23.21 . .
. (.503) . .
Post*Hispanic . −1.70 . .
. (.630) . .
Black . . −18.93 .
. . (.354) .
Post*Black . . 1.69 .
. . (.525) .
Minority . . . −21.92
. . . (.388)
Post*Minority . . . .801
. . . (.672)
NGroups 18 18 18 18
R2 .9983 .9977 .9971 .9964
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Only the coefficients of interest are shown.
Results are from a regression of group means that have been
regression adjusted for covariates that vary within group on
covariates that do not vary at the group level.
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This dissertation is a collection of papers that examine the impact of legal challenges
to Affirmative Action and the subsequent policy responses on educational outcomes. The
first chapter examined the impact of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger
and Grutter v. Bollinger on applications and admissions at the University of Michigan.
The second and third chapters examine the impact of Hopwood v. Texas and Texas’s Top
Ten Percent Rule (TTTPR) on score report sending behavior and the rate at which the
graduates of Texas high schools attempt admissions examinations, respectively.
In the first chapter, I find that the pool of applicants changed. The size of the applicant
pool changed, as well as the racial/ethnic makeup.The academic quality of the applicant
pool, as measured by average SAT scores and average ACT scores, increased. The pool
of admitted students changed as well. The academic quality of the admitted students
increased; however, the increase wasn’t as large as the increase in the academic quality of
the applicant pool. With respect to the probability of admission, I find no evidence that
the probability of admissions declined for black applicants, a finding that was contrary to
expectations. I also show that the admission probabilities of whites and asians with rela-
tively low selection index scores, the metric I use to identify similar applicants, converged,
somewhat, after the Supreme Court decisions, with the advantage that white applicants
with low selection index scores had over Asian applicants with low selection index scores
declining.
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The above findings should be interpreted with caution. There were discrepancies in one
of the data sets I used to produce my estimates. Namely, the admissions data set had too
many Hispanic students; therefore, I excluded Hispanics from the portion of the analysis
that compared intertemporal changes in the probability of admission. This is a weakness
of the analysis, as I am unable to analyze the impact of the changes in the admissions
regime on one of the largest under-represented minority groups.
In addition, the analysis in the first chapter exploited the fact that the two samples
were purportedly independently drawn ninety percent random samples of applicant and
admits. The discrepancy with the Hispanic implies that the data wasn’t a ninety percent
random sample. This likely affects the results.
The questions that I address in this article have important policy implications. As such,
the data used to inform policy should be as consistent as possible. In future research, I
intend to use a complete and accurate data set. Such data minimizes the need for statis-
tical assumptions and maximizes the reliability of the results obtained from the empirical
investigation.
This paper examines the impact of both Texas’s Top Ten Percent Rule (TTPR) and
the targeted recruitment and financial aid programs instituted by the University of Texas
Austin and Texas A&M-College Station on the score-report sending behavior—our proxy
for applying to a particular college—of Texas’s public high school students. Recall that
TTPR grants automatic admission to any Texas public college or university to any graduate
of a Texas high school—public or private—who finishes in the top decile of her class and
completes the admission process within two years of graduating. TTPR was intended to
restore minority enrollment at Texas’s elite institutions, the University of Texas at Austin
and Texas A&M-College Station.
I find that evidence that the Top Ten Percent rule matters and that the effects vary
according to self-reported class rank. Students in the top decile under TTPR are less likely
to submit score reports to more than four schools, less likely to submit to non-selective
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institutions, and more likely to submit to selective institutions in Texas. Students in the
first decile under TTPR are less likely to submit score reports to non-selective institutions.
Students in the fourth and fifth quintiles under TTPR are more likely to send score reports
to non-selective institutions.
I also find evidence that students from high schools that are eligible for the Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship program who self-report as being ranked in the top three rank
classifications increase the likelihood that they submit an application to the University
of Texas at Austin. The effects of the Century Scholar program on the likelihood that
students from designated high schools submit score reports to Texas A&M are smaller in
magnitude relative to the effects of the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program and
are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Both programs increase the likelihood that
students in the top decile submit score reports to selective institutions in Texas.
The analysis of the top ten percent rule on score report sending behavior shows that the
inter-temporal variation in the importance of class rank to the admissions decision does
influence the score-report sending behavior of SAT test takers in Texas. The Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship program demonstrates that it is possible to successfully recruit
at high schools with a high percentage of minorities in an environment where race can’t be
used explicitly. The relative lack of success of the Century Scholar program suggests that
targeted recruitment isn’t necessarily a panacea for minority enrollment deficits. Knowl-
edge of how these race-neutral programs affect student choice is important as race-sensitive
admissions and recruiting programs remain a contentious issue.
Access to education at elite institutions in the United States is highly competitive. The
use of race-conscious admissions policies and race-neutral admissions in determining who
deserves access to education at elite universities remains contentious. This dissertation
contributes to understanding how these policies affect how students select colleges and
how an elite institution distributes access.
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ABSTRACT




Co-Chairs: Kerwin K. Charles and Sheldon H. Danziger
The first chapter of the dissertation explores the impact of the United State’s Supreme
Court’s 2003 decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger on applications
and admissions at an elite public university. The decisions proscribed the use of point
systems; however, they permitted the use of race in a holistic review. I find that the size
of the applicant pool declined and that the academic quality of applicants and admits
increased. I find no evidence that the conditional probability of admissions declined for
black applicants or that the advantage that white applicants with relatively low selection
index scores held over Asian applicants with similar scores declined.
The second chapter examines the impacts of both Texas’s Top Ten Percent Rule (TTTPR)
and targeted recruitment programs on the score report sending behavior of SAT test-takers
in Texas. Texas’s Top Ten Percent Rule guarantees admission to any public college in Texas
to high school graduates who finish in the top decile. Using SAT data and Texas High
School data, I examine the score report sending behavior of SAT takers by self-reported
class rank. I find that TTTPR affects score report sending behavior and that the effects
vary with self-reported rank. I find that the targeted financial aid program instituted by
the University of Texas was successful in attracting score reports, a proxy for applications,
from targeted high schools; the program instituted by Texas A&M-College Station was not
as successful.
The third chapter examines the effects of the implementation of Texas’s Top Ten Percent
Rule on the rate at which graduates from Texas’s high school attempt an admissions
examination, a proxy for applying to a more selective college. Using high school level
data from the Academic Excellence Indicator System, I find a decrease in the percentage
of graduates who attempt an admissions examination and that the decrease is larger at
schools that had student bodies with socioeconomically disadvantaged students or high
schools with student bodies that had a high percentage of Hispanic Students.
